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Abstract
To address information security threats, an organization defines security policies
that state how to deal with sensitive information. These policies are high-level
policies that apply for the whole organization and span the three security do-
mains: physical, digital and social. One example of a high-level policy is: ”The
sales data should never leave the organization.” The high-level policies are refined
by the Human Resources (HR), Physical Security and IT departments into imple-
mentable, low-level policies, which are enforced via physical and digital security
mechanisms and training of the employees. One example of low-level policy is:
”There should be a firewall on every external-facing system”.
The erroneous refinement of a high-level policy into a low-level policy can intro-
duce design weaknesses in the security posture of the organization. For example,
although there is a low-level policy that places firewalls on every external-facing
system, an adversary may still obtain the sales data through copying it on a USB
stick. In addition, the erroneous enforcement of a low-level policy using a specific
security mechanisms may introduce implementation flaws. For example, although
there might be a firewall on every external-facing system, the firewall might not
be configured correctly. The organization needs assurance that these errors are
discovered and mitigated.
In this thesis we provide methods for testing whether (a) the high-level policies
are correctly refined into low-level policies that span the physical, digital and
social domain, and (b) whether low-level policies are correctly enforced is specific
mechanisms. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1. We propose a formal framework, Portunes, which addresses the correct re-
finement of high level policies by generating attack scenarios that violate a
high-level policy without violating any low-level policies. Portunes binds
the three security domains in a single formalism and enables the analysis of
policies that span the three domains. We provide a proof of concept imple-
mentation of Portunes in a tool and polynomial time algorithms to generate
the attack scenarios.
2. We propose a modal logic for defining more expressive high-level policies.
We use the logic to express properties of Portunes models and model evolu-
tions formally. We provide a proof of concept implementation of the logic
in the Portunes tool.
3. We propose two methodologies for physical penetration testing using social
engineering to address the correct enforcement of low-level policies. Both
methodologies are designed to reduce the impact of the test on the employ-
ees and on the personal relations between the employees. The methodolo-
gies result in a more ethical assessment of the implementation of security
mechanisms in the physical and social domain.
4. We provide an assessment of the commonly used security mechanisms in
reducing laptop theft. We evaluate the effectiveness of existing physical
and social security mechanisms for protecting laptops based on (1) logs
from security guards regarding laptop thefts that occurred in a period of two
years in two universities in the Netherlands, and (2) the results from more
than 30 simulated thefts using the methodologies in contribution 3. The
results of the assessment can aid in reducing laptop theft in organizations.
5. We propose a practical assignment of an information security master course
where students get practical insight into attacks that use physical, digital and
social means. The assignment is based on the penetration testing method-
ologies from contribution 3. The goal of the assignment is to give a broad
overview of security to the students and to increase their interest in the field.
Besides for educational purposes, the assignment can be used to increase the
security awareness of the employees and provide material for future security
awareness trainings.
Using these contributions, security professionals can better assess and improve
the security landscape of an organization.
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Samenvatting
Om informatiebeveiligingsrisico’s het hoofd te bieden, stellen organisaties een
beveiligingsbeleid op hoofdlijnen op, dat bepaalt hoe omgegaan dient te worden
met gevoelige informatie. Dit beleid is geldig voor de gehele organisatie en heeft
betrekking op drie beveiligingsdomeinen: fysiek, digitaal en sociaal. Een voor-
beeld van dergelijk beleid is ”Verkoopgegevens mogen nooit buiten de organisatie
komen.” Het beleid wordt door de afdelingen van Personeel en Organisatie (P&O),
IT en fysieke beveiliging verder uitgewerkt in gedetailleerde beveiligingsregels,
die worden afgedwongen door fysieke en digitale beveiligingsmechanismen, en
door training van medewerkers. Een voorbeeld van zo’n regel is ”Elk van buiten
toegankelijk systeem moet een firewall hebben.”
Fouten die optreden bij de vertaling van het beleid naar concrete regels of van
regels naar specifieke beveiligingsmechanismen, kunnen het beveiligingsniveau
van de organisatie aantasten. Alhoewel er een regel is die firewalls verplicht
stelt, kan een aanvaller bijvoorbeeld toch de verkoopdata verkrijgen door deze
op een USB stick te kopiren. Bovendien kunnen er in de handhaving van de gede-
tailleerde regels implementatiefouten zitten. Zo kan de firewall wellicht onjuist
geconfigureerd zijn. Organisaties moeten daarom de zekerheid hebben dat deze
fouten ontdekt en gerepareerd worden.
In dit proefschrift ontwikkelen we methoden om te testen of (a) het beveiligings-
beleid op correcte wijze is uitgewerkt in beveiligingsregels (fysiek, digitaal en
sociaal) correct is, en (b) deze regels op correcte wijze gehandhaafd worden door
beveiligingsmechanismen. Onze bijdragen zijn als volgt samen te vatten:
1. We introduceren een formeel raamwerk, Portunes, dat onderdeel (a) uitwerkt
door aanvalsscenario’s te genereren die het beveiligingsbeleid overtreden,
zonder daarbij de gedetailleerde beveiligingsregels te doorbreken. Portunes
kan de drie beveiligingsdomeinen in n model representeren, en de bijbe-
horende beveiligingsregels analyseren. We beschrijven een proof-of-concept
implementatie van Portunes in een tool en algoritmen die in polynomische
tijd aanvalsscenario’s genereren.
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2. We presenteren een modale logica voor het definiren van geavanceerder
beveiligingsbeleid op hoofdlijnen. We gebruiken deze logica om eigen-
schappen van Portunes modellen en hun evoluties formeel uit te drukken.
We presenteren tevens een proof-of-concept implementatie van deze logica
in de Portunes tool.
3. We stellen twee methoden voor om on-site penetratietesten uit te voeren
gebruikmakend van social engineering, als uitwerking van onderdeel (b).
Beide methodologien zijn ontwikkeld om de impact van de testen op de
medewerkers en hun onderlinge relaties zo veel mogelijk te beperken, en
daarmee een meer verantwoorde beoordeling van de implementatie van beveilig-
ing in het fysieke en sociale domein mogelijk te maken.
4. We presenteren een evaluatie van de meestgebruikte beveiligingsmechanis-
men om laptopdiefstal te reduceren. We evalueren de effectiviteit middels
de analyse van (1) rapporten van beveiligingsmedewekers met betrekking
tot laptopdiefstallen die hebben plaatsgevonden in een periode van twee
jaar bij twee Nederlandse universiteiten, en (2) de resultaten van meer dan
30 gesimuleerde laptopdiefstallen op basis van de methoden van bijdrage
3. De resultaten kunnen helpen om laptopdiefstal in de betreffende organ-
isaties te beperken.
5. We presenteren een opdracht in de context van een mastervak informatiebeveilig-
ing, waarin studenten praktische inzichten verkrijgen in aanvallen die fysieke,
digitale, en sociale technieken gebruiken. De opdracht is gebaseerd op de
technieken voor penetratietesten uit bijdrage 3.Het doel van de opdracht is
het geven van een breed perspectief op informatiebeveiliging en het ver-
groten van de interesse van de studenten in het vakgebied. Naast onderwi-
jsdoeleinden kan de opdracht ook gebruikt worden om het beveiligingsbe-
wustzijn van medewerkers te vergroten. Ook levert de opdracht materiaal
voor toekomstige security awareness trainingen.
Met behulp van deze bijdragen kunnen professionals op het gebied van infor-
matiebeveiliging het beveiligingslandschap van een organisatie doeltreffender beo-
ordelen en verbeteren.
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Introduction
”Confidential information on almost 130,000 prisoners and dangerous criminals,
which was stored on an unencrypted computer memory stick, has been lost by the
Home Office, sparking yet another Government data crisis.”
The Telegraph, 22.08.2008
”Soldier smuggled highly classified data out of his intelligence unit on a disc dis-
guised as a music CD [...] He is suspected of disclosing more than 150,000 diplo-
matic cables, more than 90,000 intelligence reports on the war in Afghanistan and
one video of a military helicopter attack - all of it classified. Most of the information
was given to WikiLeaks.”
The New York Times 08.07.2010, 07.04.2011
”The Stuxnet worm, designed to be delivered through a removable drive like a USB
stick [...] was designed specifically to attack the Siemens-designed working system
of the Bushehr plant and appears to have infected the system via the laptops and
USB drives of Russian technicians who had been working there.”
Guardian 26.09.2010 02.10.2010
.
1.1 Introduction
The threat of a security breach and loss of sensitive information forces organiza-
tions to provide secure and safe environments where the information is stored and
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Figure 1.1: High-level policies are refined into low-level, implementable policies. The majority
of the current IT research (dashed line) focuses on modeling and analysis of the digital aspect of
security, limiting the expressiveness of the models to attacks where the adversary uses only digital
means to achieve her goal. The focus of this thesis is the modeling and analysis of attacks where
the adversary uses physical, digital and social means (solid line).
processed. An organization protects sensitive information by developing a secu-
rity program. The security program starts with the management defining all se-
curity requirements through high-level security policies. These policies describe
the desired behavior of the employees (social domain), the physical security of
the premises where the employees work (physical domain) and the IT security of
the stored and processed information (digital domain) [88]. After the high-level
policies have been designed, the Human Resources (HR), Physical Security and
IT departments refine these policies into implementable, low-level policies [17],
which are enforced via physical and digital security mechanisms and training of
the employees.
During the refinement and enforcement of the policies mistakes may occur. These
mistakes could be exploited by both external parties as well as disgruntled em-
ployees, insiders, to achieve a malicious goal. Therefore, the management needs
assurance that both refinement and enforcement are done correctly. This assurance
is achieved in two steps: auditing and penetration testing. During the auditing pro-
cess, auditors assess whether the security policies produced by the departments
6
1.2. Motivating example
are correct with respect to the policies defined by the management. After the poli-
cies from the departments have been audited, penetration testers test the security
mechanisms correctly enforce the policies from the departments.
Both auditing and penetration testing are mature fields in information security
and follow methodologies that aim for reliable, repeatable and reportable results.
However, the attention to the physical and social domain in these methodologies
is limited (Figure 1.1). Unfortunately, the adversaries do not limit their actions
only to the digital domain but they use any weak link they can find, regardless of
the domain. The lack of methodologies for auditing and testing the alignment of
security policies across all three domains makes an organization vulnerable to an
attack where the adversary combines physical, digital and social actions to achieve
her goal.
This thesis focuses on assessing the security of an organization by methodolog-
ical and experimental tool support for the specification and analysis of security
policies that span the three domains, as well as enforcement of these policies via
security mechanisms. We show how the contributions in the thesis can help in
mitigating the threat from insider attacks, where employees with intimate knowl-
edge of the limitations and the gaps in the existing security policies and security
mechanisms obtain access to sensitive information.
1.2 Motivating example
The management of a fictitious organization ACME has defined a set of high-
level policies that allow the organization to mitigate security threats and support
business processes. For example, to comply with legislation the management has
defined the high-level policy HLP1: Aggregate sales data should be given to all
shareholders. In the past few years ACME has grown rapidly, causing a shortage
of working places for the employees in its facility. As a response, the management
produced the policyHLP2: One quarter of the employees should work from home.
Recently, the management identified a new threat. A new competitor is entering
the market, offering the same services as ACME. The management wishes to pro-
tect its client information from the threat of industrial theft and introduces a new
high-level policy HLP3: Sales data should not leave the financial department.
This policy is implemented by the departments for physical security, IT security
and HR (human resources). In turn, each of the departments refines the policy
from management into a set of more specific threats with concomitant security
policies in their domain.
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High-level threat: The competitors get the list of clients.
High-level policy from management:
Sales data should not leave the financial department.
Domain Example low-level threat Example low-level policies
All windows should be locked.
Physical Hard drives get stolen from the office Enforce two-factor authentication on all
entrance doors of the department.
Kensington locks on all computers.
Monitor all network traffic.
Digital Malware infection from the Internet Forbid remote connections on the
computers.
Forbid software download.
Forbid bringing non-employees at work.
Social Employee discloses information Forbid sharing any sales information
with non-employees.
Forbid employees sharing security
policies with competitor employees.
Figure 1.2: A high-level policy and the response from each of the three departments
Table 1.2 provides one representative sample threat identified by each department
and three sample policies introduced to mitigate the sample threats. In reality,
the number of identified threats and the number of low-level policies that mitigate
these treats is much larger and depends on the size and the security requirements
of the organization.
Each of the three departments focuses on security policies that mitigate threats
from their domain, and relies on policies from the other departments for the other
domains. For example, the IT department focuses only on threats from malicious
outsiders using remote access. The IT department relies on the physical security
department to provide physical isolation between the data and non-employees and
on the HR department to educate the employees against being tricked into giving
the data away.
However, a number of actions allowed in one domain, when combined with al-
lowed actions from the other two domains, may lead to an undesired behavior.
Consider the road apple attack:
The competitor leaves a number of dongles with malicious software in front
of the premises of the organization. An employee takes one of the dongles
and plugs it in his computer in the financial department. When plugged in,
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the malicious software uses the employee credentials to get the sales data,
encrypts the data and sends it to a remote server.
In this example the competitor obtains the sales data by intelligently combining
the unawareness of the employee, the inability of the doors to stop the dongle
and the inability of the firewalls to inspect encrypted traffic. However, none of
the departments can individually produce all policies that will stop this attack,
because for some policies there are no mechanisms that can enforce them, or the
departments cannot identify a threat in their domain that requires such a policy.
The management must be assured that the low-level policies stop all forbidden
behaviors and allow all allowed behaviors. Thus, the policies should not only
mitigate attacks that use purely digital, physical or social actions, but also any
combination of them.
Problem 1: How can the management be sure that the total set of low-level poli-
cies produced by the three departments matches their high-level policy?
After the low-level policies have been defined, technicians and trainers implement
security mechanisms to enforce them. Even if the policies address all allowed and
forbidden behaviors, there might still be mistakes in their enforcement. Techni-
cians might put the wrong lock on a door, an employee might ignore or forget
some of the policies or some computers might be misconfigured and still accept
remote connections. Therefore the departments need to be able to test whether
the security policies are properly enforced. These tests should include attempts
of gaining physical access to the restricted areas, as well as attempts in tricking
the employees to violate a policy. However, organizations are reluctant to execute
these tests, because they fear that the tests may stress the employees when asked
to violate a policy or disrupt the working process because of accidental damage
during the physical access, which results in financial loss.
Problem 2: How can the three departments be sure that the security mechanisms
in place are following the design specifications of the low-level policies?
1.3 Policy alignment
Policies can be defined at different level of abstraction. In this thesis we use a
view of the world as presented by Abrams, Olson and Bailey [73, 10].
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Definition 1. Policy alignment is the process of adjusting security policies among
different levels of abstraction to support the business goals of the organization.
Policy alignment consists of horizontal alignment of high-level policies, vertical
alignment of high-level policies into low-level policies and enforcement of low-
level policies via security mechanisms.
Definition 2. Policy refinement is the process of defining multiple policies with a
greater level of detail for a given general policy.
The refinement step should be repeated for each level of abstraction, starting from
the policies defined on the highest level of abstraction, toward policies to a lower
level of abstraction [73]. To simplify the presentation, we use just two levels of
abstraction for the policies.
Definition 3. High-level policies are statements that allow or forbid a set of be-
haviors.
A behavior is a sequence of actions, where an action is a discrete event that cannot
be broken up further. For example, the road apple attack is a behavior which con-
sists of the actions: competitor leaves the dongle, an employee takes the dongle,
an employee plugs the dongle in her computer, the malicious software gets the
data, the software encrypts the data and the software sends the encrypted data to
a remote server.
The high-level policies divide the space of possible behaviors into behaviors that
are allowed, behaviors that are forbidden and behaviors that are neither forbidden
nor allowed. In the motivating example HLP1 and HLP2 define two sets of be-
haviors that are allowed, while HLP3 defines a set of behaviors that is forbidden.
All other behaviors are neither allowed nor disallowed.
Definition 4. Low-level policies are implementable rules close to the abstraction
level of security mechanisms.
The low-level policies focus on events rather than on behaviors. Since an event
can either occur or not but not both, the low-level policies either allow or forbid
an action, dividing the space of possible actions into two disjunct sets. A behavior
is allowed by the low-level policies if all the actions it consists of are allowed by
the low-level policies. A behavior is forbidden by the low-level policies if at least
one of its actions is forbidden by the low-level policies.
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Sales data should never leave the organization.
Low-level policies that enable employees to work
from home.
2
1
:
a :
a
Some employees should work from home.
Low-level policies that forbid the sales data leaving
the organization.
Figure 1.3: Ideally, there is no gap nor conflict between high-level policies, and
all high-level policies are completely refined into low-level policies.
Undefined
ForbiddenAllowed
Conflicting
Allowed: Aggregate sales data should be given
to all shareholders.
Forbidden:
Undefined:
Sales data should not leave the
financial department.
Any data other than the sales data.
Figure 1.4: High-level policies may conflict with each other or might be not de-
fined.
1.3.1 Horizontal alignment of policies
Definition 5. A set of high-level policies is mutually consistent if there is no be-
havior that is both allowed and forbidden by the policies.
Definition 6. A set of high-level policies is jointly exhaustive if every behavior is
either allowed or forbidden by the policies.
Definition 7. Horizontal policy alignment is the process of positioning high-level
policies that are at the same level of abstraction so that they are mutually consis-
tent and jointly exhaustive.
Consistency between policies means that the policies should not conflict with each
other and exhaustiveness means that the policies address all possible behaviors
that might occur.
In the motivating example, the organization has a high-level policy that enforces
a behavior: Aggregate sales data should be given to all shareholders. With the
introduction of the policy that forbids a behavior: Sales data should not leave
the financial department the set of high-level policies is not consistent anymore.
There is a conflict between the two policies, because the first policy forbids the
sales data leaving the financial department, while the second policy requires some
of the sales data to leave the organization.
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On the other hand, the absence of high-level policies allowing or forbidding a
behavior may introduce a gap in security. In the motivating example, there will be
no mechanism that stops an employee giving data other than the sales data to the
competitors, because what happens with the rest of the data is not addressed by
any of the high-level policies. Since the management has no clear policy on this
behavior, security professionals would not know whether to allow or forbid it.
1.3.2 Vertical alignment of policies
Definition 8. A set of low-level policies is complete with respect to a set of high-
level policies if every behavior allowed by the high-level policies is allowed by
the low-level policies and every behavior forbidden by the high-level policies is
forbidden by the low-level policies [10].
Definition 9. Vertical policy alignment is the process of refining the high-level
policies into low-level policies so that the low-level policies are complete with
respect to the high-level policies.
Even when a set of high-level policies is exhaustive and consistent, the refinement
of high-level, organizational policies to low-level, implementable policies may
still be incomplete. A high-level policy might be refined into overly permissive
or overly restrictive low-level policies, which introduces an opportunity for an
adversary to violate the high-level policy (Figure 1.3).
In the motivating example, overly permissive low-level policies such as allowing
employees to bring storage devices to work and allowing dongles to be plugged
in the computer allow the violation of the high-level policy HLP3.
There might be two cases when a set of low-level policies is not complete:
• A behavior that is allowed by a high-level policy is forbidden by the low-
level policies (area C1 from Figure 1.5). Such conflicts occur because the
high-level policy is refined in overly restrictive low-level policies. In the
motivating example, if an employee tries to work from home, she will be
stopped by the low-level security policy: ”Forbid remote connections on
the computers”.
• A behavior that is forbidden by a high-level policy is allowed by the low-
level policies (area C2). Such conflicts occur because the high-level policy
is refined into low-level policies that are too permissive. In the motivating
example, the road apple attack occurs because the low-level policies are too
permissive. The policies allow the employees to bring storage devices at
work and allow dongles to be plugged in the computers.
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Sales data should never leave the organization.
An employee cannot log-in from home.
The data is moved to a remote server.
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Figure 1.5: In a realistic case, there are behaviors that are allowed by the high-
level policies but are forbidden by the low-level policies (C1), and behaviors that
are forbidden by the high-level policies but yet the low-level policies allow them
(C2).
One possible approach in addressing Problem 1 from Section 1.2 is providing a
formal assessment whether the low-level policies are complete with respect to the
high-level policies. The first part of the thesis uses this approach to address the
problem.
1.3.3 Policy enforcement
Definition 10. Policy enforcement is a process where low-level policies are en-
forced via security mechanisms.
During policy enforcement, the security and IT departments place security mech-
anisms that enforce the low-level policies from the physical and digital domain,
and the HR department educates the employees on which actions are forbidden.
To test whether the set of security mechanisms is complete, testers check whether
these mechanisms are sufficient to enforce the policies. Such tests are done using
social engineering in the social domain, physical access in the physical domain
and hacking in the digital domain.
Definition 11. A set of security mechanisms is complete with respect to a set
of low-level policies, if every action that is allowed by the low-level policies is
allowed by the mechanisms, and every action that is forbidden by the low-level
policies is forbidden by the mechanisms.
In the motivating example, the penetration testers would test whether the employ-
ees when politely asked would let a foreign person inside the financial department,
or test whether the computers have remote access disabled.
One possible approach in addressing Problem 2 from Section 1.2 is orchestrating
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ethical penetration tests that include obtaining physical access and usage of so-
cial engineering. The second part of the thesis uses this approach to address the
problem.
1.4 Research question
This thesis tackles the problem of policy alignment across the three security do-
mains. The focus of the thesis is assessing the vertical policy alignment from
high-level to low-level security policies and testing the enforcement of low-level
security policies via security mechanisms.
The main research question we seek to answer in the thesis is:
Main research question: How can we align and enforce security poli-
cies spanning the physical, digital and social domain?
Aligning security policies across domains requires three preliminaries. First, the
departments should not work in isolation but cooperate in aligning the policies.
To work together, the departments need a common language for representing the
policies and specify a behavior. Second, obtaining a complete set of behaviors
that violate a policy requires exhaustive search on all possible behaviors that can
occur for the given low-level policies. Finally, policy testing requires the usage of
social engineering and attempts in obtaining physical access.
To address these issues, we refine the main research question in the following re-
fined research questions:
Research question 1: How can we represent the policies from the three
domains in one formal framework?
Representing all three security domains in a single formalism is challenging.
Firstly, the appropriate abstraction level needs to be found. A too low-level of
abstraction for each domain (down to the individual atoms, bits or conversation
dynamics) makes the representation complicated and unusable. However, ab-
stracting away from physical spaces, data and relations between people might
ignore details that contribute to an attack. Secondly, the domains have different
properties making them hard to integrate. For example, mobility of digital data is
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less restricted than mobility of objects in the physical domain. Likewise, physical
objects cannot be reproduced as easily as digital data.
Research question 2: How can we efficiently discover all cross-domain
threats caused by policy misalignment?
Having a formal definition of the environment allows formal methods and tools
to exhaustively search all possible behaviors that can occur in the organization.
This list of allowed behaviors can then be compared to the behaviors that are al-
lowed by the high-level policies to assess whether any of the produced behaviors
is forbidden by the high-level policies. The challenge of this approach is to make
it scalable and to ease the assessment of the large amount of behaviors it produces.
Research question 3: How can we test and improve the enforcement
of the low-level policies?
Addressing the third refined research question rises three challenges. First, during
a penetration test the testers use social engineering on the employees and try to
obtain physical access to a specific resource or location. Social engineering al-
ways includes some form of deception of the employee, which in turn may cause
stress, discomfort or even disgruntlement among employees.
Second, the deployment of security mechanisms and training of the employees is
limited by a fixed budget. Currently, the organizations have no clear overview of
the effect of security mechanisms from one domain on the security in the other
domains. Without a clear overview on how security mechanisms from the three
domains supplement each other, it is challenging to prioritize security mechanisms
deployment.
Finally, to perform good quality tests, the testers should have training in exploiting
vulnerabilities in each of the domains and how have in-depth knowledge on how
the vulnerabilities relate between each other. Universities are an excellent location
to provide this education, because they can provide environment where the testers
can test vulnerabilities and expose them to the ethical implications of penetration
testing. However, teaching penetration testing at university level raises the issue
whether the students will abuse the obtained skills and knowledge.
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1.5 Contribution
This thesis provides methodological and experimental tool support to assess com-
pleteness of the policy refinement and techniques for testing the policy enforce-
ment. The results from this thesis can be used as a mitigation of the threat from
insider attacks. In detail, the contributions of this thesis can be summarized as
follows:
• A FRAMEWORK that binds the three domains in a single formalism. We
present Portunes, a formal framework which integrates all three security
domains in a single environment, thereby enabling analysis of policies that
span the three domains. Portunes consists of a graph and a language, that
describe a model of the environment of interest at a different level of ab-
straction. The graph is a visual representation of the environment focusing
on the relations between the three security domains. It provides a concep-
tual overview of the environment that is easy to understand by the user. The
language is at a relatively low level of abstraction, close to the enforcement
mechanisms. The language is able to describe low-level security policies
as predicates and behaviors as process definitions. We provide a proof of
concept implementation of Portunes and polynomial time algorithms that
produce possible behaviors for a given Portunes model.
• A LOGIC for defining high-level policies. We propose a modal logic to de-
scribe high-level policies and to express properties of Portunes models and
model evolutions formally. The logic is used to find subsets of actions that
lead to violation of a high-level policy. The logic enables security profes-
sionals to focus only on subsets of attack scenarios that share a common
property. We provide a proof of concept implementation of the logic in the
Portunes tool.
• TWO METHODOLOGIES for physical penetration testing using social en-
gineering. The goal of the penetration tests is to gain possession of an asset
from the premises of the organization by using a combination of hacking,
physical access and social engineering. Both methodologies are designed to
reduce the impact of the test on the employees and the relationship between
the employees.
16
1.5. Contribution
• AN ASSESSMENT of the commonly used security mechanisms in reduc-
ing laptop theft. We evaluated the effectiveness of existing physical and
social security mechanisms for protecting laptops based on (1) logs of lap-
top thefts which occurred in a period of two years in two universities in
Netherlands, and (2) the results from more than 30 penetration tests we or-
chestrated over the last three years, where students tried to gain possession
of marked laptops in the same universities. The results from the log analysis
and the penetration tests show that the security of an asset depends mainly
on the level of security awareness of the employees, and to a lesser extent
on the technical or physical security mechanisms.
• AN ASSIGNMENT for increasing the security awareness for employees and
future security professionals. We designed the practical assignment of an
information security master course where students get practical insight on
attacks that use physical, digital and social means. The goal of the security
course is to give a broad overview of security to the students and to increase
their interest in the field.
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Figure 1.6: Contributions of the thesis
17
Chapter 1. Introduction
Research questions
RQ1 RQ2 RQ3
Chapter 1
Chapter 2 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 4 
Chapter 5  
Chapter 6 
Chapter 7 
Chapter 8 
Chapter 9
Figure 1.7: Research questions addressed in the chapters
1.6 Outline of the thesis
The remainder of this thesis is divided in two parts: Vertical Policy Alignment and
Policy enforcement. The outline of the thesis is depicted in Figure 1.6.
Part I provides a novel approach for representing high-level and low-level poli-
cies and techniques for assessing the refinement of the high-level into low-level
policies. Chapter 2 first introduces a set of requirements that a model representing
all three domains should satisfy. The chapter describes the current state of the art
models and analyzes their compliance with the distilled requirements. Chapter 3
introduces Portunes. Portunes is a formal framework which integrates all three
security domains in a single environment, thereby enabling the analysis of poli-
cies that span the three domains. Chapter 4 describes algorithms that generate all
possible behaviors for a given Portunes model and a proof of concept implemen-
tation. Chapter 5 provides a modal logic that enables description of high-level
policies. We apply the presented framework and logic to describe malicious be-
havior of an insider, who uses actions that span the three domains to achieve her
goal. As a running example through out the first part of the thesis, we use the
road apple attack, where the insider uses the trust from a colleague to obtain the
financial data.
Part II expands the field of testing policy enforcement. Chapter 6 proposes two
methodologies for performing physical penetration tests using social engineering.
Chapter 7 assesses the effectiveness of security mechanisms in the physical and
18
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social domain. Chapter 8 proposes a practical assignment for teaching students
penetration testing skills. As a running example of the second part of the thesis,
we explore the problem of protecting laptops from theft. The last chapter of the
thesis, Chapter 9, summarizes the main contributions and provides an outlook on
future research directions.
Figure 1.7 illustrates which research questions are addressed in the chapters.
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Part I
Vertical policy alignment
The first part of the thesis focuses on vertical policy alignment. We show how
low-level policies and high-level policies can be modeled in a single formal frame-
work, and how to analyze the completeness of low-level policies with respect
to high-level policies. We use the vertical policy alignment to help in describ-
ing, generating and analyzing malicious insider behaviors. As a running example
throughout the first part of the thesis, we use the road apple attack, where an in-
sider uses the trust from a colleague to obtain secured data.
First, in Chapter 3 we show how to model low-level policies, behaviors and as-
pects from the three security domains. In Chapter 4 we show how for a given
model, we can automatically generate a possible malicious behavior. In Chapter 5
we present a logic that can be used to represent high-level policies. There can be
many behaviors that lead to the violation of a single high-level policy. Therefore
the logic can be used to select a subset of behaviors that satisfy a high-level policy.
The results from the first part of the thesis can be used in two domains, physical
penetration testing and auditing. In penetration testing, the testers are interested
in a set of attack scenarios that do not violate any low-level policies but still allow
them to achieve their goal. After scouting the premises of an organization, the
testers can use Portunes to generate a model of the implemented low-level poli-
cies and produce attack scenarios automatically. In auditing, the auditors want to
assess whether the low-level policies are complete with respect to the high-level
policies. Auditors can use Portunes to check whether there exists any behavior
that can violate a high-level policy.
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Chapter 2
Modeling the physical, digital and
social domain∗
Models play an important role in securing IT systems. They are used
to identify possible threats and represent attack propagation through-
out the network. We show that current models are not powerful enough
to identify the emerging threats from miss-aligned policies due to the
inability to represent physical and social aspects from security, such
as physical mobility, physical access and social interaction between
people. Researchers have proposed security models that particularly
focus on representing physical access and social interaction. We show
that none of the current security models simultaneously considers the
physical and social aspect of security to a satisfactory extent. As a
result, none of the current security models effectively represents the
security policies from the physical, digital and social domain. There-
fore these models cannot identify potential security threats where an
adversary uses physical access and social interaction to achieve a ma-
licious goal.
∗This chapter is a minor revision of the paper ”On the inability of existing security models to
cope with information mobility in dynamic organizations” [4] published in the Proceedings of the
Workshop on Modeling Security (MODSEC’08), CEUR Workshop Proceedings, 2008
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2.1 Introduction
To secure their sensitive information, organizations define policies that restrict
physical mobility of people and assets, digital mobility of information and so-
cial interactions between employees. In the last decade three main trends have
emerged in information systems, that increase the need for a formal approach in
studying such policies. The first is information omnipresence raised by the in-
creasing usage of mobile devices. The second trend is the increasing usage of
outsourcing. Organizations gain access to a highly trained workforce by becom-
ing decentralized and by outsourcing whole business processes and departments.
The last trend is the increasing cooperation between organizations. To increase
market share, organizations carry out joint projects with other organizations and
extensively hire part-time consultants. These trends lead to increased risk from
social engineering attacks [69] and attacks where the adversary uses physical ac-
cess [11]. Attacks that use physical access and social engineering emphasize the
need for closer analysis of the policies that define the access to information and
interaction between employees and their alignment to the high-level security poli-
cies of the organization.
Researchers from the industry are aware of the increase of mobility of people
and assets [63, 75, 100] as well as the impact of social interactions on secu-
rity [15, 107, 62]. A number of mechanisms, such as best practices of protect-
ing against laptop theft and increasing the security awareness of the employees
are proposed to help the organization mitigate the threats due to mobility and so-
cial interaction [61, 118, 119, 116, 117]. All of the solutions partially restrict the
mobility of data and laptops and are based on best practice criteria.
Problem Information omnipresence, outsourcing and cooperation between orga-
nizations increase information mobility and social interactions more than ever,
making it increasingly difficult to align the low-level security policies with the
high-level security policies in the organization.
Contribution A step toward understanding the security implications of the mo-
bility of information and the social interactions in an organization is to create a
model that includes the digital, physical and social aspect of security. We show
that threats that arise from mobility of information and social interaction can-
not be presented with the existing security modeling techniques. We define the
requirements for an integrated security model and look in the literature at alterna-
tive models of security that can represent the mobility of information and social
interaction. We analyze state of the art security models using attack scenarios pre-
sented in a case study, show that none of the new security models consider both
of information mobility and social interaction to a satisfactory extent, and present
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requirements for an integrated model that addresses this deficiency.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a case
study of current threats that include mobility of objects, interaction between a
person with a machine and interaction between people. Section 2.3 introduces the
requirements for an integrated security model that is able to present the attacks
presented in the case study. Section 2.4 presents the analysis of current models
and shows to which extent the security models satisfy the requirements of the
integrated security model. Section 2.5 briefly touches on a few informal models
that describe physical access and social interaction and Section 2.6 concludes the
chapter.
2.2 Case study
To provide a focus for the analysis, we present two attacks on a laptop. The first
type of attack is based on permanent physical possession of the laptop and focuses
on the confidentiality of the information stored inside. The second type of attack
introduces social engineering as a way to provide access to the laptop and focuses
on the integrity of the data in the laptop.
We chose these attacks because they include a combination of social engineering
with physical and digital access, making them a representative set of the type of
attacks we are interested in and a suitable set for analyzing the expressiveness of
presented models.
2.2.1 Confidentiality of the data in a laptop
If the adversary is in possession of the laptop, the adversary is also in possession
of the encryption keys, making the storage of encryption keys in tamper resistant
hardware crucial. The threat model of a storage device [55, 27] provides a variety
of options for the adversary to consider, such as removal or tampering with parts
of the device. The need for a good protection of the encryption keys has become
widely acknowledged after the coldboot attack [53], which is therefore worthy of
further study.
To present the coldboot attack, we first introduce a simplified example of present-
ing encrypted data to a user as shown in Figure 2.1. The snapshot is taken from
the Microsoft Threat and Analysis Modeling tool (TAM) and modified (e.g. num-
bers are added to present the sequence of the calls), to give a better overview of
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Figure 2.1: Coldboot attack
the example.
The user presents to the operating system a key coupled with a request that defines
the data the user wants to read (1). The operating system forwards the request to
the hard drive (2) and recovers the encrypted data (3). Then, the operating system
loads the encrypted data together with the key into the RAM (4). From the RAM,
the operating system feds the data into the processor (5), which as a result returns
the plain text (6). Th operating system then sends the plain text to the user (7,8). In
the coldboot attack, the adversary does not target the hard drive with the sensitive
information, nor the operating system, but the RAM where the encryption keys
are stored. When it is not possible to boot the computer from another media,
the adversary physically transfers the RAM to another computer, and dumps the
memory on a hard drive. Later, the adversary has all the time needed to use search
algorithms on the dumped memory to get the encryption keys.
2.2.2 Rootkit attacks on a laptop using social engineering
Stealing a laptop provides an instantaneous benefit to the adversary. However,
installing malware that sends data periodically from the internal network of the
organization to the adversary is more dangerous. To infect the network, the adver-
sary needs to combine social engineering with malicious software such as rootk-
its [93], making the mobile device an excellent carrier of the malicious software.
A rootkit [93] is software that hides itself and other files from diagnostic and se-
curity software and is used in a bundle with viruses, Trojans and other malicious
software. A rootkit can be installed on the ROM of any peripheral device [111],
in the ACPI tables in the BIOS [112] or in the RAM of the laptop [109]. There
are several ways an adversary can use to install a rootkit [93] on a laptop.
The term road apple refers to an apple that is found on a road, tempting the finder
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Figure 2.2: Road apple attack
to take it. In the IT world, the apple is usually an infected generic dongle (ex.
USB stick) with the logo of the organization left by the adversary in a social place
of the organization, such as a cafeteria. When an employee finds the dongle he
may be tempted to plug the dongle into his laptop [122]. In the rest of the chapter
we call this case road apple 1.
Another approach by the adversary to realize the road apple attack is through
direct interaction with the employee. For example, the adversary impersonates
higher level management and builds a trust relationship with the employee. The
adversary provides a fake identity and simulates an emergency, asking to send a
file he has on a dongle through the laptop of the employee. If the employee plugs
the dongle on the laptop, the dongle will install the rootkit without the employee’s
knowledge [12, 30, 31]. In the rest of the chapter we call this case road apple 2.
2.3 Integrated security model of the world
When an adversary tries to compromise a system, the adversary uses all avail-
able resources, which besides digital penetration include physical possession of
a device and usage of social means to acquire sensitive information. To model
the coldboot attack and physical tampering with devices, we need to be able to
model the tamper resistance of components in a laptop. We also need to present
the removal/addition of components in the laptop. The road apple attack, as many
other social engineering attacks [69] relies on activities occurring in the digital,
physical and social world. Thus, we need a model which presents movement and
roles, as well as physical and digital objects.
The digital, social and physical aspects are defined by Wieringa [104] and we
quote his definitions below:
The physical world is the world of time, space, energy and mass mea-
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sured by kilograms, meters, second, Amperes, etc. The social world is
the world of conventions, money, commercial transactions, business
processes, job roles, responsibility, accountability, etc. structured in
terms of conceptual models shared by people. At the interface be-
tween the social and physical worlds we have the digital world which
consists of symbols that have a meaning for people.
A step towards understanding the security implications in an organization caused
by the mobility of assets and information as well as the social interactions be-
tween people, is to create a model that includes the digital, physical and social
aspect of the world. Implicitly, this topic is touched upon in the system require-
ments domain [57], where the user describes the environment in which the system
operates.
Here we provide requirements of an integrated security model of the world from
the digital, social and physical aspect, together with the basic building blocks the
model needs to include.
The requirements we want an integrated security model to achieve are:
1. The model should be capable of representing the data of interest.
2. The model should be capable of representing the physical objects in which
the data resides and the locations where the physical objects are stored.
3. The model should be capable of representing the roles a user can have.
4. The model should define the interactions between the data, physical objects
and the roles.
The first three requirements present the digital, physical and social aspect of the
world, while the last binds them together. Following the requirements and the
definitions of the physical, digital and social aspect, elements of interest in the
integrated security model are: data, physical objects, roles and interaction rela-
tions.
We use the attacks from the case study to provide focus of the analysis and show
how the above requirements present properties of real-life attacks. In Section 2.4
we use the same attacks to show how the inability of a model to satisfy a require-
ment leads to inability to present a specific attack from the case study.
From the digital aspect represented by the data, we believe that the integrated
model needs to present the data at rest as well as data in movement. The spa-
tial/temporal characteristic provides information about the movement of the ob-
jects which is needed to model the attacks presented in Section 2.2. To represent
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Aspect Element Property
Digital Data Static, Dynamic
Physical Object Resistance, Spatial
Social Role Interaction, Transition
Table 2.1: Properties of interest for an integrated model
tampering with a device, the model should be capable of representing the physi-
cal properties of an object including the boundary of the object. From the social
aspect we are interested in the transition of one role to another, as well as the in-
teraction between roles. Through role interaction and role transition we can rep-
resent the impersonation of an adversary and adversary’s direct interaction with
an employee as presented in Section 2.2.2.
A model that will enable a security expert to represent the physical and social
security aspects in organizations will give the security expert better insight in the
threats and attack vectors, leading to an understanding of which low-level policies
are not aligned with the high-level policies.
To predict the behavior of a system over time we need a state based model. Schnei-
der [90] argues that a static model cannot enforce security policies because the
capability of a user can change over time. Goguen [48] presents a capability state
model to present dynamic changes in the system, and based on the changes of the
capability of a user, defines dynamic security policies. Goguen uses predicates
defined over the sequences of operations used to reach the current state, instead of
using a predicate on a single state.
In an integrated security model of the world, states or a sequence of states, should
be classified based on the properties we want to model. One example is distin-
guishing the difference between states that are possible in the real world and states
that are not. Another example is classification between states that cause violation
of a high-level policy and states that do not violate a high-level policy.
2.4 Security models
Motivated by the examples of attacks described in section 2.2 we did an exhaustive
literature search for models that are capable of presenting the attacks from the case
study. The most promising line of work comes from Probst et al. [84], and uses
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a modification of the Klaim language [70]. In Chapter 3 we present the Klaim
language in greater detail and show how we improve upon it. In this section we
present a list of relevant formal models that use other formalism and present their
weaknesses. During the literature search we also found models that represent
informal models that use conceptual approach in describing of the three security
domains. They are shortly addressed in Section 2.5.
Most of the formal models we found focus on modeling the data from the digital
aspect (e.g. data flow) and only a limited number of models consider the location
of the data. To the best of our knowledge there is no integrated security model
which includes all three aspects (digital, physical, social), and thus there is no
model that can truthfully represent the security implications on data mobility in
dynamic organizations.
We focus on models from the computer science domain modeling a security prop-
erty of the system, such as privacy or confidentiality. TAM and Secure Tropos
(ST) (Subsection 2.4.1) are static and used in the software industry for generation
of threats for a specific software application. Then we move into dynamic, state
based security models (Subsections 2.4.3 and 2.4.4) that include mobility of the
components in the system. These dynamic models are all inspired by the ambient
calculus [23], for which we provide the basic structure. Later we explore how
the ambient calculus is extended to focus on different properties of the world in
two other security models. We analyze the characteristics of these models with
respect to the requirements presented in Section 2.4.5. A more detailed and tech-
nical elaboration of the conclusions is presented in Appendix A.
2.4.1 TAM and Secure Tropos
One of the first steps when looking at a security issue is to create a threat model [96].
To generate the threats, the threat model needs to provide a security model of the
system on which it runs the threat generation algorithm. Usually, the input of a
threat model is the security model of the system, and the output is a set of threats.
The model does not specify how these threats could happen (which makes the
model attack independent) but recognizes the existence of such threats. This set is
later used as an input for risk assessment and report generation. In the literature,
threat modeling focuses on applications and networks. The scientific commu-
nity has worked on a formalization of threat modeling [108, 29] and produced
algorithms for threat generation [72, 77] and sorting [28]. This led to a num-
ber of tools which partially automate the threat modeling and generation process
space [115, 120]. Here we consider TAM [115] which is a state of the art tool
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used for internal threat generation and analysis in software development organi-
zations, as well as Secure Tropos, a formal model used for high-level presentation
of software requirements.
In Section 2.2.1 we used TAM to model the coldboot attack (Figure 2.1). Besides
being able to model data structures (OS and OS2) and data flow (the solid lines
between the objects) the tool also presents physical objects (RAM , CPU and
HDD) as well as roles (user1 and adversary). The addition in the model, where
the adversary takes the key from the RAM using the second operating system is
presented with the dashed line.
TAM considers the physical component and the role as static and the data as dy-
namic, allowing the TAM threat generation algorithm to focus on the flow of data.
Although this reasoning is understandable and valid in software modeling, in the
presented attacks TAM proves to be restrictive. TAM does not take into consid-
eration the possibility that a component can be removed, such as the RAM in the
coldboot attack nor that a component is mobile, such as the dongle in the road
apple attack.
TAM presents neither role interaction nor role transition. Because of the lack of
states, even with manipulation of the relationships and entities in the model, TAM
cannot present interaction between roles and role transition. The role in TAM is
used to describe the privileges over a component in an access control table, but
does not define transition between roles such as escalation of privileges between
a normal and an administrator role nor any interaction between roles, such as
delegation or separation of duty. As a result, TAM cannot present the road apple
attack where the adversary has direct interaction with the employee.
TAM cannot present physical properties of a component. A component is defined
through the service type the component provides and the data and roles the com-
ponent interacts with. Since TAM does not consider the component as a physical
object, the component’s resistance to physical attacks cannot be expressed in the
model.
We can change the meaning of the components to present the attacks from the case
study, but not without changing or blurring the relationship between the compo-
nents. We can ”attach” a new operating system to the RAM. As the number of
mobile components increases the number of such ”attachments” also increases,
degrading the model usability as well as blurring the meaning of the relationship
between components. Still TAM model ”attachments” are used in modeling the
coldboot attack as presented in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.3: A floor plan and its tree representation [80]
2.4.2 Ambient calculus
Ambient calculus [23] provides an excellent apparatus for modeling a world with
mobile components. The calculus is capable of presenting spatial and temporal
properties of a component(with running processes inside) in the model. Ambi-
ent calculus serves as an inspiration for the state of the art security models that
consider mobility of components. The ambient calculus has been expanded into
typed ambient calculus [22], boxed ambient calculus [21] etc. All of these calculi
focus on a specific security property such as boundary interference [20].
Ambient calculus does not define the properties of an entity nor the relationship
between entities, making the calculus generic enough to present any model of in-
terest. The calculus presents a comprehensive theoretical framework for reasoning
about mobility. But, without additional formal naming convention and definition
of the properties of interest in the component, cannot be directly implemented in
any model on which mechanisms such as policies or threat generation algorithms
need to be applied.
Ambient calculus cannot present tampering with a device. In ambient calculus
data decides to leave the device or not based on the capability of the data, which is
not the case when an adversary tampers with a device. Although tamper resistance
can be presented through a stack of ambients, the manipulation of the stack cannot
be done at run time, because any rearrangement or removal of a layer requires a
dynamic change of the capabilities of the data inside.
Finally, ambient calculus is based solely on a containment relation. As pointed
out in the work of Pieters [80], containment based models cannot present neigh-
boring relationship between objects. For example, we cannot model a floor that
has neighboring rooms (Figure 2.3), or networks separated by firewalls.
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Figure 2.4: Road apple using entities. The model of Scott can present the spa-
tial location of entities (blue arrows), but not the social interaction between them
(black arrow).
2.4.3 Model of Scott
Scott [91] builds a security model of the world by adding a spatial relationship
between the elements in the ambient calculus. Scott’s model is based on a build-
ing block called an entity. An entity is a spatial location. Every entity belongs to
only one of six defined sorts. To distinguish physical entities from digital enti-
ties, Scott defines a context, a physical/virtual machine capable of running code.
Scott’s model uses capabilities from ambient calculus (in/out) and renames the
capabilities depending on which entity uses the capability. If the entity is a person
moving between rooms, the capabilities are walk in/walk out. If the entity is a
person interacting with a laptop, the capability is pick up/put down. If the entity
is an agent moving between contexts, the capabilities are emit/receive.
To present tamper resistance of an entity, we can add multiple layers of protection
to the data by inserting additional entities. But the definition of the emit/receive
command teleports an entity from source address to destination address without
taking in account the layers in between, making the model oblivious to the tamper
resistance imposed by the device.
There is no social factor in the model of Scott. There is a sort person, but the
meaning is spatial. The only capability this entity has is to pick up or put down
a mobile entity. Through this we could present the coldboot attack, where the
person physically changes the location of the RAM as well as the first version
of the road apple attack. But the model cannot represent the direct interaction
between the adversary and the employee in the second version of the road apple
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attack, where the adversary directly interacts with the employee and convinces the
employee to insert the dongle (Figure 2.4). Thus, the model cannot fully present
the road apple attack.
2.4.4 Model of Dragovic
Dragovic [41] presents a security model of the world by expanding Scott’s model
and focusing on exposure treats. The main building blocks are data object, which
presents a collection of data with equal sensitivity as determined by a security
policy and container, which is an ambient (digital or physical) containing a data
object or a lower level container. In a Dragovic model, the container has as a
boundary that protects the container or data object inside from the outside influ-
ences with variable degree of success. Every container propagates downwards
its own influences in addition to the influences the container inherits from the
parent container. Boundary transparency is defined based on the degree of pro-
tection the parent container offers to the child container. Dragovic uses class
(similar to Scott’s sort) to group elements. Another distinction is made by adding
a type to the container, which presents the behavior of the container when ex-
posed to an influence from the environment. Mobility of the data is presented by
four operations: enter, leave, migrate, which atomically binds the previous two
operators and state update, which is used to update the status of the attributes
of a container. The model presented by Dragovic [40, 41] besides considering
the spatial/temporal characteristics of the object, considers the object’s physical
properties, such as the object’s capability to resist influences from the surrounding
environment, making the model suitable for presenting the tamper resistance of a
device.
The model of Dragovic includes Scott’s model with the addition of the physical
property of the objects, as well as the definition of sensitivity of data, allowing
us to model tampering with a device and the coldboot attack to a level where all
elements are realistically presented. Figure 2.5 presents the spatial relationship of
the containers in the cooldboot attack. To model the coldboot attack, we define
the RAM as a container and the encryption key as a data object. The accessibility
of the RAM is defined by the RAM’s transparency in addition of the laptop’s
transparency. Before the coldboot attack, we consider the RAM as a container
with limited tamper resistance. After the RAM is removed from the laptop, the
tamper resistance of the RAM increases due to the degradation of the data. Thus,
we can successfully present the coldboot attack.
Dragovic does not define an object person, therefore there is no defined interaction
between a person and a container. By presenting the employee and the adversary
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Figure 2.5: The coldboot attack using containers. Each container has a determined
transparency, allowing the modeling of tampering attacks. The lines between the
containers represent their spatial location.
as containers, we are able to present the movement of the dongle with the rootkit
from the adversary to the employee’s laptop. Yet, we are not able to present
the interaction between the adversary and the employee, where the employee is
convinced to insert the dongle. Thus, we cannot model the road apple attack with
direct interaction.
2.4.5 Comparison of the models
This section compares the analyzed modeling approaches. Table 2.6 presents the
objects and properties of the objects we are interested in the analyzed models.
From the presented results, we make the following observations. The ambient cal-
culus is formal and capable of presenting most of the properties of interest. Other
models impose restrictions on the model enabling them to focus on a specific area
of interest, making the models less general than ambient calculus. This prevents
the models to represent some of the properties of interest. TAM is incapable of
presenting physical or social properties, because the model focuses on software
representation and does not contain states. Scott and Dragovic cannot present role
transition and role interaction because they do not include any social element in
the model.
Table 2.7 provides an overview of the model’s ability to present tampering with a
physical device, the coldboot attack, as well as the road apple attack with indirect
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Aspect ElementProperty TAM & ST Ambient
calculus
Scott Dragovic
static yes yes yes yesDigital Data
dynamic yes yes yes yes
spatial/temp. no yes yes yesPhysical Object
resistance no no no yes
transitions no no no noSocial Role
interactions no yes no no
Figure 2.6: Ability of the models to present digital/physical/social elements
Name of attack TAM & ST Ambient calculus Scott Dragovic
Tampering no no no yes
Coldboot partially yes yes yes
Road apple 1 no yes yes yes
Road apple 2 no yes no no
Figure 2.7: Ability of the models to present the case study attacks
(road apple 1) and direct (road apple 2) interaction between the adversary and the
user.
Tampering with a device can be presented with the model of Dragovic because
the model can contain information about the property of a device. TAM does not
have this capability, and thus is not able to present the tampering. The model of
Scott can use multiple layers to represent resistance, but the teleporting ability of
data makes any attempt to represent resistance obsolete. The operators in ambient
calculus do not support teleporting, enabling the presentation of the tamper resis-
tance through multiple layers. Yet, the capabilities of the ambient cannot change
dynamically based on the change of the layer structure, preventing the complete
presentation of tampering with data.
We are able to present the spatial movement of the dongle from the adversary to
the employees laptop, but are not able to present the social interaction between the
adversary and the user, where the adversary convinces the user to plug the dongle.
This is the reason why Scott and Dragovic can only partially model the road apple
with direct interaction.
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2.5 Conceptual models
Jiang et al. [60, 59] present a data structure for the privacy issues in the ubiq-
uitous computing through data structures called information spaces. The model
of Jiang et al. focuses on presenting social groups and activities, which is a ma-
jor improvement with respect to the previously introduced security models, but
the definition of the model is informal, making the model open for interpretation.
Prayogi et al. [83] provide an access control framework for selective role transi-
tion based on the change of the context in which the system resides. However, the
role transitions are not formally defined. In the social and business fields, Hart-
mann et al. [54] provide informal model of user interaction. The model is used for
optimizing profit rather than investigating security implications.
2.6 Conclusion
We analyze the capability of state of the art security models to present the treats
arising from physical and digital mobility as well as social interaction in organi-
zations. We show that none of the state of the art security models simultaneously
consider the data mobility and social interaction to a satisfactory extent. Soft-
ware modeling tools, like Microsoft’s TAM, consider the physical infrastructure
and roles to be static and this makes it hard to present dynamic changes in the
system. Security models for ubiquitous computing are state based, but focus on
spatial/temporal characteristics and fail to recognize social interactions, which are
vital for social engineering threats. As a result, we conclude that none of the
presented state of the art security models effectively describes the physical and
social aspect of security. Thus, these models cannot identify the potential security
threats caused by misalignment of low-level policies with high-level policies.
The information omnipresence and social interactions in organizations shift the
stress from mainly digital attacks to a combination of digital, physical and social
attacks. To cope with the threats, the chapter presents the requirements for an
integrated state based model. The goal of the proposed requirements is to aid in
defining a model of the world from all three aspects, digital, physical and social
and realistically present the possible attacks. The chapter identifies the objects of
interest from all three aspects and presents an initial classification of the properties
affecting the security of the identified objects.
In the following chapter we define a formal security model that satisfies the re-
quirements provided here and defines the interactions between the identified ob-
jects, based on the properties of the objects.
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Chapter 3
Portunes∗
Representing multi-domain behavior
In this chapter, we present Portunes, a framework that incorporates
three security domains: (1) the security of the computer system itself
(the digital domain), (2) the security of the location where the system
is deployed (the physical domain) and (3) the security awareness of
the employees who use the system (the social domain). The frame-
work is able to present low-level policies as well as behaviors that
span the three domains.
The Portunes framework can be used by auditors to assure the man-
agement that the low-level policies are complete with respect to the
high-level policies. The framework can be also used to assist penetra-
tion testers by automatically generating ”what if” scenarios, that can
be used as parts of the tests. We explore these usages of the frame-
work in chapter 4 and chapter 5.
We show how the framework can be used to describe malicious be-
havior of an insider, who uses actions that span the three domains to
achieve her goal. We formalize a variation of the road apple attack as
a running example, where the insider uses the trust from a colleague
to obtain the secure data.
∗This chapter is a minor revision of the paper ”Portunes: representing attack scenarios spanning
through the physical, digital and social domain” [2] published in the Proceedings of the Joint
Workshop on Automated Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis and Issues in the Theory of
Security (ARSPA-WITS’10), pages 112-129, Springer Verlag, 2010
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3.1 Introduction
Malicious insiders are a serious threat to organizations. Motivated by greed or
malice, insiders can disrupt services, modify or steal data, or cause physical dam-
age to the organization. Protecting assets from an insider is challenging [110]
since insiders have knowledge of the security policies in place, have certain privi-
leges on the systems and are trusted by colleagues. An insider may use the knowl-
edge of the security policies to avoid detection and use personal credentials or
social engineer colleagues to carry out an attack. Securing the environment from
a malicious insider requires (1) aligning the low-level policies with the high-level
policies and (2) checking if an insider can violate a specific high-level policy.
Most current formal models for modeling insider threats [87, 99, 52] assume that
the insider uses only digital means to achieve an attack. Therefore, these models
do not look into mobility of people and devices nor social interactions between
people, and focus only on modeling the security of a network or a host. For
example, there is a lot of research that focuses on modeling and analyzing network
and host configurations to generate, analyze and rank attack scenarios using attack
graphs [102, 67, 103, 101, 66].
Assuming that the insider uses only digital means to achieve an attack leaves an
essential part of the environment of interest not captured in the security models.
Indeed, a study performed by the National Threat Assessment Center in the US
(NTAC) [86] shows that 87% of the attacks performed by insiders require no tech-
nical knowledge and 26% use physical means or the account of another employee
as part of the attack. Thus, a whole family of attacks, digitally-enabled physi-
cal attacks and physically-enabled digital attacks [38], in which the insider uses
physical, digital and social means to compromise the asset cannot be presented
nor analyzed formally.
The contribution of this chapter is Portunes1, a framework which integrates all
three security domains in a single environment, thereby enabling the analysis of
multi-domain behavior. The Portunes framework consists of a graph and a lan-
guage, which can describe an environment at a different level of abstraction. The
graph is a visual representation of the environment focusing on the relations be-
tween the three security domains. It provides a conceptual overview of the envi-
ronment that is easier to understand by the user. The language is at a relatively low
1After Portunes, the Roman god of keys
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level of abstraction, close to the enforcement mechanisms. The language is able to
describe the low-level policies defined by the security departments as predicates
and the behaviors that span across the three domains as process definitions.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 gives an overview of
related work contributing to the design of Portunes. Section 3.3 formalizes the
Portunes graph and Section 3.5 formalizes the Portunes language. Section 3.6
concludes the chapter.
3.2 Related work
The design of the Portunes framework is influenced by several research directions,
such as insider threat modeling, physical modeling and process calculi. This sec-
tion lists several papers which influenced the design of Portunes and describes
how Portunes extends or deviates from them.
Dragovic et al. [41] are concerned with modeling the physical and digital domain
to determine data exposure. Their model defines a containment relation between
layers of protection. Data security is determined not by access control policies,
but by the number of layers of protection above the data and the confidentiality
provided by each layer. The Portunes framework uses a similar relation to present
the location of elements, but uses explicit access control policies to describe secu-
rity mechanisms.
Scott [91] focuses on the mobility of software-agents in a spatial area and usage
policies that define the behavior of the agents depending on the locality of the
hosting device. The mobility of the agents is restricted through edges on a graph.
The Portunes framework adds semantics to the graph structure by giving meaning
to the nodes and edges and defines invariants enforced directly into the semantics
of the language.
Mathew et al. [66] use capability acquisition graphs to describe the physical struc-
ture of a building. The nodes in the graphs are static, and the graph can present
the progress of the insider in the graph. In our solution the structure of the graph
evolves as the attack progresses, and the insider can interact with other employees
to obtain additional capabilities.
Klaim [70] is a process calculus for agent interaction and mobility, consisting of
three layers: nodes, processes and actions. There are several Klaim dialects, in-
cluding μKlaim [50], OpenKlaim [19] and acKlaim [84]. The goal of the acKlaim
language, which is closest to our work, is to present insider threats by combining
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the physical and digital security domain. Mobility is presented by remote eval-
uation of processes. The Portunes language builds upon these Klaim dialects.
Firstly, the actions for mobility and embedding of objects (login, logout) are sim-
ilar to OpenKlaim. Secondly, the policies expressed in the Portunes language are
similar to acKlaim and μKlaim. However, in the Portunes language mobility is
represented by moving nodes rather than evaluating processes. Finally, the Por-
tunes language lacks tuple spaces which are present in all other Klaim variants.
The tuples in the physical and digital world are completely replaced by the con-
tainment sets. The social world is presented through the low-level policies, thus
no tuples are needed. The absence of tuple spaces reduces the number of possible
process definitions, allowing their automatic generation.
3.3 Portunes
This section presents the Portunes framework. We first present the requirements
which Portunes needs to satisfy and the motivation behind some of the design
decisions. Based on the requirements, we formally define the Portunes graph and
the Portunes language. To show the expressiveness of the framework, we use a
variant of the road apple attack as an example of a malicious behavior.
3.3.1 Requirements and motivation
The three security domains focus on different aspects of security. Physical se-
curity restricts access to buildings, rooms and objects. Digital security is con-
cerned with access control on information systems. Finally, security awareness
of employees focuses on resistance to social engineering, and is achieved through
education of the employees.
Representing all three security domains in a single formalism is challenging.
Firstly, the appropriate abstraction level needs to be found. A too low level of
abstraction for each domain (down to the individual atoms, bits or conversation
dynamics) makes the representation complicated and unusable. However, ab-
stracting away from physical spaces, data and relations between people might
omit details that contribute to an attack. Thus, a model integrating multiple secu-
rity domains needs to be expressive enough to present the relevant details of an
attack in each security domain. In chapter 2, we provided the basic requirements
for an integrated security model to be expressive enough to present detailed at-
tacks. Briefly, an integrated security model should be able to present the data of
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Spatial node
Physical node
Digital node
Spatial layer
Object layer
Digital layer
Figure 3.1: Graphic presentation of elements in Portunes
interest, the physical objects in which the data resides, the people that manipulate
the objects and the interaction between data, physical objects and people.
Secondly, the domains have different properties making them hard to integrate.
For example, mobility of digital data is not restricted by its locality as is the case
with objects in the physical domain. Likewise, physical objects cannot be repro-
duced as easily as digital data. An additional requirement for Portunes is to restrict
interactions and states which are not possible in reality. For example, it is possi-
ble to put a laptop in a room, however, putting a room in a laptop is impossible;
a person can move only to a neighboring location, while data can move to any
location; data can be easily copied, while the reproduction of a computer requires
assembling of other objects or materials.
3.4 The Portunes graph
To present the different properties and behavior of elements from physical and
digital security, the Portunes graph stratifies the environment of interest in three
layers: spatial, object and digital. The spatial layer presents the facility of the
organization, including rooms, halls and elevators. The object layer consists of
objects located in the facility of the organization, such as people, computers and
keys. The digital layer presents the data of interest. Stratification of the environ-
ment in three distinct layers allows specification of actions that are possible only
in a single layer (copying can only happen for digital entities) or between specific
layers (a person can move data, but data cannot move a person).
A Portunes graph abstracts the environment of an organization in a stratified graph
and restricts the edges between layers to reflect the neighbor and containment
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relations that occur in reality. A node abstracting a location, such as an elevator
or a room, belongs to the spatial layer L and it is termed a spatial node. A node
abstracting a physical object, such as a laptop or a person, belongs to the object
layer O and it is termed an object node. A node abstracting data, such as an
operating system or a file, belongs to the digital layer D and it is termed a digital
node. The edges between spatial nodes denote a neighbor relation and all other
edges in the graph denote a containment relation. The ontology used in Portunes
is given in Figure 3.2. An edge (n,m) between two spatial nodes means n is a
neighbor of m. This is a symmetric relation where the direction of the edge is not
important. For all other nodes, an edge (n,m) means that node n contains node
m; this is an asymmetric relation.
layer node edge
spatial location neighbors
contains
object physical object contains
contains
digital data contains
Figure 3.2: The ontology of a Portunes graph
The above statements are illustrated in Figure 3.1 and formalized in the following
definition.
Definition 12. Let G = (Node,Edge) be a directed graph and D : Node →
Layer a function mapping a node to Layer = {L,O,D}. A tuple (G,D) is a
Portunes graph if it satisfies the following invariants I(G,D):
1. Every object node can have only one parent.
∀n ∈ Node : D(n) = O → indegree(n) = 1
2. One of the predecessors of an object node must be a spatial node.
∀n ∈ Node : D(n) = O → ∃m ∈ Node : D(m) = L ∧ ∃〈m, ...., n〉;
where 〈m, ...., n〉 ∈ Edge+ denotes a finite path from m to n, and Edge+
is a finite set of finite paths.
3. There is no edge from an object to a spatial node.
(n,m) ∈ Edge : D(n) = O ∧ D(m) = L
4. There is no edge from a digital to an object node.
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(n,m) ∈ Edge : D(n) = D ∧ D(m) = O
5. A spatial and a digital node cannot be connected.
(n,m) ∈ Edge : (D(n) = D ∧ D(m) = L) ∨ (D(n) = L ∧ D(m) = D)
6. The edges between digital nodes do not generate cycles.
〈n, ...,m〉 ∈ Edge+ : D(n) = ... = D(m) = D ∧ n = m
The intuition behind the invariants is as follows. An object node cannot be at more
than one place, thus an object node can have only one parent (1). An object node
is contained in a known location (2). An object node cannot contain any spatial
objects (3) (for example, a laptop cannot contain a room) nor can a digital node
contain an object node (4) (for example, a file cannot contain a laptop). A spatial
node cannot contain a digital node and vice versa (5), and a digital and object
nodes cannot contain itself (6) and Theorem 1. Edges between spatial nodes rep-
resent a neighborhood relation which is a reflexive property. However, the edges
between object and between digital nodes represent a contain relation, which is
not reflexive. For example, it should not be possible for a person to contain a bag,
which in turn contains the same person.
Theorem 1. A Portunes graph (G,D), where G = (Node, Edge), can have cy-
cles only in the spatial layer:
∃〈n, ...,m〉 ∈ Edge+ : n = m → D(n) = ... = D(m) = L
Proof. The theorem follows from three properties, which we prove in turn:
1. There are no cycles between layers.
2. There are no cycles in the object layer.
3. There are no cycles in the digital layer.
1. There are no cycles between layers
 ∃〈n0...ni...nk〉 : n0 = nk ∧ D(n0) = D(ni)
Lets assume that such a cycle exists:
∃〈n0...ni...nk〉 : n0 = nk ∧ D(n0) = D(ni)
Thus, there are at least two edges in the graph which connect nodes from
different layers:
∃(nj−1, nj), (nl, nl+1) ∈ Edge : D(nj−1) = D(nj) ∧ D(nl) = D(nl+1) ∧
D(nj−1) = D(nl+1) ∧ D(nj) = D(nl)
From the invariants 3, 4, 5 (tabulated in Table 3.1) follows that such a pair
of edges does not exist.
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Layer 1 (L1) Layer 2 (L2) Edge from L1 to L2 Edge from L2 to L1
L O + - (invariant 3)
L D - (invariant 5) - (invariant 5)
O D + - (invariant 4)
Table 3.1: Invariants 3,4,5 forbid any cycles between layers.
2. There are no cycles in the object layer.
 ∃〈n, ...,m〉 : D(n) = ... = D(m) = O ∧ n = m
Lets assume such a cycle exists:
∃〈n, ...ni−1, ni...,m〉 : D(n) = ...D(ni) ... = D(m) = O ∧ n = m.
From invariant 2, for the node ni−1 exists a spatial node m, such that there
is a path between m and ni−1, ∃k ∈ Node : D(k) = L ∧ ∃〈k, ....n′i−1, ni〉.
It follows there are two edges to ni, ∃(n′i−1, ni), (ni−1, ni).
If n′i−1 = ni−1 there is a contradiction with invariant 1. OtherwiseD(n′i−1) =
O, and the analysis is repeated for the path 〈k, ....n′i−1〉. Because 〈k, ....n′i−1〉
is finite, at one point the path reaches a spatial node, and n′i−1 = ni−1. This
again contradicts with invariant 1. Thus, such cycle does not exist.
3. There are no cycles in the digital layer.
 ∃〈n, ...,m〉 : D(n) = ... = D(m) = D ∧ n = m
This follows directly from invariant 6.
Example: Road apple attack To show how Portunes can be used to represent the
three domains and represent behaviors across the domains, we use the example of
the road apple attack [122, 30, 31] which we introduced in Chapter 1. In an insider
version of the road apple attack, the insider may abuse the trust of a colleague and
convince the colleague to take the dongle. Instead of the competitor spreading
multiple infected dongles around the vicinity of the employee’s working place,
in the insider version of the road apple attack, the insider social engineers the
employee. In this chapter we will formalize the attack in the following steps.
First, the insider convinces the employee to take the dongle by abusing her trust
(social domain). Then, the employees goes to a server in a restricted area and
plugs in the dongle (physical domain). Finally, the malicious software from the
dongle transfers the sensitive data to a remote server (digital domain).
To describe the attack, the environment in which the behavior takes place needs
to include information from all three security domains. Concerning physical se-
curity, the organization has a restricted area where a server with sensitive data
resides. Additionally there is a public area where employees can socialize. Re-
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D(hall) = D(secureRoom) = D(world) = L
D(remoteServer) = D(insider) = D(employee) =
D(secureServer) = D(dongle) = O
D(serverData) = D(rootkit) = D
Figure 3.3: The function D for the road apple attack environment
1 world
2 hall
3
4
secureRoom
remoteServer
5 insider
6 employee
7 secureServer
8 dongle
9 rootkit
10 serverData
4
3
65 7
8
9
21
10
Figure 3.4: Graph of the road apple attack environment
garding the digital domain, the data on the server can be accessed only internally.
The security awareness of the employees is such that they trust each other enough
to share office material (for example: CDs and dongles).
The segregation of the nodes among the layers is presented in Figure 3.3. The
nodes hall, secureRoom and world are spatial nodes, serverData and rootkit are
digital nodes. All other nodes are object nodes. The Portunes graph is visually
presented in Figure 3.4. The spatial nodes are presented as pentagons, the object
nodes as circles and the digital nodes as squares. The edges in the graph present
the relationship between the nodes. For example, the hall is neighboring the secure
room and the secure room contains a secure server which in turn contains server
data.
In Section 3.5 we define the language that formally specifies the environment of
interest and in Section 3.5.2 we will revisit the example and show how the road
apple attack takes place using the formal specification. In Chapter 5 we will show
how to present properties in the road apple example formally.
3.5 The Portunes language
In the previous section, we defined a graph-based approach to present the facilities
of an organization, the objects in a facility and the data of interest. The Portunes
graph represents the environment on a conceptual level, and compared to the lan-
guage, it provides simplified presentation of the environment to the user. In this
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section we introduce the Portunes language. The language formally describes the
environment and makes it more suitable to describe and analyze the enforcement
mechanisms as well as to formally specify the interaction between the nodes. The
language consists of nodes, processes and actions, where a node in the Portunes
language represents a node in the Portunes graph.
The language captures two interactions, mobility and delegation. By making all
nodes first class citizens, every node can move. For example, an object node
representing an insider can move through the organization and collect keys, which
increase the initial privileges of the insider. Similarly, a spatial node representing
an elevator can move between floors in a building. In the Portunes language, a
delegator node can delegate a task to a delegatee node. By delegation here we
refer to the act of granting the delegatee additional privileges to carry out a task
on behalf of the delegator.
The above two interactions, mobility and delegation, are restricted by the invari-
ants from Definition 12 and by the low-level security policies associated with each
node. Policies on nodes from the spatial and object layer represent the physical
security. These policies restrict the physical access to spatial areas in the facility
and the objects inside the spatial areas. Policies on nodes from the digital layer
represent the digital security of the organization and focus on access control on the
data of interest. In the Portunes language people can interact with other people.
Policies on people give the social aspect of the environment, or more precisely,
they define under which circumstances a person trusts another person.
3.5.1 Overview of Klaim
The Portunes language is inspired by the Klaim family of languages. Klaim (Ker-
nel Language for Agent Interaction and Mobility) is an experimental kernel pro-
gramming language designed to model and program distributed concurrent ap-
plications with code mobility [70]. The syntax of Klaim is presented in Figure
3.5.
Klaim relies on the concept of a distributed tuple space. A tuple space is a multiset
of tuples. A tuple t is a container of information which can be either an actual
value such as an expression e, process P , or a locality , or a formal field such as
a value variable !x, process variable !X or locality variables !u. An example of a
tuple is: (5, ”person”, !var), where 5 and ”person” are expressions and !var is a
value variable. Tuples are anonymous and Klaim uses pattern matching to select
tuples from a tuple space.
A node contains one tuple space and processes. Nodes can be identified through
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N ::= Node
| 0 Empty net
| s ::ρ P Single node
| N1 ‖N2 Net composition
P ::= Process
| nil Null process
| act.P Action prefixing
| P1 + P2 Choice
| P1|P2 Parallel composition
| X Process variable
| A〈P˜ , ˜, e˜〉 Process invocation
act ::= out(t)@ | in(t)@ | read(t)@ | eval(P)@ | newloc(u)
t ::= e | P |  | !x | !X | !u | t1, t2
Figure 3.5: Syntax of the Klaim language [70]
two types of addresses: sites s and localities . Sites are absolute identifiers
through which nodes can be uniquely identified within a net and localities are
symbolic names for nodes and have a relative meaning depending on the node
where they are interpreted. Localities are associated with sites through allocation
environments ρ, represented as partial functions on each node.
Klaim processes may run concurrently and can perform five basic operations over
nodes. Three of them, in(t)@, read(t)@, out(t)@ are used to manipulate the
tuples, newloc(u) creates a new node and eval(P )@ spawns a process P for
execution at node .
3.5.2 Syntax of the Portunes language
As with other members of the Klaim family, the syntax of the Portunes language
consists of nodes, processes and actions. The Portunes language lacks the tuple
spaces and the actions associated with tuple spaces, which are present in the Klaim
family of languages, and focuses on the connections between nodes. This is be-
cause connectivity is the main interest from the perspective of security modeling.
The Portunes language is also simplified by removing variables and localities,
because our goal is to automatically generate programs rather than program them.
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N ::= Node
| l ::δs P Single node
| N1 ‖N2 Net composition
P ::= Process
| nil Null process
| P1 | P2 Process composition
| al.P1 Action prefixing
a ::= Action
| login(l) Login
| logout(l) Logout
| logout’(l) Logout’
| eval(P)@l Spawning
Figure 3.6: Syntax of the Portunes language
The syntax of the Portunes language is shown in Figure 3.6. A single node l ::δs P
consists of a name l ∈ L, whereL is a universe of node names, a set of node names
s ∈ 2L, representing nodes that the node l contains , a low-level security policy
δ and a process P . The relation between the Portunes graph and the expressions
in the Portunes language is intuitive: a node l in the graph represents a node with
name l in the language, an edge (l, l′) in the graph connects l to a node name
l′ ∈ s of the node l ::δs P . Thus, the node name uniquely identifies the node
in the graph, while the set s defines which other nodes the node contains or is a
neighbor of. These two relations identify the relative location of each element in
the environment. A net is a composition of nodes.
A process P is a composition of actions. Namely, nil stands for a process that
cannot execute any action and al.P1 for the process that executes action a using
privileges from node l ∈ L and then behaves as P1. The label l identifies a node
from where the privileges originate, and it is termed the origin node. The structure
P1|P2 is for parallel composition of processes P1 and P2. A process P represents a
task. A node can perform a task by itself or delegate the task to another node. Re-
cursive and mutually recursive process definitions are not allowed in the Portunes
language. Thus, every behavior described using the language has to be finite.
An action a is a primitive which manipulates the nodes in the language. There
are four primitives, login(l), logout(l), logout′(l) and eval(P )@l. The actions
login(l) and logout(l) provide the mobility of a node, by manipulating the set
s. The action logout′ restricts in the mobility of a node by checking whether the
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node is allowed to move, but does not manipulate the set s. The action eval(P )@l
delegates a task P to a node l by spawning a process in node l.
Notation To simplify the representation of processes, the nil at the end of non-
empty processes is omitted. For example, instead of writing the process as:
logout(hall)employee.login(secureRoom)employee.nil, we write the process as:
logout(hall)employee.login(secureRoom)employee. If the process has multiple ac-
tions from the same origin, then we put the origin node at the end of the process
rather than after each action. The process from the above example will be repre-
sented as: [logout(hall).login(secureRoom)]employee.
Example: Road apple attack (continued)
For a node representing a room, secureRoom ::δs nil, the low-level policy δ
defines the conditions under which other entities can enter or leave the secure
room. The set s contains the names of all objects that are located in the room
and the names of the locations neighboring the room. Let an insider and an em-
ployee be in a hall hall ::δ{insider, employee, secureRoom} nil which is neighboring
the secure room. An insider delegating a task to the employee is: insider ::δs
eval(P )@employeeinsider where P is a process denoting the task, employee is
the node to which the task is delegated and the label insider is the origin node.
An employee entering the secure room as part of the task delegated from an in-
sider is presented through employee ::δs login(secureRoom)
insider.P ′, while an
employee leaving the room employee ::δs logout(secureRoom)
insider.P ′′. This
example shows that the actions login and logout are abstractions of objects leav-
ing or entering locations. The same actions can be used to specify objects being
put into or removed from other objects. To keep the level of abstraction suffi-
ciently high and consistent with the constructs presented by Bettini et al. [19],
the action names are generic rather than named specifically, such as ”put/take” or
”enter/leave”.
An origin node can grant a set of capabilities C = {ln, lt, e} to another node,
where ln is a capability to execute the action login, lt to execute the action logout
or logout′ and e to execute the action eval. Which capabilities the origin node
can grant depends on its identity, location and credentials. The low-level secu-
rity policy δ is a function δ : (L ∪ {⊥}) × (L ∪ {⊥}) × 2L → 2C . The first
and the second parameter denote identity based access control and location based
access control respectively. If the identity or the location does not influence the
policy, it is replaced by ⊥. The third parameter denotes credential based access
control, which requires a set of credentials to allow an action. If a policy is not
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affected by credentials, the third parameter is an empty set. A policy can present
a situation where: 1) only credentials are needed, such as a door that requires a
key (⊥,⊥, {key}) → {ln}, 2) only the identity is required, such as a door that
requires biometrics information (John,⊥, ∅) → {ln}, or 3) only the location is
required, such as data that can be reached only locally (⊥, office, ∅) → {ln}.
The low-level policy supports combinations of these attributes, such as a door
requiring biometrics and a key (John,⊥, {key}) → {ln}. The policies focus
on the allowed action, not of the content of the action. For example, the policy
(insider,⊥, ∅) → {ln}, at a node employee, states the employee trusts the in-
sider sufficiently to accept any object from her. The least restrictive policy that
can be used is: (⊥,⊥, ∅) → {ln, lt, e}.
We introduce types on nodes to define the spatial, object and digital layer on
the nodes in the language. Typing also allows us to avoid impossible contain-
ment relationships between nodes from the same layer, such as a node contain-
ing itself. Each node has a type t ∈ T , where T is a finite partially ordered
set defined by the relation ln. The function T maps a node to its type T :
N → T . The relation ln provides ordering between nodes based on their
type. As a convention, we write types with a capital first letter. For the road ap-
ple example, T is defined as T = {Room,Person}, and the ordering relation as
ln= {(Room, Person)}. The mapping between the nodes and their types is:
T (secureRoom) = T (hall) = Room, T (employee) = T (insider) = Person.
The ordering is not transitive: For example, a room can contain a dongle and a
dongle can contain digital data. But, the room cannot contain the digital data.
Also, the ordering is not reflexive: a dongle might not be able to contain a dongle,
nor an insider can contain an employee. The only assumption on ln is that it
does not invalidate invariant 7 in Definition 12, or put differently, the relation does
not allow cycles between nodes in the digital layer.
Example: Road apple attack (continued)
In section 3.4 we introduced the Portunes graph of the environment where the road
apple attack takes place. We defined the relation between the elements through
a graph and their stratification in the graph through the function D. Now, we
additionally define the ln relation and the low-level policies on each of the
nodes.
Figure 3.7 presents the environment as a net composition. The representation
contains detailed information about the low-level policies in place, making them
suitable for analysis. For example, the node world has no processes (nil), con-
tains the remote server, the insider and is neighboring the hall. The node also has
one low-level policy (⊥,⊥, ∅) → {ln, lt}, which means every node is allowed
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world ::
(⊥,⊥,∅) → {ln,lt}
{remoteServer, insider, hall} nil
|| hall ::(⊥,⊥,∅) → {ln,lt}{employee, secureRoom} nil
|| secureRoom ::(employee,⊥,∅) → {ln,lt}{secureServer} nil
|| remoteServer ::(⊥,⊥,∅) → {ln}{} nil
|| insider ::(⊥,⊥,∅) → {ln,lt,e}{dongle} P1
|| employee ::(insider,⊥,∅) → {ln} ; (employee,⊥,∅) → {ln,lt,e}{} P2
|| secureServer ::(⊥,secureRoom,∅) → {ln,lt} ; (⊥,secureServer,∅) → {ln,lt}{serverData} nil
|| dongle ::(⊥,⊥,∅) → {e} ; (dongle,⊥,∅) → {ln,lt}{rootkit} P3
|| rootkit ::(dongle,⊥,∅) → {ln,lt,e}{} P4
|| serverData ::(⊥,secureServer,∅) → {e}{} nil
Figure 3.7: The road apple attack environment in the Portunes language
to enter and exit the area that is out of the company premises. The policy at em-
ployee (employee,⊥, ∅) → {ln, lt, e} states the employee will accept all actions
originating from herself. Removing this policy would prevent the node executing
any action using its own privileges.
To reduce the number of nodes, the majority of the policies presented here are
identity based. For example, the policy (employee,⊥, ∅) → {ln, lt} on secureRoom
requires the biometrics of the employee to identify itself when entering and leav-
ing the room. In a less secure environment, the policy can be replaced with
(⊥,⊥, ∅) → {lt}, (⊥,⊥, {key}) → {ln} meaning that everyone can leave the
room, but a person containing a key can enter.
The processes P1, P2, P3 and P4 describe intended behavior of the nodes. In
Section 3.5.5 we show how these processes can describe a behavior that represents
the road apple attack and in Chapter 4 generate them automatically.
The available types are T = {Space, Person, Server, ItObject,Data}. The
mapping and the Hasse diagram are given in Figure 3.8 and Figure 3.9. The
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T (world) = T (hall) = T (secureRoom) = Space,
T (employee) = T (insider) = Person,
T (remoteServer) = T (secureServer) = Server,
T (rootkit) = T (serverData) = Data,
T (dongle) = ItObject.
Figure 3.8: Type definition of the nodes
ItObject
Person
Space
Server
Data
Figure 3.9: The Hasse diagram of the types of the nodes
ordering relation is:
ln={(Space, Person),(Space, Server),(Space, ItObject),(Person, ItObject),
(Server, ItObject), (Person, Server), (ItObject,Data), (Server,Data)}
A net N is a formal representation of the environment. A net N , together with the
mapping functionsD,ln on its nodes presents a single state of the environment
and the processes P represent intentions of the nodes.
3.5.3 Auxiliary functions
Having defined the behavior of nodes using the three primitive actions, login,
logout and eval, we now look at the context where these actions can be executed.
A node l ::δs a
l′ .P can be restricted in executing an action a from an origin node
l′ to a target node for four reasons: (1) the origin node might not have sufficient
privileges, (2) execution of an action invalidates the invariants in Definition 12,
(3) the target node might not be in the vicinity of the node l or (4) the target
node is not physically able to contain the node. This section defines the auxiliary
functions for a given net N , which take care of these restrictions. The auxiliary
functions are defined in Figure 3.10 and are used in the operational semantics of
the language.
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grant(lo, δt, a) = ∃k1, k2 ∈ L ∪ {⊥}, ∃K ∈ P(L) : a ∈δt(k1, k2, K) ∧
(k1 = lo ∨ k1 = ⊥)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1)
∧ (k2 ∈ parentsN(lo) ∨ k2 = ⊥)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2)
∧(K ⊆ childrenN(lo)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(3)
),
where parentsN(lo) = { lpo| lpo ::δpospo R ∈ N ∧ lo ∈ spo}
and childrenN(lo) = so such that lo ::δoso R ∈ N
ltln l=
⎧⎨
⎩
false iff (D(lt)=D∧(D(l)=O∨D(l)=S)∨
(D(lt)=O∧D(l)=S) ∨ (D(lt)=S∧D(l)=D)
T (lt)lnT (l) otherwise
l e lt = (D(l) = L ∧ D(lt) = L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(4)
∧¬(D(l) = D ∧ D(lt) = O)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(5)
∧ (lt ∈ childrenN(l)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(6)
∨(∃lp ::δpsp R ∈ N : l ∈ sp ∧ lt ∈ sp︸ ︷︷ ︸
(7)
) ∨ D(lt) = D︸ ︷︷ ︸
(8)
)
Figure 3.10: Auxiliary function grant and  relations
The grant function checks if an origin node lo has sufficient privileges to exe-
cute an action a on a target node with low-level policy δt. The first parameter is
the name of the origin node lo, the second parameter is the low-level policies on
the target node δt and the third parameter is a label of an action a. A node can
execute an action depending on the identity lo of the origin node (1), its location
parents(lo) (2) or the keys children(lo) it contains (3). Note that the value of
grant depends solely of the origin node, not the node executing the process.
The relation lt ln l states that a node lt can contain a node l. The goal of this
relation is to ensure the invariants 3-6 in Definition 12 are satisfied during the net
evolution. From the relation we see that a digital node cannot contain a spatial or
a physical node, an object node cannot contain a spatial node and a spatial node
cannot contain a digital node.
The ordering relation l e lt states that node l can delegate a task to node lt by
means of spawning a process. The relation restricts delegation of tasks between
nodes depending on the layer a node belongs to and the proximity between nodes.
An object node can delegate a task to a digital node or another object node, while
a digital node can delegate a task only to another digital node. Thus, spatial nodes
cannot delegate tasks, nor can a task be delegated to spatial nodes (4), and digital
nodes cannot delegate tasks to object nodes (5). Furthermore, a non-digital node
can delegate a task only to nodes it contains (6) or nodes that are in the same
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location (7). In digital nodes the proximity does not play any role in restricting
the delegation of a task (8). The decision (8) assumes the world is pervasive
and digital nodes can delegate tasks from any location as long as they have the
appropriate privileges.
The expressions from Figure 3.10 focus on the relation between nodes. The grant
function provides the security constraints in the language based on the location
and identity nodes, while the ln, ln and e relations provide non-security
constraints derived from the layer the nodes belong to and their location. In ad-
dition, we put a restriction on the processes inside a node, to distinguish tasks
originating from a single node. We call such processes simple processes, and de-
fine an additional auxiliary function origin, which helps to determine if a process
is a simple process.
Definition 13. Let origin : Proc → 2L be a function which returns all the action
labels of a given process.
origin(nil) = {}
origin(al.P ) = {l} ∪ origin(P )
origin(P1|P2) = origin(P1) ∪ origin(P2)
A process P , which is either nil or which contains actions only from one origin
node is a simple process: origin(P ) ⊆ {l0}
In the semantics of the Portunes language this function forbids processes from one
origin to spawn processes from other origins. For example, the process definition
insider ::δs eval(logout(hall)
employee.login(secureRoom)employee)@insiderinsider
is not allowed, because both nodes employee and insider are origins of actions
in the process. This process definition can be interpreted as: the insider delegates
herself a task to enter the secure room using the privileges from the employee.
The execution of this process does not require any interaction with the employee
and does not represent a realistic scenario. We also found that the processes can
be better mapped in real life behaviors if they execute actions only from a sin-
gle origin. Naturally, a node can still execute other simple processes from other
origins in parallel.
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3.5.4 Operational semantics
Following Bettini et al. [19], the semantics of the Portunes language is divided
into process semantics and net semantics. The process semantics is given in terms
of a labeled transition relation a−→ and describes both the intention of a process to
perform an action and the availability of resources in the net. The label a contains
the name of the node executing the action, the target node, the origin node and a
set of node names which identify which nodes the target node contains. The net
semantics is given in terms of a transition relation ⇒ which describes possible
net evolutions and relies on the labeled transition relation a−−→ from the process
semantics.
origin(P ) ⊆ {lo} lt ln l grant(lo, δt, ln)
l ::δs login(lt)
lo .P‖ lt ::δtst Q
login(l,lt,lo,st)−−−−−−−−→ l ::δs P‖ lt ::δtst∪{l} Q
[login]
origin(P ) ⊆ {lo} grant(lo, δt, lt) l ∈ st
l ::δs logout(lt)
lo .P‖ lt ::δtst Q
logout(l,lt,lo,st)−−−−−−−−−→ l ::δs P‖ lt ::δtst\{l} Q
[logout]
origin(P ) ⊆ {lo} grant(lo, δt, lt) l ∈ st
l ::δs logout(lt)
lo .P‖ lt ::δtst Q
logout′(l,lt,lo,st)−−−−−−−−−→ l ::δs P‖ lt ::δtst Q
[logout’]
origin(P ) ⊆ {lo} origin(Q) ⊆ {lo} l e lt grant(lo, δt, e)
l ::δs eval(Q)@l
lo
t .P‖ lt ::δtst R
eval(l,lt,lo,Q)−−−−−−−→ l ::δs P‖ lt ::δtst R|Q
[eval]
l ::δs P
a−−→ l ::δs P ′
l ::δs P |Q a−−→ l ::δs P ′ |Q
[pComp]
Figure 3.11: Process semantics
The process semantics of the language is defined in Figure 3.11. A node l can
login to node lt [login] if it has sufficient privileges to perform the action (grant),
if the node can be contained in the target node (ln) and if the process is a simple
process with origin node lo (origin). As a result of executing the action, node l
enters node lt, or put differently, the target node lt now contains node l.
For a node to logout from a target node [logout], the target node must contain the
node (l ∈ st), the origin node must have proper privileges (grant) and the process
must be a simple process with origin node lo (origin). The action results in l
leaving lt, specified through removing its node name from st. The rule [logout’]
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has the same premises but does not remove the node l from lt. The [logout’] is
needed in the net semantics of the language in Section 3.5.5 where the data nodes
can be copied rather than moved from one node to another.
Spawning a process [eval] requires both the node executing the action and the
target node to be close to each other or the target node to be digital (l e lt), the
origin node should have the proper privileges (grant) and both processes P and
Q need to be simple processes with origin node lo (origin). The action results
in delegating a new task Q to the target node, which contains actions originating
from the same origin node as the task P . Note that for delegation to occur, in the
Portunes language it is sufficient for the employee (delegatee) to trust the insider
(delegator), rather than requiring mutual trust between them. The reason behind
this design decision is that we are interested in whether the insider can convince
the employee to execute a task, rather than whether the insider trusts the employee.
N
eval(l,lt,lo,P )−−−−−−−→ N1
N
neteval(l,P,lt)
========⇒ N1
[neteval] N1
a
==⇒ N ′1
N1 ‖N2 a==⇒ N ′1 ‖N2
[nComp]
N
logout′(l,lt1 ,lo,st1 )−−−−−−−−−−→ N1 N1 login(l,lt2 ,lo,st2 )−−−−−−−−−→ N2 D(l) = D
N
netcopy(l,lt1 ,lt2 )=========⇒ N2 [netcopy]
N
logout(l,lt1 ,lo,st1 )−−−−−−−−−−→N1 N1 login(l,lt2 ,lo,st2 )−−−−−−−−−→N2 (lt1∈st2∨lt2∈st1∨ D(l)=D)
N
netmove(l,lt1 ,lt2 )==========⇒ N2
[netmove]
Figure 3.12: Net semantics
3.5.5 Net semantics
The net semantics in Figure 3.12 uses the process semantics to define the possible
actions in the Portunes language. Spawning a process is limited solely by the
process semantics [neteval].
To move, a node executes the logout and login actions in sequence [netmove].
Both actions should have the same origin node and should be executed by the
same node. Furthermore, an object node can move only to a node in its vicinity,
while digital nodes do not have this restriction (lt1 ∈ st2 ∨ lt2 ∈ st1 ∨ D(l) = D).
Data can be copied, which is presented by data entering a new node without leav-
ing the previous [netcopy]. Although the data can be copied, it still needs permis-
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7 secureServer
8 dongle
9 rootkit
Figure 3.13: Example of a net evolution
sion from both the node it resides at lt1 and from the node it is copied to lt2 .
A net and two possible behaviors are presented in Figure 3.13. Both of these evo-
lutions lead to the insider obtaining the server data. The nets and the net evolutions
together present a Portunes model of the environment.
The standard rules for structural congruence apply and are presented in Figure
3.14.
(ProcCom) P1|P2 ≡ P2|P1
(NetCom) N1‖N2 ≡ N2‖N1
(Abs) P1|nil ≡ P1
Figure 3.14: Structural congruence of processes and nets
Definition 14. Vicinity of a node l with a parent node lt1 is defined by all nodes
lt2 that share the same parent node (lt2 ∈ st1) or the child of lt2 is a parent of l:
(lt1 ∈ st2).
Proposition 1. A node from the object and spatial layer lt1 ::δ1st1P1 can move only
to a node lt2::
δ2
st2
P2 in its vicinity.
Proof. The proposition follows directly from the netmove premise: lt1 ∈ st2 ∨
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lt2 ∈ st1 .
Proposition 2. Nodes from the object and spatial layer can evaluate processes
only to child and sibling nodes.
Proof. The property follows directly from the premise of the eval action: e.
Theorem 2. Let (G,D) be a Portunes graph and N be a net the represents the
same environment. The function Map maps a net in a Portunes graph, such that
I(Map(N),D) holds. The evolutions of the net N do not invalidate the invariants
I.
Proof. Suppose there is a net N1 which satisfies the invariants I(Map(N1),D).
Suppose exists a net N2 which is a product of a net transformation on N1. ∃N2 :
N1 ⇒ N2. We need to prove that I(Map(N2),D) also holds.
The relation ⇒ is used in the net actions neteval, netcopy and netmove.
1. neteval does not cause any changes of the structure of the net. Thus any
execution of neteval cannot invalidate an invariant.
2. netmove removes an edge (lt1 , l) and generates a new one (lt2 , l). We need
to show that the
login(l,lt2 ,lo,st2 )−−−−−−−−−→ action does not invalidate any invariant.
(a) Let D(l) = O. After logout(l,lt1 ,lo,st1 )−−−−−−−−−−→, indegree(l) = 0. Every logout
action is accompanied by a login action. When
login(l,lt2 ,lo,st2 )−−−−−−−−−→ is ap-
plied, indegree(l) = 1. Thus, invariant 1 is not invalidated.
(b) Let D(l) = O. After login(l,lt2 ,lo,st2 )−−−−−−−−−→ is applied, from ln, D(lt2) = L
or D(lt2) = O. The former case does not invalidate the second invari-
ant by definition. Since I(Map(N1),D), ∃m ∈ Node : ∃〈m...lt2〉 ∧
D(m) = L, the latter case also does not invalidate the second invari-
ant.
(c) The invariants 3, 4, 5 are not invalidated by the definition of ln.
(d) The last invariant is not invalidated because of the assumption in .
3. The effect of netcopy is an additional edge in the graph edge (lt, l) gen-
erated by the relation
login(l,lt,lo,st)−−−−−−−−→. The premise of netcopy enforces a
restriction D(lt) = D. Additional restriction comes from the relation ln,
which allows an edge to be generated only between a node from the object
and digital layer D(l) = D ∧ D(lt) = O or between two nodes from the
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P1=logout(world).login(hall). (a )
eval(logout(insider).login(hall).logout(hall).
login(employee))@dongle (b )
P2=logout(hall).login(secureRoom).
eval(logout(employee).login(secureRoom).
logout(secureRoom).login(secureServer))@dongle. (c )
P3=eval(logout(dongle).login(secureServer))@rootkit
P4=eval(logout′(server).login(remoteServer))@serverData
Figure 3.15: Process definitions enabling the road apple attack
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1 world
2 hall
3
4
secureRoom
remoteServer
5 insider
6 employee
7 server
8 dongle
9 rootkit
10 serverData
Figure 3.16: Portunes graph of the road apple attack environment after the execu-
tion of the attack
digital layer D(l) = D ∧D(lt) = D. The former does not invalidate any of
the invariants, while the latter is restricted by the assumption on .
Example: Road apple attack (continued) In Section 3.5.2 we formally speci-
fied the environment where the road apple attack occurs. By using the language
semantics it is now possible to reason about possible behaviors. A behavior is
presented through defining the processes in the nodes, that lead to violating a
high-level policy.
Figure 3.15 shows an example of the actual road apple attack as four processes,
P1, P2, P3 and P4. All actions in the process P1 have an origin node insider,
in P2 an origin node employee, in P3 an origin node dongle and in P4 an origin
node rootkit. For clarity, the labels on the actions representing the origin node
are omitted from the process definitions.
The insider (P1) goes in the hall and waits for the employee (process P1 until
reaches point a). Then, the insider gives the employee the dongle containing the
rootkit, which the employee accepts (P1 reaches b). Later, the employee plugs the
dongle in the secure server (P2 reaches c) using its own credentials and the server
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gives the dongle (P3) access to the local data. When the rootkit (P4) reaches the
server, it copies all the data to the remote server. The above actions represent
the road apple attack with a dongle automatically running when attached to a
computer [12]. After executing the processes from Figure 3.15, the data will
reside in the remote server, presented through an edge (remoteServer, data) in
the Portunes graph in Figure 3.16. The next step is to generate these processes
automatically, which is the focus of Chapter 4.
3.6 Conclusion
The main contribution of this chapter is the mapping of security aspects of the
physical and social domain together with the digital domain into a single frame-
work named Portunes. This formalization allows generating and analyzing attack
scenarios which span all tree domains, and thus helps in the protection against in-
sider threat. The framework consists of a high-level graph and a language inspired
by the Klaim family of languages. To capture the three domains, Portunes is able
to represent 1) physical properties of elements, 2) mobility of objects and data, 3)
identity, credential and location based access control and 4) trust and delegation
between people.
The applicability of Portunes is demonstrated using the example of the road ap-
ple attack, showing how an insider can attack without violating existing security
policies by combining actions from all three domains.
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Analyzing Portunes models
In Chapter 3 we introduced a framework for representing behaviors
that span the physical, digital and social domain. We used this frame-
work to present malicious behaviors of insiders, which use the trust
of their colleagues and gaps in the low-level polices to achieve their
goal. In this chapter we generate such behaviors, allowing the se-
curity professional a clear overview of the possible ways in which a
policy can be violated. We present an algorithm that finds in polyno-
mial time all possible actions allowed by the low-level policies. We
also provide two algorithms that generate from the actions a behavior
that leads to achieving a specific goal. In this chapter a specific goal
is defined informally by selecting an attribute. In Chapter 4 we show
how to specify arbitrary goals using modal logic formulae.
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we provided an abstraction of the physical, digital and
social security domains in a single formal framework, Portunes. The framework
is able to describe specific aspects, such as mobility and delegation, from the three
security domains and allows their formal analysis. The analysis of these aspects
provides information on how the security domains interact with each other and
allows drawing conclusions on the overall security of the organization.
The goal of the analysis presented in this chapter is to check an environment
formally and to reveal possible malicious behaviors. When a behavior leads to
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achieving a malicious goal, then we call it an attack. The analysis achieves this
goal by finding a sequence of actions that are allowed by the low-level policies,
but still result in the violation of a high-level policy. Finding and analyzing a
behavior is challenging because (1) it is computationally expensive to find all ac-
tions that can occur in the model and (2) the number of possible sequences of
actions grows exponentially with each new action. For unsecured environments
there can be an overwhelming number of behaviors that lead to an attack, making
the analysis of each of them unfeasible. The analysis presented in this chapter is
aimed at models of environments that are already considered as secure, such that
a manageable number of attacks can be expected.
The analysis consists of three algorithms executed in sequence. The first algo-
rithm finds the actions that can be executed by all nodes in the model. The second
generates a partial behavior by combining actions into process definitions in such
a way, that they lead to violating a policy. Both algorithms use the monotonic-
ity assumption which states that an action cannot be invalidated by another ac-
tion [14] (described in greater detail in Section 4.4). Because of the monotonicity
assumption, a behavior generated by the second algorithm might miss a number
of actions. The third algorithm shows how the monotonicity assumption can be
lifted by adding the missing actions and thus generating a realistic behavior.
The worst-case computational complexity of the analysis is O(N4) where N is
the number of nodes in the model. We implemented the semantics of the Portunes
language and the analysis in an open source tool. We compare the performance
of the first algorithm with a general purpose model checker, Groove. The first
algorithm is the most computationally intensive part of the analysis, because it
needs to find all possible actions that can be executed in the model under the
monotonicity assumption. The second and the third algorithm select a part of the
found actions that lead to the satisfaction of a goal. In the benchmarks we measure
the time to find all possible actions on a number of Portunes models.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 4.2 we provide re-
lated work in generating attacks and in Section 4.3 we introduce the terms we
use throughout the chapter. In section 4.4 we provide the algorithms for finding
all possible actions, and generate a specific behavior that invalidates a goal. Sec-
tion 4.6 describes the implementation of the algorithms in a tool and section 4.7
provides experimental data on the complexity of the first algorithm because this
algorithm consumes the most time during the analysis. Section 4.8 concludes this
chapter.
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4.2 Related work
Using graphs to produce and describe multi-step attacks in computer networks is
a well researched area. Previous research shows that such analysis can be done
efficiently and effectively in the digital domain (for example: [14, 106, 74]).
We contribute to this research area by describing and implementing an analysis
capable of finding a malicious behavior in multi-domain models. The Portunes
framework allows modeling social and physical aspects of security, enabling the
generation of behaviors for malicious insiders in more realistic than purely digital
environments, where the insider can use also physical and social means to achieve
her goal.
Producing multi-step attacks in multi-domain models is a less researched area.
Probst et al. [84, 85] propose a formal model for describing scenarios that span
the physical and digital domain. This model allows an analysis to find which
users are able to reach a certain location, based on their identity and knowledge.
Due to the usage of process and object variables in the model, and not using
the monotonicity assumption, the worst-case computational complexity of this
analysis is exponential.
Kotenko et al. [62] also propose a model for describing attacks that use social en-
gineering and physical access using preconditions and postconditions of atomic
actions. However, the performance analysis of this approach indicates an expo-
nential complexity based on the number of nodes in the graph, making it unfeasi-
ble for graphs bigger than about a hundred nodes.
4.3 Preliminaries
In this chapter we use the term model as it is used in the model checking commu-
nity. A model consists of a set of states, which in our case are nets (for example
Figure 3.7) and a set of state transitions. Each state transition is caused by the
execution of an action from a process definition within a specific node and mod-
ifies the state as defined by the net semantics of the Portunes language presented
in Section 3.5.5. In the analysis of this chapter, the states are not complete be-
cause the process definitions in the nodes are not known in advance but they are
generated. A state that lacks process definitions is called a configuration, and the
transition between two configurations is called a configuration transition. A con-
figuration transition is an execution of one of the netmove, netcopy or neteval
rules from the net semantics of the Portunes language.
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An action template is a data structure that with preconditions that must be satisfied
for a configuration transition to occur, and postconditions that specify the effects
of the transition to the configuration 1. The preconditions of a configuration tran-
sition are derived from the premises of the net rules and the postconditions of a
configuration transition are derived from the results of the net rules. Each action
template has a name, which states the process definition a node needs to execute
to generate the configuration transition.
Both the preconditions and the postconditions in an action template consist of
attributes. An attribute represents a relationship between two nodes. In the Por-
tunes language, attributes are a) containment, which states whether a node l2 is
logged into node l1 (i.e. l1 ::δsP where l2 ∈ s) and b) delegation, which states
whether a node l1 has a process definition originating from a node l2 (i.e. l1 ::δs P
where l2 ∈ origin(P )).
For a single configuration, there can be a number of action templates with all their
preconditions satisfied. If the precondition of a configuration transition is never
invalidated by the successful execution of another configuration transition, the
order of the execution of the configuration transitions does not influence the final
configuration. During the analysis we use iteration numbers to determine which
configuration transition can occur earlier than another configuration transition.
The initial configuration of the model has iteration 0. The configuration with
iteration 1 is obtained when all possible configuration transitions are applied to
the configuration at iteration 0. In general terms, the configuration N ′ resulting
from the application of all possible configuration transitions at a configuration N
is one iteration higher than the configurationN . In Section 4.4.1 we provide more
intuition and an example of iterations and why are they needed in the analysis.
Example 1: An example of an action template derived from the netmove rule is
presented in Figure 4.1. To move the serverData from server to remoteServer,
two attributes need to be satisfied: the server needs to contain the serverData
and the serverData needs to contain a process originating from dongleData.
These two attributes are the preconditions of the action template. As a result of the
execution of the action template, two attributes change: server does not contain
the serverData anymore and the remoteServer now contains the serverData.
These two attributes are the postconditions of the action template. The iteration
number shows that this action template was found during the eighth iteration of
the model. The ninth iteration of the model will contain the postconditions from
the action template as well as the postconditions of all the action templates that
1In the analysis of computer networks, action templates are called exploits [101, 102, 25, 26,
62].
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action name:
serverData :: [logout(server).login(remoteServer)]dongleData
precondition:
server contains serverData
dongleData delegates to serverData
postcondition:
remoteServer contains serverData
server does not contain serverData
iteration: 8
Figure 4.1: Example of an action template where the serverDatamoves from the
server to the remoteServer
had their preconditions satisfied in iteration eight.
4.4 Algorithms
The analysis in this chapter consists of three algorithms. The output of the analysis
is a behavior. The behavior is made up of a sequence of actions that are allowed
by the low-level security policies and satisfies a given goal. To determine which
action is possible, the algorithms implement the rules from the operational and net
semantics of the Portunes language.
The input-output relations of the three algorithms are presented in Figure 4.2.
The first algorithm takes as input a Portunes model and returns a set of action
templates that can be executed in the model. The second algorithm combines
these action templates and using the monotonicity assumption to generate a partial
behavior (partial attack) that invalidates a given goal. Finally, the third algorithm
lifts the monotonicity assumption and adds missing action templates in the partial
behavior.
The first two algorithms, inspired by Ammann et al. [14], consist of a forward
marking stage and a backward attack finding stage. In the forward marking stage,
the first algorithm starts from the initial configuration of the model and marks
all action templates that can be executed. During the backward attack finding
stage, the second algorithm begins from a goal, which is an attribute, and starts
generating a behavior by linking action templates based on their preconditions and
postconditions, until it reaches the initial configuration of the model. These two
algorithms use the monotonicity assumption, which states that the precondition of
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Figure 4.2: The input-output relations between the algorithms
a given configuration transition is never invalidated by the successful execution
of another configuration transition. In the physical world, this assumption means
that a person able to enter a room can never lose this ability, presenting the most
pessimistic scenario where the adversary never loses a credential or the ability to
reach a location. The netmove rule in the Portunes language via the rule logout
invalidates an attribute and thus the monotonicity rule. Therefore, the logout rule
is replaced with the logout’ rule from Section 3.5.4, making the postconditions of
netmove not invalidate any attribute. In Figure 3.12, the rule
N
logout(l,lt1 ,lo,st1 )−−−−−−−−−−→N1 N1 login(l,lt2 ,lo,st2 )−−−−−−−−−→N2 (lt1∈st2∨lt2∈st1∨ D(l)=D)
N
netmove(l,lt1 ,lt2 )==========⇒ N2
[netmove]
becomes
N
logout′(l,lt1 ,lo,st1 )−−−−−−−−−−→N1 N login(l,lt2 ,lo,st2 )−−−−−−−−−→N2 (lt1∈st2∨lt2∈st1∨ D(l)=D)
N
netmove′(l,lt1 ,lt2 )==========⇒ N2
[netmove’]
The monotonicity assumption leads to an over-approximation of possible behav-
iors, because it leads to finding action templates that might not be possible in real
life.
Example 2: In realistic scenarios, physical objects can not be at two locations in
the same time. Consider the following example: A restricted area and a control
room are connected with a hall. In the hall there is a guard. The restricted area
can be accessed only if a guard is in the control room. The guard cannot be
simultaneously at both places, in front of the restricted area and inside the control
room, thus it is not possible for him to enter the restricted area. The environment
is presented with the following configuration:
restrictedArea ::
(⊥,controlRoom,∅)→{ln}
{hall} nil || controlRoom ::(guard,⊥,∅)→{ln}{hall} nil ||
hall ::
(⊥,⊥,∅)→{∗}
{guard} nil || guard ::(⊥,⊥,∅)→{∗}{} P
Because of the modification of the semantics of the netmove rule, the following
process definition P is now possible:
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P = [logout′(hall).login(controlRoom).logout′(hall).login(restrictedArea)]guard
The guard enters the control room because of the policy (guard,⊥, ∅) → {ln}.
Because of the monotonicity assumption, the guard will be both in the hall and the
control room. The policy applied on the restricted area (⊥, controlRoom, ∅) →
{ln} is satisfied because the guard is inside the control room. Simultaneously,
the guard is also located in the hall allowing him to enter in the restricted area.
Thus, because of the monotonicity assumption, there will be an action template
requiring a physical node to be at two different locations (”controlRoom contains
guard” and ”hall contains guard”) as part of its preconditions, which in reality
is not possible.
Example 3: Another example when additional action templates are generated be-
cause of the monotonicity assumption is when a node gets locked in a certain
location. In Example 2, let us assume the guard takes a credential from the con-
trol room. After entering the control room, the guard can never leave the room
anymore, because there is no logout policy. In other words, the guard gets trapped
in this location. Because of the monotonicity assumption, however, the guard is
simultaneously in the hall too, so he can continue with other activities using the
credential he obtained in the control room. These activities will generate addi-
tional action templates that are not possible in reality, because the guard is not
able to exit the control room with the credential.
The monotonicity assumption, however, does not lead to missing any action tem-
plates. The only time the monotonicity assumption could cause missing of an
action template is when the action template has a precondition that requires an at-
tribute not to be satisfied [14]. In none of the actions templates we have a negative
attribute as a precondition. This is because the policies do not contain negation
(we cannot present policies where an absence of a credential allows an action) and
none of the premises in the Portunes language requires an absence of a delegation
or containment between two notes.
In Figure 4.1 the first and second algorithm will use only the first postcondition
remoteServer contains serverData in the further iterations. The second postcon-
dition, server does not contain serverData invalidates an attribute and is ignored.
Because of the monotonicity assumption, the set of action templates generated
by the second algorithm does not include cyclic movements. A cyclic movement
occurs when a node returns to a location it has previously been located into. In
terms of the Portunes language, a cyclic movement occurs when a nodeN1 moves
away from a node N2, and after a number of actions returns back to N2.
Example 4: In the initial state of the road apple attack environment, the node
world contains the node insider. A simple example of a cyclic movement is:
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Figure 4.3: The containment relationships at the initial configuration, after the
first iteration, the second iteration and after the last iteration.
insider ::δs [logout(world).login(hall).logout(hall).login(world)]
insider
After the movement of the insider to the hall, because of the monotonicity as-
sumption, the second algorithm considers that both the hall and the world contain
the insider.
The algorithm does not add additional action templates that return the insider in
the world and thus cannot generate such a behavior. However, such behaviors
are needed in situations where, for example, a person needs to go to a location to
obtain a credential, and then return to a previously visited location to continue with
the attack. The third algorithm shows how the effects of the monotonicity rule can
be lifted and generates a realistic behavior that may include cyclic movement.
4.4.1 Intuition for the algorithms
This section continues the example from Chapter 3 and provides intuition how the
analysis can be used to discover the road apple attack.
The first algorithm, findActionTemplates, finds all possible action templates that
can be executed by the nodes insider, employee, dongle and dongleData in
the road apple attack environment. Figure 4.3 shows the Portunes graph at the
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P1=[logout′(world).login(hall).eval(logout′(insider).login(hall). (a )
logout′(hall).login(employee))@dongle]insider (b )
P2=[logout′(secureRoom).login(hall). (c )
eval(logout′(employee).login(secureRoom). (d )
logout′(secureRoom).login(server))@dongle]employee (e )
P3=[eval(logout′(dongle).login(server))@dongleData]dongle (f )
P4=[eval(logout′(server).login(remoteServer))@serverData]dongledata (g )
Figure 4.4: Process definitions generated by generatePartialAttack enabling the
road apple attack. The definitions are partial because they do not contain cyclic
movement.
initial configuration, after the first iteration, after the second iteration and after
the last iteration, when all found action templates are executed. The edges in
the graph represent the initial contain relationships together with the effects from
all found action templates. For example, the edge from remoteServer (4) to
serverData (9) at iteration n means that remoteServer at one point can contain
serverData. In the first iteration four configuration transitions are possible, from
which two are visible in the figure: the insider (5) can move to the hall (2), the
insider can delegate a task to the dongle (8), the employee (6) can move to the
hall, and the dongle can delegate a task to the rootkit (10). After the first iteration,
because of the monotonicity assumption, the employee is both in the hall and
the secure room (3), and the insider in the world (1) and the hall. In the second
iteration another three configuration transitions are possible. The employee can
move from the hall to the world and the dongle can move both to the world and
the hall, because the insider is in both of the locations.
The generatePartialAttack algorithm uses the set of action templates generated by
findActionTemplates, the initial configuration of the Portunes model and the goal:
”remoteServer contains data” to generate a partial attack scenario. To present
them in the Portunes language as process definitions distributed among the net we
need to perform two additional steps: 1) all action templates need to be sorted by
the origin node of the actions they contain and 2) the action templates in every
node in the net need to be ordered by iteration number. The first step defines in
which node in the net the action from a template will be positioned and the second
step orders the templates by the order of execution.
Figure 4.4 presents the distilled process definitions after merging action templates
having actions with the same origin and ordering them by iteration number. All
actions in process P1 have the node insider as an origin and after the first step will
be located in the node insider. After the second step, these actions are ordered
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Figure 4.5: The Portunes graph after running the processes P1-P4.
by iteration number. In generating the templates, the templates that have lower
iteration number are executed before the templates with a higher iteration number.
Thus, the actions logout′(world).login(hall) will be positioned in the process
before or after the action eval in the same process.
One interpretation of the actions is the following. The insider (P1) goes in the hall
and waits for the employee (process P1 is then at point a). When the employee (P2)
arrives in the hall (P2 at c), the insider gives him the dongle containing malicious
software, which the employee accepts (P1 at b). Later, the employee plugs the
dongle in the secure server (P2 at e) using its own credentials and the server gives
the dongle (P3) access to the local data. When the malicious software (P4) reaches
the server, it sends all the data to the remote server. The above actions closely
resemble the road apple attack [122] with a dongle automatically running when
attached to a computer [12] and covertly sending sensitive information [30, 31].
The resulting scenario defines only a partial attack. When the dongle reaches the
employee, the dongle cannot move to the secure room, because the employee is
located in the hall at that moment. Thus, the part of the attack scenario where
the employee returns back to the secure room is missing. After running the simu-
lateAttack algorithm, this cyclic movement is also included (bold font). In addi-
tion, since the simulateAttack uses the semantics of the netmove rule, the actions
using the logout′ rule are replaced with actions using the logout rule:
P2 = [logout(secureRoom).login(hall).eval(logout(employee).login(secureRoom).
logout(secureRoom).login(server))@dongle.logout(hall).login(secureRoom)]employee
After running the Portunes program, the final configuration of the Portunes model
is given in Figure 4.5.
In the above example, the analysis combines physical, digital and social aspects of
security. From the example, one can observe that enforcing a policy which forbids
a server to accept remote connections is useless if there is no physical security
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policy regulating which people can physically reach the server. An additional
organizational policy should address dongle use among employees.
Having described the monotonicity assumption and the intuition of the algorithms
in detail, now we present the three algorithms.
4.4.2 Algorithm I: Finding all action templates
name : findActionTemplates
type : actionTemplate:
〈actionname, postcondition, preconditions, iteration〉
input : Queue of initially satisfied attributes sAttributes
output: Set of action templates allT emplates
1 begin
2 iteration = 0
3 while sAttributes = ∅ do
4 a = pop an attribute from sAttributes
5 templates = all possible action templates t where
a ∈ t.preconditions
6 foreach template t in templates do
7 if all t.preconditions are satisfied and consistent then
8 if t.postcondition not satisfied then
9 push t.postcondition onto sAttributes
10 t.iteration = iteration
11 allT emplates = allT emplates ∪ t
12 iteration++
Algorithm 1: Find all action templates
The first algorithm, findActionTemplates searches for action templates that exist
in the model. This search answers the question: which attributes can be satisfied?
The pseudo-code of the findActionTemplates algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
The findActionTemplates algorithm uses a bottom-up approach. As an input the
algorithm has a queue of satisfied attributes. For each satisfied attribute, the algo-
rithm finds the templates that have the attribute as a precondition (line 5). When
all preconditions of an action template are satisfied and consistent (line 7), the
(monotonic) postcondition of this template is added to the set of satisfied attributes
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(line 9). The algorithm also keeps track of the iteration at which the template was
found (line 10), which is used by the second algorithm.
The monotonicity assumption allows a physical node to be at multiple locations
simultaneously. The preconditions of an action template are consistent if they do
not require the same physical or spatial node to be simultaneously at two different
locations. If an action template is inconsistent, the configuration transition can
never be executed and the action template is ignored. An example of a situation
where an action template requires the same physical node to be at two different
locations is presented in Section 4.4, Example 2.
4.4.2.1 Termination
The termination of the algorithm depends on the while loop in line 3. The al-
gorithm terminates when all attributes that can contribute to the generation of an
action template have been considered (sAttributes = ∅). An attribute is added to
sAttributes only if it is a result of a newly found action template and has not been
satisfied before. The maximum number of attributes in the model is limited and in
the worst case scenario can be N2 delegate attributes plus N × (N − 1) contains
attributes. Thus, the findActionTemplates algorithm will terminate in maximum
2N2 −N steps.
4.4.2.2 Complexity analysis
First, we present three assumptions regarding the policies in a model. We believe
these assumptions are reasonable and realistic for secure environments, which are
the target of the analysis. Then, we analyze every element in the algorithm that
might contribute to its computational complexity.
Assumption 1: There is a constant number of nodes with a policy requiring a
certain location or credential. We consider this assumption reasonable, because
policies are defined based on requirements, not over a percentage of nodes. Thus,
a policy can be set on a specific number of nodes which is not dependent from
the total number of nodes. An example is a requirement where all rooms should
be unlocked with a master key. In this case, the number of nodes with the same
policy is equal to the number of rooms. However, the number of rooms does not
depend on the number of total nodes in the model, but depend on the design of the
building. During our modeling experience, we never encountered a model where
the deployment of a specific policy depends on the number of nodes in the model.
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Assumption 2: Policies require a constant number of credentials. It is unpractical
to ask a user to present more than a few credentials when being granted a privilege.
Formally, we assume for each policy δt(k1, k2, K), that the set K has a constant
upper bound of elements. If this assumption does not hold, a policy might require
up to N credentials before allowing an action, where N is the number of nodes in
the model.
Assumption 3: There is an upper bound on the number of policies per node. We
consider this assumption reasonable because in reality the number of policies on
a security mechanism does not depend from the size of the environment. If this
assumption would not hold, each node in the model can have up to 3× (N+1)2×
2N+1 policies. There can be one policy for each of the capabilities, ln, lt and e,
(N + 1)2 policies from all combinations of location and identity (including ⊥),
and 2N+1 policies from all combinations of credentials.
There are four points in the algorithm that are of interest for the complexity anal-
ysis: the while loop in line 3, the search for possible action templates in line 5, the
foreach cycle in line 6 and finding all satisfied preconditions in line 7. We look
closely at each of these points.
Attributes are added only once to the satisfied attributes queue. The complexity
of the while loop in the algorithm is equal to the maximum number of attributes
that can be satisfied for a given model. Thus, the complexity of the while loop in
line 3 is O(N2).
In line 5, the algorithm searches for all action templates that have the newly sat-
isfied attribute a as a precondition. There are three types of action template that
can have the attribute a as one of their preconditions, each corresponding to one
of the rules from the semantics of the Portunes language (Figure 3.12): netmove′,
netcopy and neteval.
Case I: l :: [logout′(lt1).login(lt2)]
lo (netmove’)
From the semantics of the netmove′ rule, the preconditions of the rule consist of
the preconditions of the logout′ rule, the preconditions of the login rule, and the
attributes lt1 contains lt2 (1) and lt2 contains lt1 (2). The logout
′ rule has the same
preconditions as the logout rule: lt1 contains l (3), lo delegates to l (4) and the
preconditions of the grant function. The grant function has the preconditions:
lo contains lco (5) and lpo contains lo (6). The login rule has the precondition lo
delegates to l which is identical to the attribute (4) and the preconditions of the
grant function (5) and (6).
The attribute a contains information of two node names. If the attribute a is con-
sidered as one of the attributes (1), (2), (3) or (4), two of the nodes l, lt1 , lt2 or lo
are defined. There can be at most N2 such action templates, one for every combi-
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nation of the two unidentified nodes. If the attribute a is considered as one of the
attributes (5) or (6), then the node lo is known. Because of the first assumption,
there are only a constant number of nodes lt1 and lt2 with policies that require at-
tribute a. Knowing lo and one of the nodes lt1 or lt2 , there are N
2 possible action
templates with the attribute a as a precondition. The attribute a can be considered
as any of the attributes mentioned above, thus all of them need to be checked. The
attribute a can be considered as (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5), (6) for the policies at
node lt1 and attributes (5), (6) for the policies at node lt2 . In total, there are 8×N2
netmove′ action templates that could have a as a precondition. As a result, the
computational complexity of finding these templates is O(N2)
Case II: l :: [logout′(lt1).login(lt2)]
lo (netcopy)
The netcopy rule consists of the preconditions of the logout′ rule ((3), (4), (5),
(6)) and the preconditions of the login rule ((5), (6)). These attributes are a subset
of the attributes presented in Case I and the complexity analysis is identical. Thus,
the complexity to find the netcopy action templates that have the attribute a as a
precondition is O(N2).
Case III: l :: [eval(P )@lt)]lo (neteval)
From the semantics of the neteval rule, the preconditions of the rule consist of
the preconditions of the eval rule. The eval rule consists of the preconditions of
the grant function ((5),(6)), preconditions of the l e lt relation and lo delegates
to l (4). The relation l e lt consists of the attributes l contains lt (7), l′po contains
l (8) and l′po contains lt (9).
If the attribute a is considered as one of the attributes (4), (5) or (6), the complexity
analysis is similar as in Case I. If the attribute is considered as the attribute l
contains lt (7), there can be N possible neteval action templates, one for every
possible lo. If the attribute a is considered as the attribute l′po contains l (8), l is
known, and there areN2 possible neteval action templates, for every combination
of lo and lt. Similarly, if the attribute a is considered as attribute l′po contains lt
(9), then lt is known, and there are N2 possible neteval action templates, one for
every l and lo. Again, the worst case complexity for finding all possible neteval
action templates is O(N2).
From the three cases, the overall complexity of finding the action templates that
have a specific attribute as an attribute is the complexity to find all netmove′ action
templates (O(N2)), all netcopy action templates (O(N2)) and all neteval action
templates (O(N2)). Thus the computational complexity of line 5 in the algorithm
is O(N2).
The foreach loop in line 6 traverses all found templates, which we showed can be
at most O(N2). From the net semantics of the Portunes language and assumption
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lt1 contains lt2 (1) lpo contains lo (6)
lt2 contains lt1 (2) l contains lt (7)
lt1 contains l (3) l
′
po contains l (8)
lo delegates to l (4) l′po contains lt (9)
lo contains lco (5)
Figure 4.6: Attributes used in the semantics of the Portunes language
2, it follows that each action template has a constant number of preconditions.
Thus, the number of preconditions that needs to be checked at line 7 is constant.
If the satisfied attributes are implemented using hash tables, which have a con-
stant lookup time the execution of the whole line 7 is constant. Therefore, the
complexity of the whole algorithm, using the three assumption is O(N4).
The difference with the markAttributes algorithm proposed by Ammann et al. [14]
is how the action templates are found. At every iteration, the markAttributes algo-
rithm exhaustively searches for all combinations of attributes and action templates
and for each action template checks whether its preconditions are satisfied. As a
result, the worst case complexity of the algorithm is O(A2E), where A is number
of attributes and E the number of action templates. For a given Portunes model,
under the above assumptions, there can be a maximum ofN2 attributes andN4 ac-
tion templates (for each combination of node, parent, target, origin), which would
make the complexity of this algorithm O(N8).
There are two main differences between the markAttributes and findActionTem-
plates. First, in each iteration the findActionTemplates algorithm searches only
for the attributes that were generated as a postcondition in the previous iteration,
rather than all attributes. Second, The findActionTemplates algorithm searches
only for action templates that have the newly satisfied attribute as a precondition,
rather than all possible action templates. These two improvements decrease the
computational complexity of the algorithm down to O(N4).
4.4.3 Algorithm II: Generating partial attacks
The first algorithm answers the question: which attribute can be satisfied? The
second algorithm shows how an attribute can be satisfied. The pseudocode of the
generatePartialAttack algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.
Using the generatePartialAttack it is possible to generate a sequence of actions
that lead to a particular goal by backtracking from the goal to the initial situation,
following the postconditions and preconditions of the action templates. The re-
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sulting behavior is partial since it does not contain any cyclic movement of the
nodes. An example of a cyclic movement is an insider going from a hall to a room
to obtain a key, and returning to the hall to continue with the attack.
name : generatePartialAttack
input : Set of action templates actionT
input : Set of attributes goals
input : Set of satisfied attributes sAttributes
output: List of action templates representing a partial attack
1 begin
2 list of action templates pResult = ∅
3 int maxItt = the maximum iteration found in actionT
4 return find (actionT , goals, sAttributes, maxItt, pResult)
name : find
input : Set of action templates actionT
input : Set of attributes goals
input : Set of satisfied attributes sAttributes
input : Iteration at which the action template was found itt
input : List of action templates leading to the goal pResult
output: List of action templates representing a partial attack
5 begin
6 foreach attribute goal in goals do
7 find a template s ∈ actionT with the smallest iteration number
such that s.postcondition = goal and s /∈ pResult
8 if there is no such template then return error
9 pResult.append(s)
10 let p be a set of preconditions of s not in sAttributes.
11 if p = ∅ then
12 sAttributes = sAttributes ∪ p
13 pResult = find (actionT , p, sAttributes, s.itt, pResult)
14 return pResult
Algorithm 2: Generate a monotonic attack scenario
As output, the algorithm produces a set of action templates, contributing to a par-
tial behavior. The behavior is partial because it does not contain action templates
where the node needs to return to a previous location. For example, assume an
insider located in a hall, which connects a room and a restricted area. The insider
goes from the hall to the room to obtain a credential allowing her access to the re-
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stricted area. Because of the monotonicity assumption, the insider can then move
from the room directly in the restricted area because she is also still in the hall.
If the monotonicity assumption is lifted, additional action templates are required
where the insider returns from the room to the hall.
The algorithm starts from the goal set and finds an action template of which the
postcondition satisfies a goal. For each unsatisfied precondition of the action tem-
plate, the algorithm recursively searches for an action template whose postcondi-
tion satisfies the attribute of interest.
To generate a behavior from a given list of action templates we adapt the algorithm
findMinimal presented by Ammann et al. [14]. The algorithm takes as an input the
action templates, actionT, generated by the findActionTemplates algorithm, a set
of attributes, goals, that need to be satisfied, a set of initially satisfied attributes
sAttributes and an iteration number. The resulting list of action templates or-
dered by the iteration present partial attack scenario.
4.4.3.1 Termination
The generatePartialAttack algorithm terminates when either no action template
that leads to the satisfaction of a specific attribute can be used (line 8) or when all
goals are satisfied (line 14). The termination of the algorithm depends on the depth
of the recursion at line 13. At each recursion, the number of satisfied attributes and
used action templates increases, reducing the number of possible action templates
to choose from. Thus, the algorithm at one point will use all possible attributes
and terminate. In the worst case scenario, the algorithm may generate an attack
scenario where all attributes need to be satisfied which translates into 2N2 − N
recursion calls.
4.4.3.2 Complexity analysis
From the net semantics of the Portunes language it follows that each action tem-
plate has a constant number of preconditions. Thus, the loop at line 6 is constant,
because the goals are derived from the preconditions of an action template. Simi-
larly, in line 10 there is a constant number of lookups to check whether a precon-
dition of the action template belongs to the set of satisfied attributes. The satisfied
attributes are implemented using hash tables, which have a constant lookup time.
Finding a template at line 7 is also constant when the action templates are im-
plemented using hash tables. Thus, the computational worst-case complexity of
the algorithm is determined by the number of recursive calls. In the worst-case
79
Chapter 4. Analyzing Portunes models
scenario, the algorithm can be executed for every possible attribute, making the
computational complexity of the algorithm O(N2).
4.4.4 Algorithm III: Simulating the attacks
Because of the monotonicity assumption, the set of action templates generated
by generatePartialAttack does not include cyclic movements. The simulateAttack
algorithm, adds additional action templates in the partial scenarios that generate
cyclic movement of the nodes.
name : simulateAttack
input : Set of initially satisfied attributes base
input : List of action templates pAttack
input : Set of action templates actionT
output: List of action templates representing an attack scenario results
1 begin
2 list result = ∅
3 while pAttack = ∅ do
4 a = the last template in pAttack
5 S = set of preconditions of a not part of base
6 if S = ∅ then
7 result.append(a)
8 change conditions in base based on nonmonotonic
a.postcondition
9 pAttack = pAttack\a
10 else
11 set of action templates partial = {∅}
12 partial = find (actionT , S, base, a.iteration, partial)
13 pAttack.append(partial)
Algorithm 3: Simulate the attacks
The simulateAttack algorithm uses a list of action templates pAttack, which are
generated by the generatePartialAttack algorithm and a set of attributes satisfied
from the initial configuration of the Portunes model, and returns a list of action
templates which represent an attack scenario. The algorithm takes the last action
template from the list and checks if its precondition is met. If all attributes in the
precondition are satisfied, the algorithm executes the action from the template and
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updates the attributes with the postcondition from the action template. If a precon-
dition is not satisfied because it is invalidated by the execution of another action
template, the algorithm uses the find function of the generatePartialAttack al-
gorithm to generate a new partial scenario which tries to satisfy the precondition
and continues the simulation. The variable result is a list containing an attack
scenario which might include cyclic movement and is semantically valid when
translated into the Portunes language. The attack can then be translated to the
Portunes language by grouping the actions by origin node.
4.4.4.1 Termination
The output of generatePartialAttack algorithm is finite, thus pAttack is a finite
list. The simulateAttack algorithm will terminate when the number of action
templates in pAttack gets exhausted (line 3). The only time we add action tem-
plates in pAttack is at line 13, when we need to satisfy an invalidated precondi-
tion. We show in two steps that the algorithm terminates. First, we show that for
an algorithm not to terminate, we need an action template with mutually exclusive
preconditions. Second, we show that such action template does not exist.
Step I: We add an action template to the list pAttacks at line 13 only when a
precondition of the action template is invalidated. The satisfaction of the precon-
dition can invalidate another already satisfied precondition. We distinguish three
cases based on the mutual dependence of preconditions in an action template.
Case I: An action template has an independent precondition invalidated. In this
case, the algorithm will generate a finite list of action templates that will satisfy
the precondition.
Case II: An action template has the precondition A invalidated, and its satisfac-
tion invalidates an already satisfied precondition B. In this case, the algorithm
will first generate one trace that satisfies the invalidated precondition A and then
an additional trace to satisfy the newly invalidated precondition B.
Case III: An action template that has a precondition A invalidated, and its sat-
isfaction invalidates an already satisfied precondition B. The satisfaction of the
newly invalidated precondition B invalidates the newly satisfied precondition A.
When the algorithm reaches such action template, one of the two attributes will
never be satisfied. The algorithm will find new action templates (line 12) and ap-
ply them (line 8) which will lead to the satisfaction of the invalidated attribute.
When the invalidated attribute gets satisfied, the other attribute will get invali-
dated, causing the algorithm to search for additional new action templates and
leading to an infinite loop.
Thus, the algorithm will not terminate only if there is an action template with two
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mutually exclusive attributes A and B as a precondition to achieve a postcondition
C:
1. Satisfaction of the attribute A requires the invalidation of the attribute B.
2. Satisfaction of the attribute B requires the invalidation of the attribute A.
3. Satisfaction of the attribute C requires the satisfaction of both A and B.
Step II: Only the netmove template invalidates an attribute as a postcondition.
Thus, the action template must have a precondition that requires a node to be at
a specific location (requiring the node to move to the location), and another pre-
condition that requires the same node to be at another location (requiring the node
to move to the other location). The first algorithm eliminates the action templates
that require the same physical or spatial node to be simultaneously at two different
locations as a precondition, because these actions cannot be performed in realistic
scenario. Thus, there are no such action templates that can lead to non-termination
of the algorithm.
4.4.4.2 Complexity analysis
The maximum number of action templates in pAttack is 2N2 because there can be
maximum of N2 containment relationships and N2 delegations. Thus, the com-
plexity caused by the while loop in line 3 is O(N2). For each action template, the
algorithm might need to generate a cyclic movement and call the find function
in line 12. From the previous algorithm, the complexity of generating a partial
scenario is O(N2). The rest of the actions in the algorithm are constant. Assum-
ing the existence of only simple cycles, meaning there are no cyclic movements
within the cyclic movements, the worst case complexity of the simulateAttack
algorithm is O(N4).
4.5 Correctness of the analysis
The monotonicity assumption reduces the computational complexity of the analy-
sis from exponential to polynomial. In Section 4.4 we described both the require-
ments and the effect of using the monotonicity assumption. The monotonicity
assumption requires that the invalidation of an attribute does not influence the ex-
ecution of any other action template and as a result (1) the findActionTemplates
algorithm produces an over-approximation of possible action templates (Example
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3 in Section 4.4 and (2) the generatePartialAttack algorithm produces attack
scenarios without cyclic behavior (Section 4.4.1).
To satisfy the requirement of the monotonicity assumption, we changed the se-
mantics of the Portunes language, by replacing the netmove rule with the netmove′
rule. In this section we show that the attacks generated by the analysis are correct
with respect of the semantics presented in Chapter 3: (1) the over-approximation
of action templates does not lead to attack scenarios and (2) the attack scenarios
generated by the analysis may contain cyclic behavior.
The simulateAttack algorithm follows the net semantics of the Portunes language
introduced in Chapter 3. Thus, an attack scenario produced by this algorithm
can be reconstructed using the Portunes language. If the algorithm generatePar-
tialAttack generates an attack scenario that cannot be executed using the Portunes
semantics, algorithm simulateAttack will either add any missing action templates
to make the attack semantically correct (lines 10-13) or, if this is not possible,
the generatePartialAttack algorithm will return an error (line 8). Thus, the attack
generated by the analysis follows the semantics of the Portuens language.
4.6 Implementation
We implemented Portunes in Java. Figure 4.7 illustrates a screenshot of the Por-
tunes interface. The interface is able to draw a new graph from scratch, including
the different kind of nodes, policies and relations. The steps for a successful run
of the tool are given in the activity diagram in Figure 4.8. Below we give a de-
scription of the various aspects of the Portunes interface.
1. Toolbar The toolbar is used for loading and saving a graph. It also provides
buttons to add the different kinds of nodes to the graph (object, spatial and
digital). At the end are the buttons for running the algorithms. The first
algorithm will give all possible actions using the monotonicity assumption.
By first selecting an edge that represents an undesirable goal and then press-
ing the second algorithm button, Portunes will show a number of possible
behaviors with the selected edge as a final configuration.
2. Attack scenarios This panel shows possible behaviors after a successful
run of the second algorithm. The list is ordered by the number of actions
required for the behavior to complete. By selecting a behavior one can see
the behavior in a step-by-step execution using the panel at the bottom (5).
3. Graph view With the graph view one can edit a graph by dragging nodes
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Figure 4.7: Screenshot of the implementation of Portunes
and drawing edges between them. The type of relation can be specified by
right clicking a node and selecting the appropriate type. The graph view
uses different colors and shapes for the different types of nodes and edges.
The graph view is also used by the step-by-step execution to show each
action in a graphical way by adding arrows to nodes that are involved in the
current step.
4. Policy panel With the graph view it is possible to draw a complete configu-
ration of the model, except for the policies. The Policy panel allows a user
to define the different types of policies for a node (login, logout and eval).
The panel is divided into three tabs used for giving an overview of the cur-
rent policies, defining a new policy and editing an existing policy. A policy
consists of an identity, location and zero or more credentials.
5. Attack description This panel shows a step-by-step textual description of
a selected behavior. Each step is explained and the user can step back and
forward through the behavior. With each step the graph view (3) changes to
match the current step of the behavior.
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Figure 4.8: Activity diagram of the sequence of actions in the Portunes tool
4.7 Benchmark
The performance analysis is done to study the empirical complexity of the first
algorithm and compare it to Groove, a general purpose model checker. The anal-
ysis was done on a Intel Core 2 Quad computer with CPU at 2.4 Ghz and 8 GB
of RAM. Windows 7 64-bit was used as operating system with version 1.6 of the
Java runtime environment installed. As a comparison, Groove version 4.0.2 was
used.
4.7.1 Groove
Groove2 is a model checker that uses graphs for modeling the design-time, compile-
time, and run-time structure of object-oriented systems, and graph transformations
as a basis for model transformation and operational semantics. The tool allows en-
coding the Portunes semantics as a set of graph transformation rules. The graph
models of Groove have the same benefit as Portunes, namely that the office model
can be visualized as a graph.
4.7.2 Models
To get experimental data of the performance of the first algorithm and bench-
mark compared to Groove, we used a variation of the road apple attack inside an
office model3. The model is scalable, as more floors, rooms and people can be
added. We made a secure and insecure variant of the office model, by making
more and less restrictive policies respectively. For example, in the insecure vari-
ant, the rooms and floors have no login restrictions, whereas the secure variant
only allows card holders to enter the floors and each card holder can only enter
one specific room, namely the one they start in. The insecure office model is the
worst-case scenario where the organization has no explicit security mechanisms
2groove.cs.utwente.nl
3Available for download at portunes.sourceforge.net
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Figure 4.9: Time analysis for the findActionTemplates algorithm
that restrict user and data mobility, and the secure office model is an average-case
scenario where the organization has taken actions to increase the security of the
environment. The average-case scenario does not give information on the worst-
case complexity, but it does show the speed for an architecture where proper secu-
rity measures exist. We generated 7 models for the road apple example, containing
50, 100, 150, 200, 500, 1000 and 2000 nodes.
4.7.3 Results from the benchmark
The results of the time performance analysis are presented in Figure 4.9. To
find the coefficients a and b from the complexity formula aN b, we used power
regression. The formula for the power regression curve of the Office data is
2 × 10−6N3.26 with correlation coefficient R2=0.984. The formula for the power
regression curve of the SecureOffice data is 3×10−4N1.69 with correlation coeffi-
cientR2=0.97. From the data, we can see that on average, the worst case complex-
ity model grows N3.26 with the increase of number of nodes in the model. For the
SecureOffice model which represents a well secured organization this coefficient
is much less, 1.69. As expected, the measured time complexity of Portunes for
4The correlation coefficient R2 is the proportion of variance in a data set that is accounted
for by the formula. The coefficient represents a measure of how well the formula represents the
measured data. If the formula passes exactly through every point on the scatter plot then the
coefficient would be 1. The further the line is away from the points, the closer the coefficient is to
0.
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Figure 4.10: Time analysis for Groove
the worst-case model is below O(N4). The measured time complexity of Groove
for the worst-case model is O(N5.99).
The results show that generating a behavior quickly becomes infeasible using a
general purpose model checker. Groove was unable to compute the office model
with 200 nodes where Portunes could find all possible action templates in the
office model 500 within an acceptable time frame (∼30 minutes). Looking at
the secure office model the difference becomes even more clear. Groove requires
almost 2 hours for the 200 nodes model, where Portunes is able to find the same
action templates for the 2000 nodes model in less than 4 minutes.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented the algorithms to analyze attacks that span the phys-
ical, digital and social domain. We show that computing insider attacks can be
done efficiently by splitting the work in two stages. In the first stage we compute
all possible actions by using the monotonicity assumption. In the second stage
we can recreate a specific attack by retracing the required steps. The performance
analysis shows that for reasonably secure environments (i.e. SecureOffice) the
algorithms can generate behaviors in a reasonable time (i.e. less than 4 minutes).
In this chapter we also described the Portunes tool, designed around the presented
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algorithms. The tool shows that the model and the algorithms can indeed generate
useful attack traces for a real life scenario. We tested multiple models with the
tool, all describing different situations in order to test the algorithms.
The complexity of the second and third algorithm increases polynomially with
the number of nodes. However, the number of possible behaviors grows expo-
nentially with the action templates found by the first algorithm. Therefore, it is
important to generate/select only those behaviors that are of interest to the security
professionals. In the following chapter, we present a logic that specifies high-level
policies formally. The logic can be used as a heuristic in the second algorithm in
generating behaviors that satisfy defined properties, as well as to select specific
behaviors from a set of generated behaviors.
88
Chapter 5
Expressing high-level policies in
Portunes
In this chapter we present a temporal logic for describing high-level
policies in the Portunes framework. The logic is inspired by Hennessy-
Milner Logic (HML) and the modal logic for mobile agents. First, we
provide requirements and motivating examples where we informally
describe the properties of interest in a Portunes model. Second, we
present the logic and show that it is sufficiently expressive to present
these properties formally. The logic presented in this chapter serves
three purposes: (1) from a modeling perspective, the logic enables
definition of high-level policies, that should hold for the system as a
whole, rather than on a specific object as was the case with the low-
level policies in Chapter 3; (2) from an analysis perspective, the logic
enables the description of a goal containing a conjunction or disjunc-
tion of multiple subgoals rather than a simple goal as was the case in
Chapter 4; and (3) from a functionality perspective, the logic enables
specification of subset of behaviors from a given set of behaviors,
allowing the user to focus only on the set of behaviors that are of in-
terest.
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5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3 we defined a language to describe a Portunes model and used the road
apple attack as an example. However, we defined the goal of the road apple attack
informally, saying that ”the data ends up at the remote server”. In Chapter 4 we
presented this property more formally, as a satisfaction of the attribute ”the node
remoteServer contains the node serverData”. In this chapter we present the goal
as a formal property in the modal logic that should eventually hold in the Portunes
model, 〈◦〉c(remoteServer, serverData). The formal presentation of properties
in the model is suitable for defining complex goals because of the unambiguity of
formal statements.
Modal logic is the most convenient formal tool to express properties of a Portunes
model. Modal logic is usually used to specify and verify properties of concurrent
models. Properties in these models are specified by means of temporal and spatial
modalities. In Chapter 4 we presented algorithms to generate all possible behav-
iors that lead to the satisfaction of a single spatial property. In this chapter, we
will present a new modal logic which can be used to express spatial and temporal
properties of Portunes models.
We define the logic for Portunes in order to (1) describe adversarial goals and
(2) describe high-level policies which should hold for all evolutions of a Portunes
model. The logic for Portunes is primarily aimed to aid security auditors to as-
sess whether high-level policies always hold in the organization. Portunes can
search for a behavior where a person invalidates an high-level policy without in-
validating any low-level policies specified on the nodes. The logic can also help
penetration testers describe specific adversarial goal and isolate specific subsets
of attack scenarios.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.2 we provide mo-
tivating examples to describe the properties of interest in a Portunes model. In
Section 5.3 we provide an overview of related work and how the presented logic
differs. Section 5.4 specifies the predicates for net and net evolutions and in sec-
tion 5.5 we present the logic. Section 5.6 shows how the examples presented in
Section 5.2 can be specified using the logic and in Section 5.7 we conclude the
chapter.
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5.2 Motivating examples
In this section we present the requirements for the logic. The requirements are
distilled from observing a number of Portunes models obtained through a use
case and a series of penetration tests. In the use case, we modeled a five story
building and observed the low-level policies on individual objects and the general
high-level policies. We also performed a series of physical penetration tests using
social engineering (Chapter 6). From the attack traces obtained from the tests, we
looked at which properties a penetration tester might be interested in. We present
our findings in three general requirements.
For each requirement, we provide four motivating examples. The majority of the
examples present properties from the road apple example and are linked to the
nodes in Figure 3.4. The examples are numbered in the form x.y, where x speci-
fies the requirement the example is aiming to clarify, and y is the number of the
example. The first two examples from each requirement specify properties that
are useful for penetration testers, while the second two examples specify proper-
ties that are of interest to security auditors.
Requirement 1: The logic should be able to specify knowledge, location and
possession. We consider that an attack has occurred when an unauthorized person
eventually (a) learns confidential information, (b) reaches a restricted location or
(c) gains possession of an object.
Example 1.1 The server data reaches a remote server.
Example 1.2 The insider learns the employee’s password.
Management may also use these properties to describe high-level policies.
Example 1.3 The server data should never leave the secure server.
Example 1.4 Only an employee can enter the secure room.
Requirement 2: The logic should be able to distinguish among different evolu-
tions leading to the same goal. In a penetration test, where the quality of the
security is measured by how close the tester gets to the target (the number of cir-
cumvented layers of protection), the tester is interested in specific class of attack
scenarios.
Example 2.1 The insider enters the secure room and steals the data.
Example 2.2 The insider gives a dongle to the employee and steals the data.
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P1=(logout(world).login(hall).eval(P ′)@secureServer)insider
P ′=(eval(login(remoteServer))@serverData)insider
P2=(eval(logout(hall).login(secureRoom))@insider)employee
P3=nil
P4=nil
Figure 5.1: A scenario where the employee lets the insider inside the secure room
The scenario defined by the process definitions in Figure 5.1 satisfies the prop-
erty of example 2.1, and example 2.2 is satisfied by the scenario defined by the
process definitions in Figure 3.15 that describe the road apple attack. Both sce-
narios eventually achieve the same result, namely the serverData ends up in the
remoteServer. A penetration tester might be more interested in scenarios sat-
isfying the first example where the insider as part of the data theft manages to
enter the secure room because in these scenarios she circumvents more protection
layers. Therefore, the logic should be able to distinguish such different evolutions.
From a defensive point of view, a security auditor might be interested in specifying
the proper execution order of procedures for accomplishing a task.
Example 2.3 A person can enter the secure room only through the hall.
Example 2.4 Whenever the employee receives money, the money is depo-
sited in the secure room.
Requirement 3: The logic should enable segregation of scenarios based on the
social interaction between people, namely trust and delegation. In Portunes trust
is represented through security policies on people, while delegation is described
through remote evaluation of processes on people. For example, P2 in Figure 5.1,
shows that the employee asks the insider to enter the secure room, or in other
words delegates a task to the insider, which the insider gladly accepts. However,
in the road apple attack (Figure 3.15 from Chapter 3), the insider gives the dongle
to the employee, and the employee trusts the insider sufficiently to accept the
dongle.
In some penetration tests the interaction between the tester and an employee is
forbidden by the rules of engagement, or it is considered as a risky action because
the outcome of the interaction is unpredictable. In other tests the main goal of the
tester is to investigate the reaction of the employees in specific situations. For the
first or for the second reason, penetration testers need to isolate attack scenarios
that include social interaction.
Example 3.1 The insider steals the data by tricking the employee.
92
5.3. Related work
Examples
Requirement 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4
a y n y y y y y y y y n n
1 b n y n n n n n n n n n n
c n n n n n n n y n n n n
2 n n y y y y y y y y y y
3 n n n n n y n n y y y y
Figure 5.2: The requirements and the examples that motivate the requirements.
Example 3.2 The insider steals the data without interacting with people.
From defensive point of view, the security auditor might want to check policies
on the hierarchy of the organization:
Example 3.3 No person should delegate tasks to the boss.
Example 3.4 Only the boss should delegate tasks to other employees.
In Figure 5.2 we provide an overview of the requirements and show which prop-
erty the logic should be capable to express to specify each motivating example.
For example, expressing the property in Example 3.2 requires the logic to be able
to express location, to show that the data is in a server controlled by the insider
(requirement 1.a), to segregate among subsets of net evolutions, to select only
evolutions where the insider tricks the employee (requirement 2) and to express
interactions between people, to show the interaction between the insider and the
employee (requirement 3).
5.3 Related work
The modal logic to reason about properties of a Portunes model and formally
present goals of attack scenarios is inspired by Hennesy-Milner logic (HML) [56]
and the modal logic for mobile agents [36].
In HML the temporal properties of the processes are expressed by the diamond
operator 〈a〉φ indexed with a transition label. A process P satisfies 〈a〉φ if there
exists a label a and a process P ′ such that P a−→ P ′ and P ′ satisfies φ. The
transition labels in HML are considered as basic entities and are syntactically
characterized by the label of the modal operator.
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The modal logic of De Nicola enriches HML logic with more refined action pred-
icates and state formulae. The diamond operator, instead of being indexed with
basic labels a, is indexed with abstract actions A, which denote a set of basic
labels, the localities involved in the transition and the information transmitted.
Thus, the abstract operators denote properties of the transition labels. A net N
satisfies a formula 〈A〉φ if there exists a label a and a net N ′ such that a satisfies
A, N a N ′ and N ′ satisfies φ.
The logic for mobile agents allows the specification of mobile system properties
specified in Klaim. Our approach uses similar notation and constructs, but adapts
the semantics of the logic to the constructs of the Portunes language.
First, the Portunes language does not have variables nor logical localities, but does
have node types. Thus, the predicates for variables are absent, we do not distin-
guish between physical and logical localities, and we introduce the type predicate
u.
Second, the Klaim language has a different set of actions, thus the predicates for
Klaim actions are replaced by predicates that reflect Portunes actions. Thirdly,
the Portunes language does not have tuples, thus all tuple predicates from the
transition labels and transition label predicates are absent. Because Portunes does
not use variables nor logical spatialities all binding constructs and mapping are
also absent from the logic.
Third, the modal logic for mobile agents contains state formulae to specify the
distribution of the tuples in the system. Since the Portunes language does not
have tuples, they are also missing from the logic presented in this chapter.
Finally, the diamond operator has a different meaning compared to the one used
in HML and the logic for mobile agents. A netN satisfies a formula 〈A〉φ if there
exists a label a that satisfies A, the net can eventually transition using the action a
into a net N ′ (N a=⇒+ N ′) and N ′ satisfies φ. Thus, a net will satisfy the formula
not only if the action can occur in the next transition, but also if the action can
occur in one of the further transitions.
5.4 Net and net evolution predicates
Motivated by the examples above, we now present the logic for expressing proper-
ties of a Portunes model. First we introduce the syntax of predicates for locations,
actions and processes and provide their semantics. Using these predicates we can
specify properties on process definitions for a given net. Next, we present the
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predicates on the transition labels that describe the net evolutions. Finally, we
present the semantics of the modal logic used for describing the properties of a
given net.
5.4.1 Net predicates
Syntax of location predicates:
lp ::= 1L | u | l
Location predicates can be a generic location (1L), a type (u) or a location (l). L
is the universe of node names, LN ⊆ L is a finite set of names for a given net N
and LocN is a finite set of location predicate atoms for a given net N .
Examples of location predicates are: the predicate insider is satisfied by all nodes
named insider, the predicate Space is satisfied by all nodes of type Space and 1L
is satisfied by all nodes in the net.
Syntax of action predicates:
ap ::= lt(lp) | lt′(lp) | ln(lp) | e(pp)@lp
Every action from the Portunes language is represented by a predicate. The pred-
icate lt(lp) is satisfied by all logout(l) where l satisfies the location predicate lp
and lt′(lp) is satisfied by all logout′(l) where l satisfies the location predicate lp.
Similarly, the action predicate ln(lp) is satisfied by all login(l) actions where l sat-
isfies the location predicate lp and e(pp)@lp is satisfied by all eval(P )@l, where
the process P satisfies the predicate pp and the node l satisfies the predicate lp. A
is a universe of actions, AN ⊆ A is a finite set of actions in a given net N and
ActN is a finite set of action predicates for a given net N .
A few examples of action predicates are: the predicate lt(insider) is satisfied by
all the actions logout(insider) , ln(Space) is satisfied by all login actions that
perform login to a node of type Space, and e(1p)@employee is satisfied by all
eval actions that delegate a process to a node that satisfy the predicate employee.
Syntax of process predicates:
pp ::= 1P | pp ∧ pp | aplp → pp
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The process predicate 1P is satisfied by all processes and a conjunction of two
process predicates pp ∧ pp is satisfied by processes that satisfy both predicates.
The predicate aplp → pp is satisfied by processes that contain an action satisfying
the action predicate ap with an origin node satisfying the predicate lp followed by
a process that satisfies the pp predicate. We define P as a universe of processes,
PN ⊆ P as a finite set of processes in a given net N and ProcN as a finite set of
process predicates for a given net N .
For example, the net:
N ::= insider ::δ{money}P || employee ::δ{secret}Q || hall ::δ{insider,employee}
defines an environment where an employee and an insider are in the same hall.
The intention of the insider to give money to the employee can be presented
through the process predicate:
(e(ln(employee)insider → 1P )@moneyinsider) → 1P .
The process predicate has the form aplp → pp, where the action predicate ap is
e(ln(employee)insider → 1P )@money, the origin predicate of ap is insider and
pp is the predicate 1P . The action predicate ap is of the form e(pp)@lp where the
process predicate is again of the from aplp → pp, or e(ln(employee)insider → 1P
and the locality predicate of the formmoney. This process predicate will be satis-
fied by all processes originating from insider that contain an action eval(P )@money.
Moreover the process P must contain an action login(employee) originating from
insider. Similarly the intention of the employee to give a secret to the insider is
presented through the predicate:
(e(ln(insider)employee → 1P )@secretemployee) → 1P .
Two sets of processes P and Q that satisfy these predicates:
P = eval(logout(insider)...login(employee))@moneyinsider
Q = eval(logout(employee)...login(insider))@secretemployee
5.4.2 Semantics of state predicates
The syntax of the predicates, helps in specification of nets based on the intentions
of the nodes within. In other words, we can specify properties of processes within
the nodes of the net.
The semantics of the predicates are presented in the form of the functions: L :
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L : LocN → 2LN AC :ActN → 2AN
AClt(lp)  = {logout(l) | l∈Llp}
L 1L = LN AClt′(lp) = {logout′(l) | l∈Llp}
L  u  = {l | T (l)=u} ACln(lp) = {login(l) | l∈Llp}
L  l  = {l} ACe(pp)@lp = {eval(P )@l | l∈Llp, P ∈Ppp}
P : ProcN → 2PN
P 1P  = PN
P pp1 ∧ pp2 = Ppp1 ∩ Ppp2
P aplp→pp = {P | ∃a,l,Q :a∈ACap, l∈Llp, origin(a)= l, P a−→+Q,Q∈Ppp}
Figure 5.3: Interpretation of location, action and process predicates
LocN → 2LN ,AC:ActN → 2AN ,P : ProcN → 2PN , which take a predicate lp,
pp or ap and return a set of locations, processes and actions that satisfy the pred-
icates respectively. The sets LN , AN and PN are derived from a named Portunes
model presented by a specific net N . The semantics are defined in Figure 5.3.
The relation P a−−→+ Q is satisfied when: ∃P ′ : P →∗ P ′, P ′ a−→ Q, where →∗ is
the reflexive, transitive closure of →, defined in Section 3.5.4.
L 1L returns the set of locations LN , L u returns a set of locations that belong
to a specific type and L l returns a specific location l ∈ LN . P1P  returns
all processes in the net and Ppp1 ∧ pp2 returns the processes that satisfy both
predicates pp1 and pp2. Paplp→ pp returns the processes that can execute an
action satisfying the predicate ap, using an origin satisfying the predicate lp, and
then evolve in a process that satisfies the predicate pp.
A process P from a net N satisfies the predicate pp, iff P ∈Ppp. Analogously,
action a from a net N satisfies the predicate ap iff a ∈ ACap and a location l
from a net N satisfies the predicate lp iff l∈Llp.
5.4.3 Transition label predicates
The process predicates present a set of actions that a single process might perform,
and not actual net evolutions. In other words, a process predicate specifies an
intention not an execution.
The transition labels, which present evolutions of a net are defined in Figure 5.4.
We use LabN to denote a finite set of label predicates defined over a given net N
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A ::= ◦ lab ::= netcopy (l, l, l)
| A1 ∪ A2 | neteval (l, P, l)
| A1 ∩ A2 | netmove(l, l, l)
| A1 − A2
| src (lp)
| trg (lp)
| prt (lp)
| nc (lp1, lp2, lp3)
| ne (lp1, pp, lp2 )
| nm(lp1, lp2, lp3)
Figure 5.4: Syntax of transition labels and transition label predicates
and LPN to denote a finite set of transition labels. The function that defines the
meaning of the label predicates A : LabN → 2LPN is given in Figure 5.5.
We define the syntax and semantics of label predicates, where the locations and
processes are replaced by location and process predicates. We use ◦ to denote all
transition labels and ∪, ∩ and− to denote union, intersection and exclusion of two
sets of transition labels. The predicates src, prt and trg denote transition labels
which have a specific source, parent or target node. The predicate nc(lp1, lp2, lp3)
denotes transitions labeled netcopy where the first parameter of the transition label
satisfies the location predicate lp1, the second parameter lp2 and the third param-
eter lp3. Similarly, ne and nc denote the neteval and netmove transition labels
respectively.
Using the transition label predicates, we can specify sets of transitions labels based
on a property they posses. For example, the predicate prt(insider) is satisfied by
all transition labels which add or remove an object or data from the node sat-
isfying the location predicate insider, trg(employee) is satisfied by all transi-
tion labels in which an object or data is given, or a task is delegated to a node
satisfying the location predicate employee and nm(Person, 1L, secureRoom)−
nm(employee, 1L, secureRoom) is satisfied by all transition labels in which node
of type Person other than the node satisfying the predicate employee move to a
node that satisfies the predicate secureRoom.
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A : LabN → 2LPN
A  ◦  = LPN
A A1 ∪A2 = AA1 ∪ AA2
A A1 ∩A2 = AA1 ∩ AA2
A A1 −A2 = {a|a∈AA1, a ∈ AA2}
A  src(lp)  = {a|a∈Anm(l,1L,1L)∪Anc(l,1L,1L)∪Ane(l,1P ,1L), l∈Llp}
A  trg(lp)  = {a|a∈Anm(1L,1L, l)∪Anc(1L,1L, l)∪Ane(1L,1P , l), l∈Llp}
A  prt(lp)  = {a|a∈Anm(1L, l,1L)∪Anc(1L, l,1L), l ∈ L lp}
A nm(lp1, lp2, lp3) = {netmove(l1, l2, l3)| l1 ∈ L lp1, l2 ∈ L lp2, l3 ∈ L lp3}
A ne(lp1, pp, lp2)  = {neteval(l1, P, l3) | l1 ∈ L lp1, l2 ∈ L lp2, P ∈ P pp }
A nc(lp1, lp2, lp3)  = {netcopy(l1, l2, l3) | l1 ∈ L lp1, l2 ∈ L lp2, l3 ∈ L lp3}
Figure 5.5: Semantics of transition label predicates
5.5 Logic for Portunes models
Definition 15. (Hennessy-Milner Logic) The set of HML formulas [56] for Por-
tunes is given by the BNF grammar:
φ ::= tt | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | c(lp, lp) | 〈A〉φ
The formula tt is always satisfied. The formula ¬φ is satisfied by a net that does
not satisfy φ, while φ1 ∧ φ2 is satisfied by a net that satisfies both φ1 and φ2. The
formula c(lp1, lp2) is satisfied by a net in which a node l2 with a name satisfying
the predicate lp2 belongs to the set s of a node l1 satisfying the predicate lp1,
meaning node l1 contains node l2. Finally, 〈A〉φ is satisfied by a net N that has
a transition label that satisfies A and after the transition satisfies the formula φ.
Formulas like [A]φ and φ1 ∨ φ2 can be derived from the logic: [A]φ = ¬〈A〉¬φ
and φ1 ∨ φ2 = ¬(¬φ1 ∧ ¬φ2).
For example, c(remoteServer, serverData) is satisfied by all nets where the
server data is located in the remote server and 〈nm(insider, hall, secureRoom)〉tt
is satisfied by all nets where the insider moves from the hall to the secure room.
We provide more examples of the formulas in the following section.
Let Net be a set of all nodes for a given network N , and Φ the set of all the
formulas. The semantics is defined using the functionM : Φ → 2Net (Figure 5.6).
A net N satisfies a formula φ if and only if N ∈ M φ, and we write N |= φ.
We write N a=⇒+ N1 iff ∃N ′ : N =⇒∗ N ′, N ′ a=⇒ N1. where =⇒∗ is the reflexive,
transitive closure of =⇒ defined in Section 3.5.5.
The above formulas allow us to specify properties of the net for a single state, for
all states in which the net evaluates and properties on the net evolutions.
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M : Φ → 2Net
M tt = Net
M ¬φ = Net−M φ
M φ1 ∧ φ2 = M φ1 ∩M φ2
M 〈A〉φ = {N | ∃a,N1 : N a=⇒+N1, a ∈ A A, N1 ∈ M φ}
M c(lp1, lp2) = {N | ∃l1, l2 : l2 ∈ childrenN (l1), l1∈L lp1, l2∈L lp2}
Figure 5.6: Semantics of the logic
5.6 Using the logic to specify security policies
The logic looks straightforward but it can be difficult to develop an intuition for the
meaning of the operators. In this section we show that sometimes it is difficult to
find the correct formalization of a high-level policy into a formula. For example,
consider the net N0 from Figure 5.7 and the high-level policy ”Sensitive informa-
tion should not leave the hardened servers of the organization”, which is a gener-
alization of Example 1.3, where the serverData is of type SensitiveInfo (sen-
sitive information) and secureServer of type HardServer (hardened server).
The net N0 consists of a room containing two servers, one of which is hardened
(secserver) and one is not (normalserver). The hardened server contains two
nodes (secdata1 and secdata2) both of which are of type SensitiveInfo. From
N0 there are 3 transitions possible, leading to the netsN1,N2 andN3. The netsN0,
N1 and N2 do not satisfy the policy, because from these nets some of the sensitive
information can leave the hardened server. The netN3 satisfies the policy because
the hardened server has no sensitive information that can leave. The Portunes nets,
together with the node types are presented in Figure 5.7.
A first attempt to formalize the high-level policy into our logic would be:
φ1 = ¬c(1L, SensitiveInfo)
The predicate c(1L, SensitiveInfo) in the formula is satisfied by every net where
a node contains another node of type SensitiveInfo. The negation in φ1 states
that the nets that satisfy the predicate do not satisfy the formula and thus violate
the policy. Every net that contains sensitive information will violate the policy,
no matter where the sensitive information is located. In the example net N0, the
hardened server contains sensitive information, thus, the net would not satisfy the
policy, hence N0 |= φ1. This can be proved as fallows:
Mφ1=Net−Mc(1L, SensitiveInfo)={N0, N1, N2, N3}−{N0, N1, N2, N3} = ∅
However, this is not the intention of the high-level policy. The second attempt is
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1 room
2 secserver
3 normalserver
4 secdata1
5 secdata2
2 3
4
1
5
2 3
4
1
5
2 3
4
1
5
2 3
4
1
5
N0 N3N1 N2
room ::
(⊥,⊥,∅) → {ln,lt}
{secserver, normalserver} nil
|| secserver ::(⊥,⊥,∅) → {ln,lt}{secdata1, secdata2} nil
|| normalserver ::(⊥,⊥,∅) → {ln,lt}{} nil
|| secdata1 ::(⊥,⊥,∅) → {ln,lt}{} [logout(secserver).login(normalserver)]secdata1
|| secdata2 ::(⊥,⊥,∅) → {ln,lt}{} [logout(secserver).login(normalserver)]secdata2
T = {Space,HardServer, InsecureServer, SensitiveInfo}
ln= {(Space,HardServer), (Space, InsecureServer),
(HardServer, SensitiveInfo), (InsecureServer, SensitiveInfo)}
T (room) = Space,
T (secserver) = HardServer,
T (normalserver) = InsecureServer,
T (secdata1) = T (secdata2) = SensitiveInfo,
Figure 5.7: A net with two servers and two files.
to make an exception for the hardened servers, as follows:
φ2 = ¬(c(1L, SensitiveInfo) ∧ ¬c(HardServer, SensitiveInfo))
This formula holds only if the current net has a node containing the sensitive
information and if that node is not a hardened server. However, this formula
checks for the satisfaction at the current state of the net, rather than all future net
evolutions. Although the net from the example satisfies this formula (N0 |= φ1),
during the next net transitions, the sensitive data will leave the hardened server,
which is against the high-level policy (N3 |= φ2). We can prove this as follows:
M φ2= Net−M c(1L, SensitiveInfo) ∧ ¬c(HardServer, SensitiveInfo)
= Net− (M c(1L, SensitiveInfo) ∩M ¬c(HardServer, SensitiveInfo))
= Net− (M c(1L, SensitiveInfo) ∩ (Net−M c(HardServer, SensitiveInfo)))
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= {N0, N1, N2, N3} − ({N0, N1, N2, N3} ∩ ({N0, N1, N2, N3} − {N0, N1, N2}))
= {N0, N1, N2}
The third attempt uses a temporal operator that will check whether the formula
holds for all future net transitions would not solve the problem.
φ3 = ¬〈◦〉(c(1L, SensitiveInfo) ∧ ¬c(HardServer, SensitiveInfo))
From the semantics in Figure 5.6, c(HardServer, SensitiveInfo) will hold if
there is at least one relation in the net that satisfies the predicate. Thus, the formula
will be satisfied even by nets where all but one piece of sensitive information is in
a hardened server, which is a violation of the high-level policy.
M φ3 = Net−M 〈◦〉(c(1L, SensitiveInfo) ∧ ¬c(HardServer, SensitiveInfo))
= Net− {N | ∃a,N1 : N a=⇒+N1, a ∈ A ◦,
N1∈M c(1L, SensitiveInfo)∧¬c(HardServer, SensitiveInfo)}
= {N0, N1, N2, N3} − {N0, N1, N2} = {N3}
In the example, the formula seems to deliver the required result, N0 |= φ3. How-
ever, under closer inspection, one can notice that for the current model the nets
N1 and N2 do not satisfy the policy only because they eventually transition into
N3 where all data has left the hardened server. There can be models where only
some of the sensitive data leaves the hardened servers (for example, the current net
without one of the process definitions). If only one sensitive file leaves the hard-
ened server, the resulting net will still satisfy the formula φ3, but will be against
the high-level policy. To represent the high-level policy into our logic we need
to look at a behavior that causes the sensitive information to leave the hardened
servers.
φ4 = ¬〈nm(SensitiveInfo,HardServer, 1L)〉tt
This formula would solve the issue both because it identifies the transitions where
sensitive information is moved from a hardened server and because it is applied
to all net transitions.
M φ4= Net−M nm(SensitiveInfo,HardServer, 1L)〉tt
= {N0, N1, N2, N3} − {N0, N1, N2} = {N3}
Although this policy will identify all behaviors where the information is moved
from a hardened server, it still does not include the behaviors where the sensitive
information is copied. Thus, the final formula that reflects the high-level policy
is:
φ5 = ¬〈nm(SensitiveInfo,HardServer, 1L)〉tt ∧
¬〈nc(SensitiveInfo,HardServer, 1L)〉tt
which is quite different from the initial formula ¬c(1L, SensitiveInfo).
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5.6.1 Examples revisited
In section 3.5.2 we used the Portunes language to describe the road apple attack
formally, an attack where the adversary uses physical, social and digital means to
gain possession of sensitive data. In this section we use the road apple and the
examples from the previous section to (1) describe adversarial goals and (2) for-
mally define high level policies which should hold for all evolutions of the net.
Example 1.1 The server data reaches a remote server.
〈◦〉c(remoteServer, serverData)
Example 1.2 The insider learns the employee’s password.
〈◦〉c(insider, employeePassword)
In Example 1.1 and 1.2 the goal is defined by a node being at a specific loca-
tion. Using similar logic constructs, we can express goals including knowledge of
information (person contains data) and possession (person contains object). The
usage of the 〈◦〉 means we that are not interested in the initial state of the net, but
in an eventual state in the future.
Example 1.3 The server data should never leave the secure server.
¬〈nm(serverData, secureServer, 1L)〉tt ∧
¬〈nc(serverData, secureServer, 1L)〉tt
Example 1.4 Only an employee can enter the secure room.
¬〈nm(Person, 1L, secureRoom)− nm(Employee, 1L, secureRoom)〉tt
Examples 1.3 and 1.4 describe high-level policies which should never be invali-
dated. Here we also see how location (similarly knowledge and possession) can
be used to define a high-level policy.
In Example 1.3, the transition label predicate nm(serverData, secureServer, 1L)
holds for all behaviors that contain a netmove action netmove where the server
data from the secure server moves to any other location in the net, regardless of
the state the net will evolve into(tt). The negation of this predicate results in all
allowed behaviors in the net that do not violate the policy. Because the data can
be copied instead of moved, the formula contains a conjunct transition label pred-
icate for behaviors that contain the netcopy action nc. In Example 1.4, the first
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part of the transition label predicate nm(Person, 1L, secureRoom) holds for ev-
ery behavior where node of type Personmoves into the secure room. The second
part of the predicate, nm(Employee, 1L, secureRoom), holds for every behavior
where a node of type Employee moves into the secure room. The subtraction of
these two predicates results into formula that holds true for all behaviors where a
person moves in the secure office and is not an employee. The negation of this
formula is satisfied by the all behaviors in the net except when a non-employee
enters the secure room.
Example 2.1 The insider steals the data by entering the secure room.
〈nm(insider, 1L, secureRoom)〉(〈◦〉c(remoteServer, serverData))
Example 2.2 The insider steals the data by giving the employee a dongle.
〈nm(dongle, 1L, employee)〉(〈◦〉c(remoteServer, serverData))
In the above two examples, we define two strategies how the insider might get
access to the data. Both strategies might be satisfied by a single net evolution. For
example, the insider enters the office and then gives the dongle to the employee, or
vice versa. Adding additional desired or non-desired conditions further segregates
the possible evolutions of the net, allowing the penetration tester to focus only on
those evolutions she is interested in.
In Example 2.1, the first transition label predicate nm(insider, 1L, secureRoom)
holds only for behaviors that contain an action where an insider enters the secure
room. The second part of the formula 〈◦〉c(remoteServer, serverData) holds
for all behaviors in which eventually the remote server contains the server data.
Thus, the whole formula holds for the behaviors where the insider first moves to
the secure room, and eventually reaches a state where the remote server contains
the server data. In Example 2.2 the structure of the formula is similar. The be-
haviors for which this formula holds have an action where the dongle is given
to the employee, and then eventually the remote server contains the server data.
Note that in both examples there might be no causality between the actions in the
behavior. For example, there might be a behavior where the employee receives
a dongle, but this action does not contribute to the server data ending up in the
remote server.
Example 2.3 A person can enter the secure room only through the hall.
¬〈nm(Person, Space, secureRoom)− nm(Person, hall, secureRoom)〉tt
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Example 2.4 Whenever the employee receives money, the money is deposited in
the secure room.
¬(〈nm(money, 1L, Employee)〉¬(〈nm(money, Employee, secureRoom)〉tt))
In Examples 2.3 and 2.4, the transition label predicates are satisfied only by a spe-
cific subset of the transition labels. Namely, all locations from where an employee
can move inside the room, except the hall are forbidden. Or, as is the case of ex-
ample 2.4, the property specifies only net evolutions where an employee receives
money and then the money is eventually sent to the secure room.
In Example 2.3, the transition label predicate consists of two parts. The first part,
nm(Person, Space, secureRoom), is satisfied by all behaviors where a node
of type Person enters the secure room, while the second part of the predicate,
nm(Person, hall, secureRoom), is satisfied by all behaviors where a node of
type Person enters the secure room through the hall. The whole transition la-
bel predicate is satisfied by all behaviors where a node of type Person enters the
secure room except if he enters through the hall. The negation of the whole for-
mula is satisfied by all behaviors, except the ones where a node of type Person
enters the secure room from any other place than the hall. In Example 2.4, the
first transition label predicate nm(money, 1L, Employee) is satisfied by all be-
haviors where the employee receives money. The second transition label pred-
icate nm(money, Employee, secureRoom) is satisfied by all behaviors where
the money is deposited in the secure room. When both predicates are connected
with a negation between them, the resulting formula is satisfied by all behaviors
where the employee receives money, but the money are not eventually deposited
in the secure room. Finally, the negation in front of the first transition label pred-
icate makes the whole formula hold for all behaviors except the ones where the
employee receives money, but the money are not eventually deposited in the se-
cure room.
Example 3.1 The insider steals the data by tricking the employee.
〈ne(insider, 1P , Employee)〉(〈◦〉c(remoteServer, serverData))
Example 3.2 The insider steals the data without interacting with people.
(¬〈ne(insider, 1P , P erson)〉)(〈◦〉c(remoteServer, serverData))
In some penetration tests, the rules of engagement forbid any interaction with the
employees. In other tests, the main goal is to see the resilience of the employees
against social engineering. Examples 3.1 and 3.2 show how we can segregate
105
Chapter 5. Expressing high-level policies in Portunes
attack scenarios that include contact with a specific person, or contain no contact
with people.
The structure of the formulas in Example 3.1 and 3.2 are identical with the ones
in Example 2.1 and 2.2. The first formula is satisfied by all behaviors where the
insider delegates a process to an employee, and eventually, the remote server con-
tains the server data. Similarly, the second formula is satisfied by all behaviors
where the insider does not delegate any process to a person, but still eventually
the remote server contains the server data.
Example 3.3 No person should delegate tasks to the boss.
¬〈ne(Person, 1P , boss)〉tt
Example 3.4 Only the boss should delegate tasks to other employees.
¬〈ne(Employee, 1P , Employee)− ne(boss, 1P , Employee)〉tt
In Example 3.3 and 3.4 we show how the social aspects of the Portunes model can
be used as high-level policies. Finding a delegation from an employee to a boss,
or from an employee to another employee would mean that there is inconsistency
in the policies imposed on the employees with the high-level policies.
The formula in Example 3.3 holds for all behaviors except the ones where a per-
son delegates a task to the boss. In Example 3.4 the transition label predicate
ne(Employee, 1P , Employee) is satisfied by all behaviors where there is an del-
egation of a task between two employees. The predicate ne(boss, 1P , Emploee)
holds for all behaviors where the boss delegates a task to an employee. The for-
mula that is a result of the subtraction between the two predicates holds for all
behaviors where a task is delegated to a employee, and the person that delegates
the task is not the boss. Finally, the whole formula state is satisfied by all behav-
iors in the net, except the behaviors in which an employee rather than the boss
delegates a task.
The examples 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2, 3.1 and 3.2 present undesirable properties of
behaviors, by defining a set of a) transitions 〈A〉tt, b) states 〈◦〉c(lp, lp) or c)
transitions and states 〈A〉(〈◦〉c(lp, lp). The logic can help penetration testers to
select malicious goals and select from a set of possible attack the ones that yield
the greatest chance of success. Similarly, by using a negation in the formulas, we
can specify all behaviors in the net that do not violate a high-level security policy
(examples: 1.3, 1.4, 2.3, 2.4, 3.3, 3.4). Such behaviors can help auditors to define
multiple policies, and get a set of all allowed behaviors in the organization.
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5.6.2 Other uses of the logic
In this chapter we showed how the logic can be used to describe behaviors using
temporal operators, specify complex goals using spatial operators and a combi-
nation of both behaviors and goals. The logic formulas can be used to describe
high-level policies which should hold for every state of the model.
Another usage of the formulas is to aid the analysis from Chapter 4. The gener-
atePartialAttack algorithm may use the formulas as a heuristic in searching only
for the behaviors that have the property specified by the formulas, effectively cut-
ting the search space.
Finally, the formulas from the logic can be used as a fine grained search for a
specific behavior from a set of behaviors. For example, if a set of behaviors satisfy
a goal, the user can search for a subset of behaviors within the found behaviors,
by providing additional formulas stating additional properties of interest.
We partially implemented the logic in the Portunes tool, by allowing multiple
goals composed by combining the ∨ an ∧ state operators in the specification of a
goal. We consider the full implementation of the logic into the Portunes tool as
future work.
5.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we presented a variant of Hennesy-Milner logic and the modal logic
for mobile agents and used the logic to express state and transition properties of
the Portunes language. The logic lacks variable, tuple and logical locality predi-
cates, predicates for Klaim actions are replaced by predicates that reflect Portunes
actions and the diamond operator has a different meaning compared to the other
variations of the HML logic.
The logic is designed to specify a set of desired and undesired behaviors and states
of Portunes models. These behaviors and states are represented as properties of
Portunes models that (1) describe adversarial goals and (2) formally define high-
level policies which should hold for all evolutions of the net. The logic lacks
recursion and thus cannot express arbitrary repetition of actions because we are
interested in a single achievement of an adversarial goal or invalidation of a policy.
For example, if the analysis finds an attack scenario, we assume the scenario can
be repeated multiple times.
In the first part of the thesis we showed how to describe and analyze behaviors
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that span the three security domains. We presented low-level policies as pred-
icates, high-level policies as modal logic formulae and describe behaviors that
can occur as process definitions. We also provide an analysis that assesses the
completeness of the policy refinement by taking both defensive (auditing) and
offensive (penetration testing) standpoint.
The main contribution of the first part of the thesis is the mapping of security as-
pects of the physical and social domain together with the digital domain into a
single framework named Portunes. The framework consists of a graph and a lan-
guage inspired by the Klaim family of languages. To capture the three domains
efficiently, Portunes is able to represent 1) physical properties of elements, 2) mo-
bility of objects and data, 3) identity, credential and location based access control
and 4) trust and delegation between people.
We chose the abstraction level of the three domains to be sufficiently high to
be easy to use, but still sufficiently detailed to provide useful results. One can
envision extending the framework with constructs such as negotiation between
people, behavioral patterns or detection mechanisms, to increase the detail of the
produced behaviors.
To bring the framework closer to practitioners, we provided a logic to help users
specify high-level policies and adversarial goals and a graphical implementation
of the language in a tool. This approach allows generating and analyzing attack
scenarios which span all tree domains.
The applicability of the Portunes framework was demonstrated using the example
of the road apple attack, showing how an insider can attack without violating
existing security policies by combining actions from all three domains. We also
showed how Portunes can be used to generate attack scenarios automatically for
penetration testing teams that use physical access and social engineering to gain
possession of a digital asset. So far, we found out that the Portunes tool can
produce sufficiently detailed realistic attack scenarios for testers to execute. We
describe our findings on this matter in greater detail in Chapter 8.
The behaviors generated by the analysis can be used in several areas. In quantita-
tive risk assessment, risk estimates are based on a number of attacks on the asset
obtained through brainstorming. The Portunes tool can automatically generate a
complete list of attacks, greatly improving the security risk estimate for an asset.
In designing new socio-technical systems it is crucial (and sometimes mandatory)
to show that the system is behaving in accordance with a set of high-level policies.
Portunes can aid in this analysis by generating possible scenarios that can violate
these policies.
In outsourcing scenarios, the vendor to whom a task is outsourced needs to demon-
108
5.7. Conclusion
strate that the data of the user is stored in a secure location and show that all
possible scenarios are considered to protect the confidentiality of the data from
adversaries and internal staff members. Portunes can aid in formally providing
this proof. In security awareness training programs, it is advisable to use facility
specific simulations to teach the employees on possible threats to the organiza-
tion. Portunes can generate these simulations automatically and greatly speed up
the process of preparing the program.
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Part II
Policy enforcement
The second part of this thesis focuses on testing policy enforcement. In the first
part of the thesis, we used the road apple attack, where an insider gives a dongle
to an employee, as a running example. This example is interesting because it uses
policies from all three domains and is challenging to model. When testing the
enforcement of the policies, it is harder for the tester to obtain an asset from an
employee rather than give one. Therefore, as a running example of the second
part we explore the problem of protecting laptops from theft. This example is
more suitable than the road apple attack because it is harder for a tester to take a
laptop from an employee, than to give a dongle to an employee.
Chapter 6 proposes two methodologies for performing physical penetration tests
using social engineering where the tester needs to obtain an asset. In this chapter
we provide a set of requirements a penetration testing methodology should satisfy,
and evaluate the two proposed methodologies based on these requirements. The
methodologies focus on obtaining a marked asset from the premises of a targeted
organization.
Chapter 7 assesses the effectiveness of security mechanisms in the physical and
social domain. Using the methodologies provided in Chapter 6, we orchestrated
more than 30 penetration tests. We also analyzed the logs from stolen laptops in 2
universities over a period of two years. The results from the penetration tests and
the analysis of the logs provided us with an insight of the effectiveness of CCTV,
access control and security awareness of the employees as mechanisms for pro-
tecting assets in an organization.
Chapter 8 proposes a practical assignment for teaching students penetration test-
ing skills. During a period of three years we provided a practical assignments
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for first year master students in computes security. As part of this assignment,
students were provided with the opportunity to perform physical penetration tests
using social engineering, offline attacks on laptops and online attacks on vulner-
able servers. We analyze the implications of the assignment to the students and
to the employees and argue that such assignments are useful for both the students
and organization if executed with diligence.
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Chapter 6
Methodologies for Physical
Penetration Testing using Social
Engineering ∗
Penetration tests on IT systems are sometimes coupled with physical
penetration tests and social engineering. In physical penetration tests
where social engineering is allowed, the penetration tester directly
interacts with the employees. These interactions are usually based on
deception and if not done properly can upset the employees, violate
their privacy or damage their trust toward the organization and might
lead to law suits and loss of productivity.
In this chapter, we propose two methodologies for performing a phys-
ical penetration test where the goal is to gain an asset using social
engineering. These methodologies aim to reduce the impact of the
penetration test on the employees. We used these methodologies to
orchestrate 32 penetration tests over a period of three years.
∗This chapter is a minor revision of the paper ”Two Methodologies for Physical Penetration
Testing using Social Engineering” [5] published in the Proceedings of the 26th Annual Computer
Security Applications Conference (ACSAC’10), pages 399-408, ACM, 2010
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6.1 Introduction
A penetration test can assess both the IT security and the security of the facility
where the IT systems are located. If the penetration tester assesses the IT security,
the goal is to obtain or modify marked data located deep in the organizations
network. Similarly, in testing the physical security of the location where the IT
system is located, the goal of the penetration test is to obtain a specific asset,
such as a laptop or a document. Physical and digital penetration tests can be
complemented with social engineering techniques, where the tester is allowed to
use knowledge and help from the employees to mount the attack.
In digital penetration tests the resilience of an employee is measured indirectly,
by making phone queries or sending fake mail that lure the employee to disclose
secret information. These tests can be designed in an ethical manner [45] and
within the legal boundaries [94]. However, measuring the resilience of an em-
ployee against social engineering in a physical penetration test is direct and per-
sonal. When the tester enters the facility of the organization and directly interacts
with the employees, she either deceives the employee, trying to obtain more in-
formation about the goal, or urges the employee to help her, by letting the tester
inside a secure area or giving the tester a credential. The absence of any digital
medium in the communication with the employees makes the interaction between
the penetration tester and the employee intense, especially if the employee is asked
to break company policies.
There are three main consequences from personal interaction between the tester
and the employee. First, the employee might be stressed by having to choose be-
tween helping a colleague and breaking the company policies. Second, the tester
might not treat the employee respectfully. Finally, when helping the penetration
tester to enter a secure location, the employee loses the trust from the people who
reside in the secure location. For example, employees might stop trusting the sec-
retary when they find out she let an intruder into their office. To avoid ethical
and legal implications, organizations may avoid physical penetration testing with
social engineering, leaving themselves unaware of attacks where the attacker uses
non-digital means to attack the system.
This chapter tackles the problem how to perform a physical penetration test using
social engineering in the most respectful manner, while still getting results that
lead to improving the security of the organization. The contribution of this chap-
ter is two methodologies for physical penetration tests using social engineering
where the goal is to gain possession of a physical asset from the premises of the
organization. Both methodologies are designed to reduce the impact of the test on
the employees. We used these methodologies to perform 32 penetration tests over
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a period of three years, where students tried to gain possession of marked laptops
placed in buildings of two universities in The Netherlands. Detailed information
on the execution of these tests is presented in Chapter 7.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In section 2 we present related
work and in section 3 we set the requirements for the methodologies. Sections 4
and 5 outline the methodologies, section 6 provides an evaluation of the structure
of the methodologies and section 7 concludes the chapter.
6.2 Related work
In the computer science literature, there are isolated reports of physical penetra-
tion tests using social engineering [51, 11]. However, these approaches focus
completely on the actions of the penetration tester and do not consider the impact
of the test on the employees.
There are a few methodologies for penetration testing. The Open-Source Security
TestingMethodologyManual (OSSTMM) [113] provides an extensive list ofwhat
needs to be checked during a physical penetration test. However, the methodol-
ogy does not state how the testing should be carried out. OSSTMM also does
not consider direct interaction between the penetration tester and the employees.
Barret [16] provides an audit-based methodology for social engineering using di-
rect interaction between the penetration tester and an employee. Since this is an
audit-based methodology, the goal is to test all employees. Our methodologies are
goal-based and focus on the security of a specific physical asset. Employees are
considered as an additional mechanism which can be circumvented to achieve a
goal, instead of being the goal. Tu¨rpe and Eichler [97] focus on safety precautions
while testing production systems. Since a test can harm the production system, it
can cause unforseeable damages to the organization. In our work the penetration
test of the premises of an organization can be seen as a test of a production system.
In the crime science community, Cornish [34] provides mechanisms how to struc-
ture the prosecution of a crime into universal crime scripts and reasons about
mechanisms how to prevent the crime. We adopt a similar reporting format to
present the results from a penetration test.
The Bellman report [47] defines the ethical guidelines for the protection of humans
in testing. The first guideline in the report states that all participants should be
treated with respect during the test. Finn [46] provides four justifications that
115
Chapter 6. Methodologies for Penetration Testing using Social Engineering
need to be satisfied to use deception in research. We use the same justifications to
show that our methodology is ethically sound.
6.3 Requirements
A penetration test should satisfy five requirements to be useful for the organiza-
tion. First, the penetration test needs to be realistic, since it simulates an attack
performed by a real adversary. Second, during the test all employees need to be
treated with respect [47]. The employees should not be stressed, feel uncomfort-
able nor be at risk during the penetration test, because they might get disappointed
with the organization, become disgruntled or even start legal action. Finally, the
penetration test should be repeatable, reliable and reportable [16]. We call these
the R* requirements:
Realistic - employees should act normally, as they would in everyday life.
Respectful - the test is done ethically, by respecting the employees and the mutual
trust between employees.
Reliable - the penetration test does not cause productivity loss of employees.
Repeatable - the same test can be performed several times and if the environment
does not change, the results should be the same.
Reportable - all actions during the test should be logged and the outcome of the
test should be in a form that permits a meaningful and actionable documentation
of findings and recommendations.
These are conflicting requirements. For example:
1. In a realistic penetration test, it might be necessary to deceive an employee,
which is not respectful.
2. In a realistic test, arbitrary employees might be social engineered to achieve
the goal, which is unreliable.
3. In a reportable test, all actions of the penetration tester need to be logged,
which is unrealistic.
Orchestrating a penetration test is striking the best balance between the conflicting
requirements. If the balance is not achieved, the test might either not fully assess
the security of the organization or might harm the employees.
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We propose twomethodologies, Environment-FocusedMethodology and Custodian-
Focused Methodology for conducting a penetration test using social engineering.
Both methodologies strike a different balance between the R* requirements, and
their usage is for different scenarios. Both methodologies assess the security of an
organization by testing how difficult it is to gain possession of a pre-defined asset.
The methodologies can be used to assess the security of the organization, by re-
vealing two types of security weaknesses: errors in enforcement of social, digital
and physical policies and an absence of a policy. In the first case, the tests should
focus on how well the employees follow the security policies of the organization
and how effective the existing physical and digital security mechanisms are. In
the second case, the primary goal of the tests is to find and exploit gaps in the ex-
isting policies rather than in their implementation. For example, a test can focus
on how well the credential sharing policy is enforced by employees or can focus
on exploiting the absence of a credential sharing policy to obtain the target asset.
In this chapter we present the two methodologies which reduce the impact of
these tests. The Environment-Focused (EF) Methodology, measures the security
of the environment where the asset is located. The methodology is suitable for
tests where the custodian (person who controls the asset) is not subject of social
engineering and is aware of the execution of the test. One example of such test is
evaluating the security of the assets residing in the office of the CEO, but not the
awareness of the CEO herself. The Custodian-Focused (CF) Methodology is more
general, and includes the asset owner in the scope of the test. In this methodology,
the owner is not aware of the test. The CF methodology is more realistic, but it is
less reliable and respectful to the employees.
6.4 Environment-Focused Methodology
First, we define the actors in the Environment-Focused methodology. Then, we
introduce all events that take place during the setup, execution and aftermath of
the penetration test. Finally, we validate the methodology by conducting three
penetration tests and present some insights from the experience.
6.4.1 Actors
The penetration test involves four different actors.
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Figure 6.1: Actors in the EF methodology
Security officer - an employee responsible for the security of the organization. The
security officer orchestrates the penetration test.
Custodian - an employee in possession of the assets, sets up and monitors the
penetration test.
Penetration tester - an employee or a contractor trying to gain possession of the
asset without being caught.
Employee - person in the organization who has none of the roles above.
The actors and the relations between them are shown in Figure 6.1. The majority
of actors treat each other with respect. No respect relation between two actors
means either the actors do not interact during the penetration test (for example
between the tester and the custodian) or do not have a working relationship (be-
tween the penetration tester and the employee). In this methodology, the tester
deceives the employee during the penetration test, presented in the figure with a
dashed line.
6.4.2 Setup
Figure 6.2 provides the sequence of events that take place during the setup, execu-
tion and closure of the penetration test. During all three stages of the penetration
test, employees should behave normally (1 in Figure 6.2).
As in other penetration testing methodologies, before the start of the test, the
security officer sets the scope, the rules of engagement and the goal (2 in Figure
6.2). The goal is gaining physical possession of a marked asset. The scope of
the testing provides the penetration tester with a set of locations she is allowed
to enter, as well as business processes in the organization she can abuse, such
as processes for issuing a new password, or processes for adding/removing an
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Figure 6.2: The sequence of events in the Environment-Focused Methodology.
Each box represents an event which happens in sequence or parallel with other
events. For example, event 3 happens after event 2 and in parallel with events 1
and 4.
employee. The rules of engagement restrict the penetration tester to the tools and
means she is allowed to use to reach the target. These rules, for example, define if
the tester is allowed to force doors, to break windows or to use social engineering.
The custodian first signs an informed consent form and then sets up the environ-
ment, by marking an asset in her possession and installing monitoring equipment.
The asset should not be critical for the daily tasks of the custodian or anyone else,
including the organization. Thus, when the penetration tester gains possession of
the asset, the productivity of the custodian using the asset and the process flow of
the company will not be affected. The custodian leaves the asset in her office or
an area without people (storage area, closet). If the custodian shares an office with
other employees, the monitoring equipment should be positioned in such a way
that it records only the asset and not the nearby employees. The custodian knows
when the test takes place, and has sufficient time to remove/obscure all sensitive
and private assets in her room and around the marked asset (3 in Figure 6.2).
Meanwhile, the penetration tester needs to sign the rules of engagement (4 in
Figure 6.2). The OSSTMM methodology [113] provides a comprehensive list of
rules of engagement.
119
Chapter 6. Methodologies for Penetration Testing using Social Engineering
6.4.3 Execution
The security officer should choose a trustworthy penetration tester and monitor
her actions during the execution stage.
When the penetration test starts, the tester first scouts the area and proposes a set
of attack scenarios (5 in Figure 6.2). The proposed attack scenarios need to be ap-
proved first by the custodian (6 in Figure 6.2) and then by the security officer (7 in
Figure 6.2). The custodian is directly involved in the test and can correctly judge
the effect of the scenario on her daily tasks and the tasks of her colleagues. The
security officer needs to approve the scenarios because she is aware of the general
security of the organization and can better predict the far-reaching consequences
of the actions of the tester.
If the custodian or the security officer disapprove an attack scenario, they need
to evaluate the scenario and estimate the success. The tester puts in the report
that the scenario was proposed, the reasons why the scenario was turned down
and the opinion of all three roles on the success of the scenario. In this way,
although the scenario is not executed, it is documented including the judgment on
the effectiveness of the attack by the security officer, the custodian and the tester.
After approval from the custodian and the security officer, the tester starts with the
execution of the attack scenarios (8 in Figure 6.2). The custodian and the security
officer remotely monitor the execution (9 in Figure 6.2) through CCTV and the
monitoring equipment installed by the custodian.
The penetration tester needs to install wearable monitoring equipment to log her
actions. The logs serve three purposes. First, they ensure that if an employee is
treated with disrespect there is objective evidence. Second, the logs prove that the
penetration tester has followed the attack scenarios, and finally, the logs provide
information how the mechanisms were circumvented, helping the organization
repeat the scenario if needed.
6.4.4 Closure
After the end of the test, the penetration tester prepares a report containing a list of
attack traces. Each attack trace contains information of successful or unsuccessful
attacks (10 in Figure 6.2). Based on the report, the security officer debriefs both
the custodians and any deceived employees during the test (11 in Figure 6.2).
Reporting. The attack traces are structured in a report that emphasizes the weak
and the strong security mechanisms encountered during the penetration test, struc-
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Generic
Script
Attack trace Circumvented
mechanisms
Recommendations
Prepare for the at-
tack
Buy a bolt cutter and hide it in a
bag. Scout the building and the of-
fice during working hours.
Obtain an after working hours ac-
cess card.
Access control of the
building entrances during
working hours.
Credential sharing policy.
Keep entrance doors to the
building locked at all time.
Provide an awareness
training concerning
credential sharing.
Enter the building Enter the building at 7:30 AM, be-
fore working hours.
Hide the face from CCTV at the en-
trance using a hat.
CCTV pre-theft surveil-
lance.
Increase the awareness of
the security guards during
non-working hours.
Enter the office Wait for the cleaning lady. Pretend
you are an employee who forgot the
office key and ask the cleaning lady
to open the office for you.
Challenge unknown peo-
ple to provide ID.
Credential sharing policy.
Reward employees for dis-
covering intruders.
Identify and get
the asset
Search for the specific laptop. Get
the bolt cutter from the bag and cut
the Kensington lock. Put the laptop
and the bolt cutter in the bag.
Kensington lock. Get stronger Kensington
locks. Use alternative
mechanism for protecting
the laptop.
Leave the build-
ing with the lap-
top
Leave the building at 8:00, when
external doors automatically unlock
for employees.
CCTV surveillance.
Access control of the
building entrances during
working hours.
The motion detection of
the CCTV cameras needs
to be more sensitive .
Figure 6.3: Reporting a successful attempt. The figure shows an example of a
generic script instantiated with an attack trace. First we define the generic script,
which encompasses the stages of all attacks. In the example, they are: enter the
building, enter the office, identify and get the asset, and exit the building. For each
step in a trace, we identify both the mechanisms (if any) that were circumvented
and mechanisms that stopped an attack. For failed attacks, the table shows which
mechanisms were circumvented up to the failed action, and the mechanism that
successfully stopped the attempt.
tured following 25 techniques for situational crime prevention [35]. For different
domains there are extensive lists of security mechanisms to enforce the 25 tech-
niques (for example, [61]). The combination of the attack traces together with the
situational crime prevention techniques gives an overview of the circumvented
mechanisms [105] (Figure 6.3)
Debriefing the employees and the custodian. After finding they were deceived by
the same organization they work for, the employees might get disappointed or dis-
gruntled. At the end of the test the security officer fully debriefs the custodian and
the employees. The debriefing should be done carefully, to maintain or restore the
trust between custodian and the employees who helped the tester to gain the asset.
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Figure 6.4: Recording from the orchestrated tests using the EF methodology. The
student provided to the janitor a fake email stating he needs to collect a laptop
from the custodian office. The janitor let the student into the office and helped
him find the key from the Kensington lock.
6.4.5 Case study
To test the usability of the physical penetration tests using social engineering on
the employees, we executed a series of penetration tests following the EF method-
ology. These pilots allowed us to gain a clear, first-hand picture of each execution
stage of the methodology, and draw observations from the experience. The tests
are presented in detail in Chapter 7.
6.4.6 Lessons learned from the penetration tests
The observations are result of our experience with the penetration tests using
qualitative social research and might not generalize to other social environments.
However, the observations provide an insight of the issues that arose while using
the methodology in practice.
The attack scenarios should be flexible. Although the testers provided scenarios
prior to all attacks, in all cases they were forced to deviate from them, because
the target employee was either not present or was not behaving as expected. At-
tack scenarios assure the custodian and the security officer that the actions of the
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penetration tester are in the scope of the test, but at the same time there should be
some freedom in adapting the script to the circumstances.
The methodology does not respect the trust relationship between the custodian and
the employees. After the penetration test, the custodian knows which employees
were deceived, and the trust relationship between them is disturbed. For example,
if the secretary lets the penetration tester into the office of the custodian, the cus-
todian might not be able to trust her again. Therefore, after some penetration tests
the security officer might decide not do debrief the custodian completely.
During the penetration test, separating the custodian from the employees is hard.
Whenever the testers approached a colleague from the office, the first reaction of
the colleague was to call the custodian and ask for guidance. This led to uncom-
fortable situations where the custodians were forced to shut down their telephones
and ignore e-mails while outside the office. These situations can be reduced if the
testers inform the custodians the exact time they will carry out an attempt. Thus,
the custodians can be unavailable only for short periods.
Debriefing proved to be difficult. After the test, we fully disclosed the test to all
involved employees. During the debriefing we focused on the benefits of the pen-
etration test to the university and their help setting up the test. In three of the
executed penetration tests a security guard opened the office door for the penetra-
tion testers. After the debriefing, we concluded that we caused more stress to the
guard during the debriefing than the testers had caused during the penetration test.
We addressed this issue in the second methodology, by selectively informing the
involved employees.
6.5 Custodian-Focused Methodology
In the EF methodology, the custodian is aware of the penetration test. The knowl-
edge of the penetration test may change her normal behavior and thus influences
the results of the test. Since the asset belongs to the custodian, and the asset is
in the office of the custodian, in many environments it is desirable to include the
custodian’s resistance to social engineering as part of the test.
After performing the first series of penetration tests, we revisited and expanded
the Environment-Focused Methodology. The CF methodology can be seen as a
refinement of the EF methodology, based on the experience from the first set of
penetration tests. In the CF methodology the custodian is not aware of the test,
making the methodology suitable for penetration tests where the goal is to check
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Figure 6.5: The sequence of events in the Custodian-Focused methodology
the overall security of an area including the level of security awareness of the
custodian.
6.5.1 Actors
There are six actors in the CF methodology.
Security officer - an employee responsible for the security of the organization.
Coordinator - an employee or contractor responsible for the experiment and the
behavior of the penetration tester. The coordinator orchestrates the whole pene-
tration test.
Penetration tester - an employee or contractor who attempts to gain possession of
the asset without being caught.
Contact person - an employee who provides logistic support in the organization
and a person to be contacted in case of an emergency.
Custodian - an employee at whose office the asset resides. The custodian should
not be aware of the penetration test (1 in Figure 6.5).
Employee - person in the organization who has none of the roles above. The
employee should not be aware of the penetration test (2 in Figure 6.5).
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Figure 6.6: Actors in the CF methodology
Figure 6.6 shows the actors and the relations between them. In this methodology,
the penetration tester deceives the employees as well as the custodian. Moreover,
the contact person also needs to deceive the custodian. These relations are dis-
cussed in greater depth in section 6.6.
6.5.2 Setup
At the beginning, similar to the EF methodology, the security officer initializes
the test by defining the target, scope and the rules of engagement. The security
officer at this point assigns a coordinator for the penetration test and provides
the coordinator with marked assets and equipment for monitoring the assets (3 in
Figure 6.5). The marked assets should be similar to the asset of interest for which
the security is measured. The monitoring equipment should be non-intrusive and
its purpose is to have additional information on the activities of the penetration
tester.
The penetration tester should sign the rules of engagement (Appendix A) before
the start of the execution stage (4 in Figure 6.5). The coordinator selects a number
of contact people and provides them with the marked assets and the monitoring
equipment (5 in Figure 6.5). Furthermore, the coordinator provides a cover story
which explains why the custodian is given the asset. The contact person selects a
number of custodians based on the requirements from the security officer (random,
specific roles, specific characteristics) and distributes the marked assets and the
monitoring equipment to the custodians. After giving the monitoring equipment,
the contact person should get a signed informed consent (Appendix B) from the
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custodians (6 in Figure 6.5). If the asset can store data, the document must clearly
state that the custodian should not store any sensitive nor private data in the asset.
Before the penetration test starts, the coordinator distributes a list of penetration
testers to the security officer, and a list of asset locations to the penetration tester
(7 in Figure 6.5).
6.5.3 Execution
The first steps of the execution stage are similar to the previous methodology. The
penetration tester scouts the area and proposes attack scenarios (8 in Figure 6.5).
The coordinator and later the security officer should agree with these scenarios
before the tester starts executing them (9 and 10 in Figure 6.5). After approval
from both actors, the tester starts executing the attack scenarios. If a penetration
tester is caught or a termination condition is reached, the penetration tester imme-
diately informs the contact person. Thus, if the custodian stored sensitive data in
the asset, the data is not exposed.
When the tester gains possession of the target asset, she informs the contact per-
son and the coordinator and returns the asset to the contact person (11 in Figure
6.5). The contact person collects the monitoring equipment and informs the secu-
rity officer (12 in Figure 6.5). If the tester gains possession of the asset without
the knowledge of the custodian, the contact person needs to reach the custodian
before the custodian reaches the office and explain to the custodian that the test
is terminated. The tester should also leave a note stating that the asset has been
taken as part of a test together with contact details from the coordinator and the
security officer (for example, Appendix F). The security officer obtains surveil-
lance videos from the CCTV and access logs and gives them to the coordinator
(13 in Figure 6.5).
6.5.4 Closure
After the execution stage, the penetration tester writes a report of all attempts, both
failed and successful, in the form of attack traces and gives them to the coordinator
(14 in Figure 6.5). The coordinator has two tasks. First, she collects the marked
assets and monitoring equipment from the contact person (15 in Figure 6.5) and
returns them to the security officer. Second, the coordinator debriefs the security
officer and the custodians and provides the custodian a form of reward for helping
in the assessment (16 in Figure 6.5).
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Not all employees that were social engineered should be debriefed. Employees
who were treated with respect and to whom the penetration tester did not cause
discomfort during the interaction should not be debriefed, because the debriefing
can cause more stress than the interaction with the penetration tester. The decision
which employees need to be debriefed lies with the security officer, and is based
on the logs from the penetration tester and the monitoring equipment. The criteria
on which employees need to be debriefed are presented in greater detail in Section
6.6.
All custodians should be debriefed, because they sign an informed consent at the
beginning of the test. However, to preserve the trust between the custodian and
the employees, the custodian should not know which employee contributed to the
attack.
Three elements should be considered before the debriefing. First, the custodians
were deceived by the organization they work for (more specifically, by the contact
person). Second, in case of direct interaction, their privacy might be violated by
the logging equipment from the tester. Third, they might be stressed from the
penetration test either directly, through interaction with the penetration tester, or
indirectly, by finding their asset is gone before the contact person reaches them.
The debriefing should focus on the contribution of the custodian in finding the
security vulnerabilities in the organization, and the custodian should be rewarded
for the participation.
6.5.5 Case study
Similarly as with the EF Methodology, we orchestrated a number of penetration
tests to obtain first hand insight of the possible consequences of using this method-
ology as well as mechanisms to improve the methodology. We orchestrated 29
penetration tests with the Custodian-Focused Methodology in a period of 2 years.
Part of the tests were performed in University of Twente and part in the Technical
University of Eindhoven. The penetration tests are described in greater detail in
Chapter 7.
6.5.6 Lessons learned from the penetration tests
It should be specified in advance which information the penetration tester is al-
lowed to use. For example, the penetration tester should not use knowledge about
the cover story used by the contact person. During the case study, six penetration
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Figure 6.7: Recording from a penetration test orchestrated using the CF methodol-
ogy. The student went to the office early in the morning, disguised as an employee
who forgot his key. The cleaning lady let the student in. The student used a bolt
cutter to remove the Kensington lock.
testers used knowledge of the cover story to convince the custodian to hand in the
laptop. Thus, these tests were less realistic.
Panic situations need to be taken into consideration in the termination conditions.
Several times the custodian or an employee got suspicious and raised an alarm.
Since only the security officer knew about the experiment, and the other security
personnel was excluded, news of people stealing laptops spread in a matter of
hours. In these situations the coordinator should react quickly and explain to the
employees that the suspicious activity is a test.
The penetration test cannot be repeated many times with the same persons. If
a custodian participated in the penetration test once, she knows what will hap-
pen. The same holds for the employees she told about the experiments and the
employees that were socially engineered.
Asking the custodians to install the monitoring equipment proved to be hard The
custodians either did not have the technical skills to install the software on their
PC, had no administrator rights on the PC, or had a laptop instead of PC, which
they took home after working hours.
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6.6 Evaluation
In this section we compare both methodologies against the R* requirements. The
satisfaction of the requirements is defined by the rules of engagement, which at-
tack scenarios are approved for execution, and the structure of the methodologies.
Less restrictive rules of engagement and approving more invasive attack scenarios
make the penetration test more realistic, but make the test less reliable and re-
spectful to the employees. The evaluation below assumes these two elements are
tuned to the risk appetite of the organization and focuses only on the structure of
the methodologies.
Reliable: In the EF methodology, the penetration tester gains possession of a
non-critical asset which the custodian is prepared to lose. Thus, the result of the
penetration test will not affect the productivity of the custodian. In the CF method-
ology, the productivity of the custodian may be affected, since the custodian does
not know the asset will be stolen. The informed consent is a mechanism to avoid
productivity loss, since it explicitly states not to use the marked asset for daily
tasks nor store sensitive information on the asset. In both methodologies, the pro-
ductivity of other employees is not affected, since the penetration tester does not
gain possession of any of their belongings without their approval.
Repeatable: The repeatability of any penetration test using social engineering is
questionable, since human behavior is unpredictable. Checking if a penetration
test is repeatable would require a larger set of tests on a single participant, and a
larger number of participants in the test.
An additional issue of repeating a penetration tests by social engineering the same
employees is the experience the employees obtain from the tests. An employee
that has been social engineered may be much harder to social engineer twice.
However, this is a desired outcome of the tests.
Reportable: The approach used in reporting the results of the penetration test com-
pletely covers all information needed to perform the attack in a real-life situation
and provides an overview of what should be improved to thwart such attempts.
The logs from the tester and the monitoring equipment installed by the custodians
provide detailed information on all actions taken by the penetration tester, giving
a clear overview of how the mechanisms are circumvented.
Respectful: Both methodologies should respect all the employees and the trust
relationships between them.
In physical penetration testing, the social engineering element is more intense
than in digital penetration testing because the interaction between the penetra-
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EF methodology CF methodology
Reliable +++ ++
Repeatable - -
Reportable +++ +++
Respectful: actors ++ +
Respectful: trust relations - ++
Realistic + +++
Figure 6.8: Evaluation of both methodologies
tion tester and the employee is direct, without using any digital medium. Baum-
rind [18] considers deception of subjects in testing as unethical. The National
Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral
Research, also clearly states this in their first rule of ethical principles: ”Respect
for persons” [47].
However, some tests cannot be executed without deception. Finn [46] defines
four justifications that need to be met do make deception acceptable: (1) The
assessment cannot be performed without the use of deception. (2) The knowl-
edge obtained from the assessment has important value. (3) The test involves no
more than minimal risk and does not violate the rights and the welfare of the in-
dividual. Minimal risk is defined as: ”the probability and magnitude of physical
or psychological harm that is normally encountered in the daily lives” [71]. (4)
Where appropriate, the subjects are provided with relevant information about the
assessment after participating in the test. Physical penetration testing using social
engineering can never be completely respectful because it is based on deception.
However, the deception in both methodologies presented in this chapter is justifi-
able.
The first two justifications are general for penetration testing and its benefits, and
have been discussed earlier in the literature (for example, Barrett [16]). The third
justification states that the risk induced by the test should be no greater than the
risks we face in daily lives. In the EF methodology, the only actor at risk is the
employee. The penetration tester cannot physically harm the employee because
of the rules of engagement, thus only psychological harm is possible. If the em-
ployees help the penetration tester voluntarily, the risk of psychological harm is
minimal. The logging equipment assures the interaction can be audited in a case
of dispute. In the CF methodology, an additional actor at risk is the custodian.
The only case when the risk is above minimal for the custodian is if the tester
gains possession of the asset without custodian’s knowledge. When the custodian
finds the asset missing and does not read the letter left by the testers, her stress
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level might increase. Therefore it is crucial for the contact person to reach the
custodian before custodian learns about the theft.
The fourth justification states that all actors should be debriefed after the exercise.
In both methodologies, all actors except the employees are either fully aware of
the exercise, or have signed an informed consent and are debriefed after the exer-
cise. Similarly to Finn and Jakobsson [45], we argue that there should be selective
debriefing of the employees. Debriefing can make the employee upset and dis-
gruntled and is the only event where the risk is higher then minimal. Thus, an
employee should be debriefed only if the security officer constitutes the tester did
more than minimal harm.
Besides being respectful toward all the participants, the methodology needs to
maintain the trust relations between the employees. The EF methodology affects
the trust between the custodian and the employees and the employees and the
organization. This is a consequence of the decision to fully debrief all partici-
pants in the test. The CF methodology looks at reducing these impacts. First, the
custodians are not told who contributed to the attack. Only the coordinator and
the security officer have this information, and they are not related to the custo-
dian. Second, the employees are not informed about the penetration test unless it
deemed necessary. However, the trust between the custodian and the contact per-
son is shaken. Therefore, the contact person and the custodian should not know
each other prior to the test.
In conclusion, the CF methodology is less respectful to the custodian than the
EF methodology, because the custodian is deceived and might get stressed when
she finds out the asset is gone. The EF methodology does not preserve any trust
between the employees, the organization and the custodian. The CF methodology
preserves the trust bond between the custodian and the employees and between the
employees and the organization. However, the trust bond between the custodian
and the contact person may be affected.
Realistic: The EF methodology allows testing the resilience to social engineering
of employees in the organization. Since the custodian knows about the penetra-
tion test, she is not directly involved during the execution of the test, making this
methodology implementable in limited number of situations. In the CF method-
ology, neither the custodian nor any of the other employees know about the pene-
tration test, making the test realistic.
One might argue that if the asset is not critical for the employee, the tests are not
realistic. On the other hand, taking away ”real” assets in the penetration tests will
clearly cause loss of production. In the EF methodology, this issue does not exist,
as the employees who may be social-engineered are not aware of the importance
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of the target asset. Therefore, they have no reason to behave differently toward
the experimental asset than to a ”real” asset. However, in the CF methodology,
the value of the asset as perceived by the custodian might influence the result of
the tests, as the employee may be more likely to give the asset away if she knows
it is not critical. As future work, we plan to investigate the effect of the perceived
importance of the asset on the results of such tests.
6.7 Conclusion
Securing an organization requires penetration testing on the IT security, the physi-
cal security of the location where the IT systems are situated, as well as evaluating
the security awareness of the employees who work with these systems. We pre-
sented two methodologies for penetration testing using social engineering. The
Custodian-Focused methodology improves on the Environment-Focused Method-
ology in many aspects. However, the Environment-Focused Methodology is more
reliable, does not deceive the custodian and fully debriefs all actors in the test. We
provide criteria to help organizations decide which methodology is more appropri-
ate for their environment. We evaluated both methodologies through analysis of
their structure against a set of requirements and through qualitative research meth-
ods by performing a number of penetration tests ourselves. This chapter shows
that physical penetration tests using social engineering can reduce the impact on
employees in the organization, and provide meaningful and useful information on
the security posture of the organization.
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Chapter 7
Laptop Theft: ∗
An Assessment of the Effectiveness of Security
Mechanisms in Open Organizations
Organizations rely on physical, digital and social mechanisms to pro-
tect their IT systems. Of all IT systems, laptops are probably the
most troublesome to protect, since they are easy to remove and con-
ceal. When the thief has physical possession of the laptop, it is also
difficult to protect the data inside. In this study, we look at the ef-
fectiveness of the security mechanisms against laptop theft in two
universities. The study considers the physical and social protection
of the laptops. We analyze the logs from laptop thefts and comple-
ment them with qualitative and quantitative analysis on the results of
the orchestrated penetration tests performed using the methodologies
described in Chapter 6. The results from the study show that the effec-
tiveness of security mechanisms from the physical domain is limited,
and it depends mostly from the social domain. The study serves as a
motivation to investigate further the analysis of the alignment of the
mechanisms across all three security domains to protect the IT assets
in an organization.
∗This chapter is a major revision of the paper ”Effectiveness of Physical, Social and Digital
Mechanisms against Laptop Theft in Open Organizations” [1] published in Proceedings of the
2010 IEEE/ACM International Conference on Green Computing and Communications & Interna-
tional Conference on Cyber, Physical and Social Computing (GREENCOM-CPSCOM ’10), pages
727-732, IEEE, 2010
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7.1 Introduction
Of all IT systems, laptops are particularly hard to protect. Laptops are mobile,
easily concealable, there is a big market to sell the hardware and there can be
many of them in a single building. With the increased data storage capabilities
of laptops, the loss of even a single laptop can induce dramatical costs to the
organization [82]. Thus, although there can be a large number of laptops in an
organization, losing even a single laptop may not be acceptable.
Organizations open to the public are particularly at risk from laptop theft. Hospi-
tals and universities, for example, accept hundreds of people that can wander in
the premises every day. Marshall et al. [65] points out that 46% of data breaches
occur in institutions open to the public: education, health care and the government.
Laptops containing sensitive medical or academic data become highly vulnerable
in these environments.
The problem security professionals face is how to protect the laptops in such open
organizations. There are three types of security mechanisms to secure laptops in
a building: digital, physical and social mechanisms. Digital mechanisms such
as laptop tracking and remote data deletion protect the laptop and the data in
the laptop by using software. Physical mechanisms, such as doors and cameras,
physically isolate the thief from the laptop and/or identify her in case of a theft.
Social mechanisms such as organizational policies and rules decrease the number
of mistakes by employees and increase the resilience of employees toward social
engineering. Using digital mechanisms to protect laptops is elaborately researched
by the computer science community [123, 121, 58, 89]. However, linking these
mechanisms with physical and social mechanisms in protecting laptops is still not
explored.
This chapter evaluates the existing physical and social security mechanisms for
protecting laptops based on (1) logs of laptop thefts which occurred in a period of
two years in two universities in Netherlands, and (2) 32 penetration tests (within
which we had 31 successful attacks and 31 attacks that failed) in the same uni-
versities using the methodologies described in the previous chapter. The goal of
the penetration tests was to gain possession of a marked laptop from an employee
unaware of the penetration test. The results from the log analysis and the pen-
etration tests show that the security of an asset in an open organization depends
mainly on the level of security awareness of the employees, and to a lesser ex-
tent on the technical or physical security mechanisms. The physical and technical
mechanisms have a passive, deterrent role on reducing theft, while the employees
have an active, preventive role.
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The outline of the rest of the chapter is as follows. In Section 7.2 we provide
a literature overview on laptop theft. In Section 7.3 we describe the methodol-
ogy we used in obtaining and analyzing the logs of the laptop thefts and describe
how the penetration tests were prepared and executed. In Section 7.4 we analyze
the logs and the results from the penetration tests qualitatively and provide gen-
eral observations that can be used as a guideline for which mechanisms should be
considered first in adding security mechanisms. In Section 7.5 we provide a quan-
titative analysis of the results from the penetration tests, and produce a logistic
regression model that provides the likelihood of a success of a theft. Section 7.6
summarizes the chapter and reiterates the main conclusions.
7.2 Literature overview
There are two areas of research that focus on protecting laptops: computer science
and crime science.
In the computer science community, there has been a considerable effort to model
the complex security relations between the digital, physical and social domain.
Scott et al. [91, 92] provides a holistic security model of the world by using spa-
tial relationship between the elements in the ambient calculus [23]. Dragovic et
al. [40, 41] presents a model which uses the physical property of objects and the
sensitivity of the data inside the objects to identify possible threats. In Chapter 3,
we also provided a formal model for representing and analysis of policy misalign-
ment between the three domains. These models provide sound policy design but
do not ensure effectiveness of security mechanisms that enforce these policies.
There are multiple mechanisms in computer science that work either in the phys-
ical or digital domain. In the digital domain, several security products, such as
TrueCrypt1 and BitLocker2 provide encryption for the whole hard drive. These
solutions assume the adversary does not have physical control of the laptop, be-
cause if the adversary has physical possession of the laptop, she can always suc-
cessfully execute a number of attacks [114, 24, 98]. These approaches also seem
to ignore the human element, or more precisely, induce performance overhead and
decrease the usability of the laptop. A recent study by Panemon [81] shows that
the majority of non-IT individuals, even when provided with an encrypted laptop,
turn off the encryption software.
A number of tracking applications, such as Adeona [89] and LoJack [121], can
1www.truecrypt.org
2www.tinyurl.com/microsoft-bitlocker
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track the location of the laptop they are installed on. In case of theft, these solu-
tions use the Internet to provide the owner with the current location of the laptop.
These solutions suffer from two problems: (1) if the goal of the theft is obtain-
ing data from the laptop, the thief might never connect the laptop to Internet and
(2) if the goal is to obtain the hardware, the thief can easily remove the tracking
application by flashing the BIOS and/or formatting the hard drive.
In the computer science community, the accent is on protecting the data residing
in the laptop and finding the location of the stolen laptop. The approach from
the crime science community is more general, and considers the laptop and its
environment. The goal in this field is to prevent a thief from stealing the laptop in
the first place, by either changing the environment surrounding the laptop or by
creating situations that will deter a thief [35]. Kitteringham [61] provides a list of
117 strategies how to prevent laptop theft. The strategies include the implemen-
tation of physical, digital and social mechanisms. Although the list is elaborate,
all suggested mechanisms focus only on a single domain and do not consider any
interaction between the mechanisms.
There are several other studies that analyze laptop theft. These reports focus on
the money loss from a stolen laptop [82] and the frequency of laptop theft and
the most affected sectors [65]. Our results are complementary, and look at the
effectiveness of conventional physical and social security mechanisms in stopping
laptop theft.
7.3 Methodology
Assessing the effectiveness of a security mechanism can be achieved by auditing
and penetration testing. We apply both methodologies to investigate the most
commonly used security systems in the physical and social domain.
First, we look at logs of recent laptop thefts in two universities in Netherlands.
From the logs we obtain information about: the last control that failed before the
laptop theft, alarms raised by the theft and the role of physical mechanisms in
securing the laptop and finding the thief, such as access control and surveillance
cameras. The logs provide valuable information on the approaches thieves use to
steal a laptop. However, the logs provide limited information about the level of
security awareness of the employees. In particular, the logs do not provide any
information on the possible violation of social security mechanisms, such as let-
ting strangers inside an office and sharing credentials between employees. Even in
case of a burglary, the logs did not provide any information how the thief reached
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Locked Open Restricted Public No Total
office office location location details
(burglary)
Stolen laptops 18 11 2 27 1 59
Cut locks 1 5 0 1 0 7
Other damage 16 0 0 0 0 16
Figure 7.1: Information from the logs. The logs from both universities are merged
to anonymize the data.
the burgled office. Therefore, to better understand the effect of the security mech-
anisms, we orchestrated 32 penetration tests where we used social engineering to
steal a laptop. The penetration tests were executed using the methodologies pre-
sented in Chapter 6. Through the tests, we observed the security awareness of the
employees as well as the efficiency of the physical security mechanisms in both
universities.
7.3.1 Log analysis
In a period of two years, the two universities suffered from 59 laptop thefts (Figure
7.1). The logs from the thefts provide (1) the location from where the laptop
was stolen, (2) protection mechanisms on the laptop, and (3) how the theft was
discovered.
7.3.1.1 Results from the log analysis
Location of the theft: In 30% of the thefts, the thief broke into a locked office
either by forcing the door or breaking a window. This number indicates failure
of the physical security mechanisms in both campuses. In 46% of the thefts, the
laptop was stolen when the employee left it unattended in a public location, such
as a cafeteria or meeting room. These thefts indicate the level of security aware-
ness of the employees. In 19% of the cases, the theft occurred when the employee
left the office for a short period of time without locking the door. These results
show a combined failure of the physical and social mechanisms. The low security
awareness let the users leave the laptops unattended in a restricted area, and the
physical security mechanisms did not protect the laptops from being stolen.
Protection mechanisms on the laptop: In five of the thefts that occurred in an
unlocked office, the laptop was locked with Kensington lock. Only one of the
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Figure 7.2: In majority of the cases, the theft occurred because the employee either
left the laptop in a public location or forgot to lock the office door.
laptops stolen in a public location was locked with a Kensington lock.
Theft discovery: The majority of the thefts (93%) were reported by the laptop
owner. In a few cases the report came from an employee who observed a bro-
ken door or window (5%). Only one of the thefts triggered an alarm. In this
case, the thief grabbed the laptop while the employee went to collect print outs
and left through the fire door, triggering the fire alarm. In all buildings, in both
universities, there are surveillance cameras (CCTV) and either partially or fully
centralized access control systems able to log access requests. Surprisingly, the
systems provided no useful information in any of the thefts. These mechanisms
are further analyzed in section 7.4.
Limitation of the logs: The logs provide information obtained after the theft took
place, based on evidence found by the police and the security guards. The logs
provide information only of successful theft attacks, but do not show when the
security controls have succeeded in stopping the thief. Moreover, the logs do
not provide information on how the thief reached the location nor on whether the
security awareness of the employees contributed to the theft.
Researchers and organizations recognize that the employees are the weakest link
in the organization [16, 15, 107]. Since the logs from the laptop thefts were in-
sufficient to provide us with this information, we orchestrated a set of penetration
tests where we used social engineering as a means to obtain a laptop. These tests
provided us with an opportunity to validate the methodologies we introduced in
the previous Chapter 6.
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7.3.2 The penetration tests
To obtain more detailed information on the effectiveness of the commonly used
security mechanisms in laptop theft protection, we orchestrated 3 penetration tests
using the Environment-Focused Methodology and 29 penetration tests using the
Custodian-Focused Methodology.
To avoid bias in the execution of the tests, we did not perform the tests ourselves,
but enlisted the help from 72 master students in computer security who took the
role of penetration testers. Before performing the tests we informed and received
permission for the penetration tests from the chief security officers in both uni-
versities. We informed the officers exactly which locations we were going to test
and the names of the staff and students involved. No other security person in the
universities knew of the tests. The tests were approved by the legal department
from the universities.
The students were divided in teams of three. The goal of each team was to steal a
clearly marked laptop from an employee who was unaware of the penetration test.
First, we did a pilot study with only three teams and three laptops. Based on the
results and insights of the pilot study, we performed an additional 29 penetration
tests the next two year.
As a methodology for the penetration tests, we used the Environment-Focused
Methodology for the pilot study and for the rest of the penetration tests we used the
Custodian Focused-Methodology from Chapter 6. The rest of the section defines
(1) the roles in a penetration test, (2) the setup, (3) the execution and (4) the
closure phase in the test, and discusses (5) the results and (6) the limitations of the
tests.
7.3.2.1 Roles in the penetration test
We defined five roles in the penetration tests.
1 Coordinator - researchers from the Distributed and Embedded Security Group
(DIES). The coordinators orchestrated the penetration tests.
2 Penetration tester - a student who attempts to gain possession of the asset
without being caught.
3 Contact person - an employee who volunteers to distribute the asset to the
custodians. In part of the penetration tests, this role was taken by colleagues
of the researchers, and by the DIES researchers themselves.
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4 Custodian - an employee at whose office the laptop was placed.
5 Employee - all other employees in the university who had none of the roles
above.
7.3.2.2 Setup of the environment
The setup between the penetration tests following the EF and the CF Methodology
varied.
In the penetration tests that followed the EFmethodology, the coordinator was also
the custodian, because the tests were not focused on the behavior of the custodian.
We locked the laptops with Kensington locks and hid the keys in the office desk of
the custodian. To monitor the laptops, we installed motion detection web cameras
which streamed live feeds to an Internet server. Since the custodian shared the
office with four other colleagues, the cameras were positioned in such a way to
preserve the privacy of the colleagues. We told the colleagues we are doing an
experiment, but we did not reveal the nature nor the goal of the experiment.
Since we knew about the penetration test, we did not allow the students to gain
possession of the laptops in our presence. During the experiment, we carried
on the normal work, thus the students were forced to carry on the attacks after
working hours or during the lunch break.
In the penetration tests that followed the CF methodology there was a distinction
between the coordinators and the custodians. In 11 of the tests we selected 4
PhD students as contact persons, who chose 11 friends as custodians (snowball
sampling [49]) from University of Twente and Technical University of Eindhoven.
In the other 18 tests, we selected a single contact person who randomly selected
the custodians from a list of all researchers in University of Twente.
After selecting the contact people and the custodians, we marked 29 laptops as
assets to be stolen. The contact persons asked the custodians to sign an informed
consent form, and then distributed the clearly marked laptops, each with a web-
camera and a Kensington lock. The custodians resided in two different universities
in nine different buildings. To steal any of the laptops, the penetration testers
needed to circumvent at least three layers of access control: the entrance of the
building, the entrance of the office where the custodian works and the Kensington
lock.
We gave the laptops to the custodians for two weeks usage. To avoid bias in the
study, none of the custodians was aware of the real purpose of the study. Instead,
we informed the custodians that the universities were conducting a usability study
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on the new laptops, and thus they needed to measure the satisfaction level of the
laptop users. We informed the custodians that the level of satisfaction would be
measured using motion detection web-cameras that would record the usage of the
laptops. The contact persons explained that they cannot tell the custodians exactly
which behavior we measure, since it might change the results of the experiment.
For security reasons, the contact people instructed the custodians to lock the lap-
tops with a Kensington lock and to keep them in the office. To reduce the risk of
data leakage and loss of productivity, the contact people asked the custodians not
to store any private or work data on the laptops. With these measures, we tried to
reduce the risk of data leakage and loss of productivity caused by any theft.
7.3.2.3 Execution of the penetration tests
After setting up the environment, we gave each of the penetration teams the lo-
cation of a single laptop they should obtain. In the first part, each team scouted
their location and collected as much information as possible about the custodian
and the security mechanisms at the location. Then, each team proposed a list of
attack scenarios they wanted to conduct. A sample attack scenario is presented in
Figure 7.4. During the second part of the test, after getting approval for executing
the scenarios by the coordinator, the teams started testing.
The actions of the teams were logged using the web-cameras we positioned in
the offices of the custodians and through recording devices carried by the teams
during the attacks. We used such comprehensive recordings (1) to have a better
overview of why the attacks succeeded/failed and (2) to be sure the employees
were treated with respect by the penetration testers. The students were asked to
try to avoid the CCTV cameras, to reflect the behavior of a real thief.
After each successful or failed attack, the teams provided an attack trace listing
which mechanisms they circumvented and, in case of failed attacks, which mech-
anism caused the attack to fail. Figure 7.6 provides a summary of the successful
approaches of teams and the disguises they used to obtain the laptop.
7.3.2.4 Closure
After all penetration tests were over, we debriefed the custodians and the contact
people through a group presentation, where we explained the penetration test and
its goal. All custodians and contact people were thanked and rewarded for helping
in the assessment of the security in their university.
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Figure 7.3: In twenty of the tests the custodians willingly gave the laptop or as-
sisted in giving the laptop, either believing that the teams were from the help desk
or that they were sent by the coordinator.
1. Social engineer night pass from an employee.
2. Enter the building early in the morning.
3. Social engineer the cleaning lady to access the office.
4. Cut any protection on the laptop using a bolt cutter.
5. Leave the building during office hours.
Figure 7.4: Example of an attack scenario
7.3.2.5 Results from the penetration tests
Surprisingly, all teams but one were eventually successful in stealing their lap-
top. Besides the 31 successful attacks, there were an additional 31 unsuccessful
attacks.
The students took roles as service desk employees, students that urgently needed
a laptop for a few hours, coordinator representatives or relied only on physical
means to obtain the laptop. The students used mobile phones and pocket video
cameras to record the conversation with the employees. In one case they took a
professional camera and a cameraman, and told the custodian the recording is part
of a study to measure the service quality of the service desk.
The favorite approach of the teams was to confront the custodian directly and ask
for the laptop. The resistance of the custodians varied. In most cases, the custo-
dians gave the laptop easily after being showed a fake email and being promised
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Figure 7.5: In nine tests the teams social engineered a person other than the custo-
dian. In nine of the tests the students used a bolt cutter to cut the Kensington lock
or used other means to circumvent the lock.
Approach Disguise
Social engineered the custodian as coordinator helpers 5
as ICT desk 14
as students 2
Social engineered another employee as ICT desk 3
as delivery person 1
Social engineered the janitor as students 5
Social engineered the cleaning lady as PhD student 1
Used no social engineering 2
Figure 7.6: Successful approaches and disguises of the penetration testing teams
they will get the laptop back in a few hours. In some cases the custodian wanted
a confirmation from a supervisor or the coordinator. The teams succeeded in
these attempts because the custodian called a number provided by the penetration
testers. Needless to say, the number was of another team member pretending to be
the coordinator. In one case a colleague of the custodian got suspicious and sent
an email to the campus security. Since only the main security officer knew about
the penetration test, in few hours the security guards were all alerted and started
searching for suspicious students.
Some groups were not able to social engineer the custodian directly and were
forced to look for alternative approaches. For example, in one of the cases the
students entered the building before working hours. At this time the cleaning lady
cleans the offices, and under the assumption it is their office let the students inside.
After entering the office, the students cut the Kensington lock and left the build-
ing before the custodian arrived. A summary of all successful and unsuccessful
attacks is presented in Appendix G.
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7.3.2.6 Limitations of the tests
A limitation of the tests might be the high self-confidence of the testers. The
security guards were not aware of the penetration test. If caught, the identification
process would be unpleasant experience for the testers. Nevertheless, they knew
they will not go to jail for their actions. A thief might rather wait for the laptop
to be left unattended than approaching an employee directly and asking for their
laptop.
7.4 Qualitative analysis
We observed three main security mechanisms in the universities: surveillance
cameras, access control and the level of security awareness of the employees.
7.4.1 Surveillance cameras
Security officers do not use cameras as alarming mechanisms, but use recorded
footages a posteriori, to identify an offender after an accident has taken place. The
security officers cannot afford to monitor all surveillance cameras. The cameras
work only when a motion is detected, and automatically store the recording in a
back end server. The delay between the occurrence and report of the theft gives
the thief sufficient time to leave the building.
Even when used to identify the thief a posteriori, the cameras provide limited
information about the thief. In none of the logs nor during any of the penetra-
tion tests the cameras provided enough information to reveal the identity of the
thief. The CCTV system is providing limited help because (1) the cameras are
not mounted in offices, (2) the thief can easily conceal the laptop and (3) thieves
usually know the position of the cameras and obscure their face.
The cameras are not mounted in offices. All penetration tests and 49% of the
thefts took place in an office. Cameras are not mounted in offices to preserve the
privacy of the employees and because mounting cameras in every office is not cost
effective. Without surveillance in these offices, it is impossible to identify a thief
during the act.
Instead of offices, the cameras are usually mounted on the entrance of buildings.
Many people pass through the entrances with bags, and each of the bags might
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conceal a stolen laptop. Even if there are only two persons observed by the cam-
era, if the persons are not caught on the spot and challenged by the security guards,
the evidence from the surveillance camera can not be used against them.
Cameras positioned to monitor public locations, such as cafeterias, halls and re-
ception desks can record the thief during the theft. The logs show that 46% of the
laptop thefts happened in public locations. During the penetration tests we noticed
that these cameras are usually triggered by motion detection, and are not actively
monitored by the security guards. A careful thief would obscure her face from
the cameras using a hat, a hood or just covering her face with her hands before
she steals the laptop. In one of the penetration tests, three penetration testers wan-
dered with newspapers on top of their faces through the building without being
challenged by anybody.
In conclusion, the surveillance system provides no help in stopping the theft and
has limited usage in identifying the thief a posteriori.
7.4.2 Access control
We spotted two weaknesses of the access control in the universities. Locks are
usually bypassed because (1) they are disabled during working hours and (2) the
doors and windows where the locks reside are easy to force.
The access controls on the entrances of the building are easily bypassed because
they are disabled during working hours and because there are too many people
with credentials that can open the door. From the 32 penetration teams, the major-
ity bypassed the entrance locks by attacking during working hours and only a few
teams social engineered credentials from an employee to enter the building out of
working hours.
Another attack vector for stealing a laptop is to force a door or a window. The
penetration teams were not allowed to damage any property of the universities
except cutting the Kensington locks. However, the logs from actual laptop thefts
show that in 30% of the thefts, the thief broke a door or a window to get access to
the office.
Similarly to recordings from surveillance cameras, logs from the access control
systems provide limited help in identifying the thief. The logs show whose cre-
dential was used to enter a restricted area at a specific time period. Since the
credentials are easy to steal or social engineer and because there are many people
entering and leaving the area where the theft occurs, it is hard to deduce which
person is the thief.
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In conclusion, the typical access control mechanisms deployed in the universi-
ties are mainly used to deter opportunistic thieves, but provide no help against a
determined thief.
7.4.3 Security awareness of the employees
The level of security awareness of the employees plays a crucial role in success or
failure of a theft. The human element is the main reason behind the success of the
laptop thefts. In 69% of the laptop thefts and 100% of the penetration tests, the
theft occurred either because the employee left the laptop unattended in a public
location or did not lock the door when leaving the office. Similarly, during the
penetration tests, employees opened door from offices of their colleagues, shared
credentials or handed in laptops without any identification. Therefore, even with
strong access control in place, if the security awareness of the employees is low,
the access control can easily be circumvented.
On the other hand, the human element is the main reason behind the failure of
67% of all failed penetration tests. In these cases, an employee informed the
security guards for suspicious activities, rejected to open a door for the tester,
rejected to unlock a laptop without permission from the custodian or interrupted
the tester during the theft. In these cases, the employees besides enforcing the
access control mechanisms, also played a role as an additional surveillance layer
around the laptop.
Employees are usually considered as the weakest link in the security of an orga-
nization. We observe that employees can also be the strongest link in the security
of open organization. A proper security education of employees increases the em-
ployee’s resistance to social engineering, and increases effectiveness of the other
security mechanisms.
7.4.4 Limitations of the observations
The observations from the test and log analysis is based on the security mecha-
nisms in two open institutions. The observations may apply to other mobile assets,
such as medical equipment, beamers and mobile phones in institutions open to the
public. However, other types of organizations might have different spectrum of
mechanisms for protecting their laptops.
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Figure 7.7: Representation of the concepts from routine activity theory
7.5 Quantitative analysis
In this section we develop a statistical model that predicts the probability that a
theft will succeed based on the presence of guardians, managers and attack tools.
To achieve the goal, first we use Routine Activity Theory to define a number
of variables that describe the attack traces from the penetration tests. Then, we
calculate the correlation of the variables with the success of an attack scenario.
Finally, we use the variables that are statistically significant in a multivariate lo-
gistic regression, to construct a model that will predict the probability of an attack
succeeding based on the values of the variables.
The results from the analysis (1) can aid to better allocate protection mechanisms
in organizations and (2) can help generate/differentiate attack scenarios likely to
succeed during a penetration test.
We use Routine Activity Theory (RAT) [44] as a framework to analyze the results
from the penetration tests. For an attack to succeed, routine activity theory states
that three elements need to converge in space and time: a motivated offender,
a suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian. Capable guardians are
people that supervise people or property. When an offender and target exist, the
absence of a capable guardians allows the crime to occur. Besides the guardians,
there are two other groups of people that may prevent a crime, handlers and man-
agers [43]. A handler, such as a police officer, monitors likely offenders, while
a manager, such as a security guard, monitors amenable places. The concepts of
routine activity theory are presented in Figure 7.7.
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Figure 7.8: Successful and unsuccessful attacks. The figure includes the variables
that contribute to the success of the attack, as well as reasons why an attack failed.
The majority of the attacks failed while the testers where trying to circumvent the
entrance to the office of the custodian (14) and the Kensington lock (16). In all but
one attack the testers managed to enter the building and in all attacks the testers
managed to leave the building.
During the penetration tests, we chose the offender (the penetration testers) and
the target (the laptop), and focused on the capable guardian (the custodian) and the
managers. Managers are the people whose presence in the location might prevent
the theft, such as the security guards, cleaning ladies, janitors, secretaries, and
employees in the office where the laptop is situated. The managers and guardians
have tools that help them thwart the likely offenders, such as (1) the entrance to
the building, (2) the entrance to the office, (3) the Kensington lock and (4) the exit
from the building with the target. Similarly, the offenders have tools to help them
steal the laptop, including physical theft and social engineering
7.5.1 Selection of the variables
Our dataset used in the analysis consists of 62 attacks distilled from the attack
traces generated by the 32 penetration tests, from which 31 are successful and
31 not successful. Figure 7.8 provides a summary of how the testers managed to
circumvent each layer of defense, as well as why some attacks failed.
We defined 30 variables that belong to one of the elements of interest in the routine
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Variable Description Encoding
Yes No
SocialEng An individual is social engineered 1 0
PhysTheft A physical theft took place 1 0
SomeoneInside The testers entered an unlocked, non-empty office 1 0
CustodianUnl The custodian unlocks the Kensington lock 1 0
ICTEmployee The testers took the role of an ICT Help Desk employee 1 0
Custodian The testers approached the custodian during the attack 1 0
Employee The testers approached another employee during the attack 1 0
Figure 7.9: Independent variables
activity theory. We divided the variables in three groups: (1) how the four layers
of defense were circumvented, (2) which managers were circumvented and (3)
which tools the testers used during the attack.
From the attack traces we defined 19 variables that belong to the first group. These
variables together with the frequency of occurrence are presented in the successful
attacks in Figure 7.8. For the second group, the managers, we used 4 variables that
specify the roles of the people that were approached during the tests: custodian,
employee, janitor, cleaning lady. Finally, for the third group we used 2 variables
for the technique the testers used, social engineering and physical theft, as well as
5 variables based on the roles the testers took during the attack: ICT Help Desk,
PhD student, student, assistant to the coordinator or no role. The complete lest of
variables is presented in Appendix H.
7.5.2 Correlation between the variables
We used the SPSS statistic package to correlate the values of the variables with
the results of the attacks. Of the defined variables, 8 had a sufficient statistical
significance of the correlation with the success of the attack. Of these variables
7 were present at a sufficient number of successful attacks (10 or more) and were
included in the further analysis. The dependent variable in the analysis is whether
the attack succeeded or failed, while the independent variables which had suffi-
cient statistical significance are presented in Figure 7.9. A summarized result of
the analysis for these independent variables is presented in Figure 7.10.
The points of interest in Figure 7.10 are the ratio between successful and total
number of attack for a given value from one of the independent variables, and
the correlation between the independent and dependent variable. For example,
there are 31 attacks where the office was empty. From these attacks, only 11 suc-
ceeded (36%). There were another 31 attacks when someone was in the office,
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Variable SomeoneInside CustodianUnl Custodian Employee
Value 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Succeeded /
Number of attacks 11/31 20/31 12/43 19/19 10/34 21/28 27/47 4/15
In % 36% 65% 28% 100% 29% 75% 57% 27%
Poarson’s R 0.29 0.67 0.45 -0.26
Significance test 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.04
Variable ICTEmployee SocialEng PhysicalTheft
Value 0 1 0 1 0 1
Succeeded/
Number of attacks 16/41 15/21 1/15 30/47 23/52 8/10
In % 39% 71% 7% 64% 44% 80%
Poarson’s R 0.31 0.49 0.26
Significance test 0.02 0.00 0.04
Figure 7.10: Relation between the distilled variables and the success of an attack
from which 20 succeeded (65%). Thus the information for the variable Some-
oneInside can be interpreted as: When someone was inside the office (custodian
or employee), allowing the testers to get inside the office, 65% of the attacks suc-
ceeded. Only 36% of the attacks succeeded when the testers needed to find a
different way to circumvent the office door.
The next two row in Figure 7.10 present the strength and direction of the cor-
relation between the variable in question and the outcome of the result and its
significance. The significance provides the probability of obtaining the current
distribution of frequencies, or one that is more uneven. The direction of the corre-
lation between the variable SomeoneInside and the outcome of the attack is pos-
itive, and the strength of the correlation is 0.29. The significance of this result is
0.02 (<0.05), which leads to the conclusion that there is a chance of 2% to get
such or more uneven distribution of the frequencies randomly.
Interpretation of the results
The first two variables, SomeoneInside and CustodianUnl, show which ways of
circumventing the layers of defense (the managers) correlate the most with the re-
sults of the attacks. The circumvention of the entrance to the office is more likely
when there is someone inside, because then the entrance is unlocked. Similarly,
when the custodian unlocks the Kensington lock for the testers, the attack always
leads to a success. From these two instances we can conclude that the defined lay-
ers of defense are not very useful because they can be disabled by the custodians
and other employees that have access to the office where the target resides.
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The second pair of variables, Custodian and Employee, belong to the group of
variables describing the guardian and the managers that were approached during
the penetration tests. Approaching the custodian as part of the attack positively
correlates with the success of the attack. This is an expected result, because if the
custodian agrees (even indirectly, by phone or mail) to give the laptop to the tester,
the managers usually do not interfere with the execution of the attack. However,
there is a negative correlation with the Employee variable. When employees other
than the custodian are approached during an attack, they often refuse to give ac-
cess to the laptop, and in most times refer the tester to come back in the office
when the custodian is present. From these two instances we can conclude that the
managers are more likely to interfere with an attack, while the guardians are more
likely to give the device away.
The correlation of the last three variables in the analysis, ICTEmployee, SocialEng
and PhysicalTheft, describes the dependency between the roles and techniques
used by the testers, and the outcome of the attacks. When the testers took the role
of an employee from the ICT Help Desk, the managers and guardians were more
likely to give away the laptop rather than when the testers assumed a different
role or no role at all. From the techniques used, both when the testers used social
engineering as part of the test and when they used physical theft, the theft was
more likely to succeed.
7.5.3 The success likelihood of an attack
We use the selected 7 variables to build a regression model. The regression model
provides information on how the modification of the variables in an attack scenario
(adding or removing any of them) can change the probability of a success of the
attack. The probability of a success of an attack scenario depends on the influence
of each of the identified properties in the scenario and their cumulative influence:
Psuccess =
1
1+e−z
z = α + β0X0 + ...+ βnXn
where P represents the probability of success, and depends on the constant α, the
regression coefficients β1, , βn that are linked to the independent variables X1,,
Xn and the values of these variables.
To build the model we use the stepwise backward multivariate logistic regression
from the SPSS package. From the selected 7 variables, we discounted Custodi-
anUnl because it gave uninterpretable results. The analysis finished in 4 steps,
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Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Step 4 X0: SocialEng 5.0 1.5 11.8 1 .001 151.48
X1: PhysicalThefts 3.1 1.3 6.0 1 .014 23.14
X2: Employee -3.1 1.0 11.6 1 .001 0.05
C : Constant -3.8 1.4 7.2 1 .007 0.02
Figure 7.11: Variables in the equation. Variables entered on step 1: SocialEng,
PhysicalTheft, SomeoneInside, ICTEmployee, Custodian, Employee.
discounting one of the variables in each step. The summarized result is presented
in Figure 7.11.
The values for B represent the coefficients in the logistic regression equations.
Exp(B) is the exponentiated coefficient, yielding the odds ratio. S.E. represents
the standard error associated with each of the coefficients. As only a single in-
dependent variable is involved in each test the degrees of freedom (df ) equals 1.
We used the Wald-test to confirm the validity of our model. In order for an inde-
pendent variable to be statistically relevant, the Wald value needs to be compared
to a Chi-squared distribution. This gives the significance, which is also presented
in the table. A variable is said to be significant when the significance is 0.05
or less [9]. In our case, as can be seen in Figure 7.11, we found that the three
independent variables SocialEng, PhysicalTheft, Employee and the constant are
significant. Thus, we can predict the chance of success for a given attack sce-
nario based on knowledge of whether the social engineering and theft is used and
whether employees are involved using the function Psuccess:
Psuccess(X0, X1, X2) =
1
1+e−(−3.8+5.0X0+3.1X1−3.1X2)
Interpretation of the results
From the results we can deduce that the use of social engineering appears to have
the biggest influence on the model’s outcome (increasing the predicted probabil-
ity). Involvement of physical theft increases this probability even more. However,
when managers are involved, the probability of the success of the attack decreases.
In case none of the independent variables are true, the predicted probability will
be only based on the constant coefficient.
We can evaluate this model by comparing the observed outcome with the result
predicted by the model as depicted in Figure 7.12. The result shows that overall,
83.9% of the cases would be correctly predicted by the model. The probability of
obtaining a false positive (22.6%) from the model seems to be slightly higher than
the probability of a false negative (9.7%).
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Step 4 Observed Predicted
Result Percentage correct
0 1
The outcome of the attack 0 24 7 77.4%
1 3 28 90.3%
Overall percentage 83.9%
Figure 7.12: Classification table
Limitation of the results
Our dataset has 62 attacks. When using logistic regression, problematic results
are known to occur if there are not enough events compared to the number of
independent variables [32]. There are three different types of problems or er-
rors: underfitting, overfitting and paradoxical fitting. These are respectively when
important variables are omitted, when too many variables are used or when a vari-
able actually suggests a factor to have a certain impact when in fact the opposite
is true. To keep the model valid, these errors must at least be kept to a minimum,
in order to do this it is suggested to use at least ten events per independent vari-
able [33, 78, 79]. An event is the smaller number of the binary outcome of the
logistic model. In our case an event is the successful theft of a target laptop, and
the number of successful and unsuccessful attacks is the same, 31. In our model,
we have 3 independent variables, which meets the minimum of 10 events per vari-
able. To make stronger claims on the results we need to increase the dataset, which
can be achieved with the execution of additional penetration tests.
7.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we evaluated the security mechanisms from the physical and so-
cial domain that influence laptop theft in organizations open to the public. We
analyzed the logs of laptop thefts which occurred in a period of two years in two
universities in Netherlands. We complemented the findings from these logs with
32 penetration tests using the methodologies in Chapter 6, in which we used social
engineering to gain possession of marked laptops.
We observed that (1) mechanisms from a single domain can provide only limited
protection against laptop and (2) the effectiveness of a physical security mecha-
nism depends mainly on its alignment with security mechanisms from the social
domain. From the quantitative analysis of the results from the penetration tests,
we obtain two conclusions. First, in the crime prevention domain, we conclude
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that people managers have the biggest contribution in stopping a theft. Second,
in the penetration testing domain, using social engineering as a tool provides the
biggest probability of successful acquisition of the laptop.
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Training Students to Steal∗
A Practical Assignment in Computer Security
Education
Practical courses in information security provide students with first-
hand knowledge of technical security mechanisms and their weak-
nesses. However, teaching students only the technical side of infor-
mation security leads to a generation of students that emphasize digi-
tal solutions, but ignore the physical and the social aspects of security.
In the last two years we devised a course where students were given a
practical assignment which includes a combination of physical secu-
rity, social engineering and digital penetration testing. As part of the
course, the students took the role of penetration testes, and using the
methodologies presented in Chapter 6 obtained laptops from unaware
employees throughout the university campus. The assignment pro-
vided the students with a practical overview of security and increased
their awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of security mecha-
nisms. The penetration tests executed by the students helped us draw
conclusions on the effectiveness of security mechanisms presented in
Chapter 7. In this chapter we present the design of the practical as-
signment and the observations from the execution.
∗This chapter is a minor revision of the paper ”Training Students to Steal: A Practical Assign-
ment in Computer Security Education” [3] published In Proceedings of the 42nd ACM technical
symposium on Computer science education (SIGCSE ’11), pages 21-26, ACM, 2011
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8.1 Introduction
Educational institutes are starting to offer specialized CSIA (Computer Security
and Information Assurance) courses, designed to train students in assessing and
improving the security of digital systems. Computer security focuses on the pro-
tection of data from theft and corruption by using a combination of physical, dig-
ital and social mechanisms. Physical mechanisms focus on restricting and detect-
ing physical access to the data, such as locks, CCTV, infrared sensors and heat
sensors. Digital mechanisms focus on digital detection and protection of the data.
Common digital mechanisms are firewalls, intrusion detection systems and en-
cryption. Finally, social mechanisms focus on increasing the security awareness
of the employees and reducing mistakes from human factors. Examples of social
mechanisms that improve security are lectures on social engineering and clearly
defined policies.
Graduate courses in computer security often provide a narrow view on security
and focus mostly on the digital aspects (Figure 8.1, dashed line). Such a focus
provides an unrealistic view of the security requirements of an organization and
leads to students assuming that digital means ensure secured data.
However, most of the attacks performed by insiders require no technical knowl-
edge [86]. In the literature there are numerous examples where an adversary uses
social engineering and physical access to obtain data [16, 69, 11]. Thus, it is im-
portant to get the students acquainted with attacks in which the hacker uses also
physical and social means to compromise the data (Figure 8.1, solid line).
Practical assignments clarify and support the theory students learn. In practical
assignments students use the same methods and tools that hackers with malicious
intent use to gain access to information. The usage of practical assignments in
computer security is performed as part of many computer security courses, such
as in forensics [37], in education on spam [95] and in social engineering [42]. We
believe that students need to understand the hacking mentality and see how an
adversary would attack also in the physical and the social domain of information
security. That can be done by giving students first hand experience of the effec-
tiveness of the physical and social security mechanisms, exploring which attack
vectors are more likely to succeed than others.
In this chapter we present the practical assignment of an introductory graduate
course in computer security. The goal of the course is to give a broad overview
of security to the students and to increase their interest in the field. As part of the
course, the students steal laptops from unaware employees, mount offline attacks
on the laptop and attack a vulnerable server using the data from the laptop.
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Figure 8.1: Computer security in context
In section 8.2 we present the course and give a description of the practical assign-
ment as well as observations from the execution of the assignment. In section 8.3
we present in greater detail the practical and ethical implications of the physical
penetration test from the assignment. In section 8.5 we summarize our experience.
8.2 Course description
Since 2008 we have taught a class on introduction to computer security to graduate
students. The duration of the course is eight weeks, in which the students need
to write a scientific paper and take part in a practical assignment which can be
either suggested by them or by the lecturer. The course is part of a master track
in computer security, and introduces the students to all concepts in security. The
rest of the courses in the security track provides in-depth knowledge in different
aspects of information security. The goal of the introductory course is threefold:
1. Describe important concepts in computer security from the perspective of
physical, digital and social security.
2. Prepare the students to place security mechanisms in an overall security
context; for example, design a system or analyze a situation and determine
what the different physical, digital and social mechanisms could achieve in
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1. Gain possession
of laptop
2. Decrypt a file
from the laptop
3.Use the data from the
file to attack servers
Figure 8.2: The steps in the practical assignment
a given scenario or what techniques could be applied to reach a given goal.
3. Provide students with a first-hand experience with the strengths and weak-
nesses of security mechanisms from the physical, digital and social domain.
As part of the class, we provide a practical assignment where the students take the
point of view of an adversary.
The practical assignment is divided in three exercises, (1) physical penetration
exercise using social engineering, (2) offline attacks on a laptop and (3) online
attacks on a vulnerable server (Figure 8.2).
8.2.1 Physical and social engineering attacks
The goal of the physical penetration exercise (1), is to make the students aware of
the social engineering and physical activities an attacker can use to get sensitive
data, by stealing a laptop. After this exercise the students should have knowledge
of social engineering and physical security, and know the threats that arise from
them. For the first part of the assignment we used the methodologies described in
Chapter 6.
In 2008 we performed a pilot study with 9 students divided in 3 groups. The
groups performed 3 penetration tests using the EF methodology. After positive
feedback and applying the lessons learned in the pilot study, we gave the practical
assignment to all students in the class of 2009, 11 groups of 3 students. In the sec-
ond year, the students performed the penetration tests using the CF methodology.
Each laptop the students obtained was protected with at least three layers of access
control: the entrance of the building, the entrance to the office of the employee and
a Kensington lock. After setting up the environment, we gave each of the teams
the location of a single laptop they should obtain. First, each team scouted their
location and collected as much information as possible about the employee and the
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security mechanisms in place. Then, each team proposed a list of attack scenarios
they wanted to conduct. Each scenarios was approved by us and the security
management. The students had two weeks to gain possession of the laptop. The
actions of the teams were logged using the web-cameras we positioned in the
offices of the employees and through recording devices carried by the students,
such as mobile phones. We used such comprehensive recordings to be sure the
employees were treated with respect by the students. After each successful or
failed attempt, the teams provided an attack trace listing which mechanisms they
circumvented and, in case of failed attempts, which mechanism caused the attack
to fail.
8.2.2 Offline attacks
The second part of the practical assignment (2) consists of offline attack on en-
crypted data. The goal of the offline attacks, is to make the students aware of
the strength of the current encryption mechanisms, as well as the state of the art
hacking tools. After this exercise the students should have knowledge of most
commonly used tools for encryption of data and their vulnerabilities.
During the pilot study, on each of the laptops marked for stealing we put three
copies of a file containing the IP address of one vulnerable server. One copy
was encrypted with WinZip1, the other copy with TrueCrypt2 and the third with
BitLocker3.
During the actual assignment, to avoid privacy breach of the custodians, we in-
stalled the copies of the file on laptops provided by the students rather than on the
laptops marked for stealing.
In this part of the assignment, the students used offline attacks, such as the Cold-
boot attack [53] and/or password cracking tools such as John the Ripper4 and
Hydra5 to obtain the IP address from the encrypted file.
1www.winzip.com
2www.truecrypt.org
3bitlocker.
4www.openwall.com/john
5freeworld.thc.org/thc-hydra
159
Chapter 8. Training Students to Steal: A Practical Assignment
8.2.3 Online attacks
During the digital penetration testing exercise, the students need to use the IP
address obtained from the second part of the exercise as an attack vector in on-
line attack on a vulnerable server (3). The goal of the exercise was to give the
students an overview of the current online techniques in compromising a system.
After the exercise, the students should to be able to use the common tools used in
penetration testing, and know their capabilities.
As a target server, we used a number of virtual machines running Windows and
Linux operating systems. On each machine we set a web site in which we intro-
duced a vulnerability, either SQL injection or buffer overflow.
In the last exercise the students used Backtrack6 to attack the vulnerable server
and obtain a protected file.
In this chapter we focus only on the first exercise of the assignment, the physical
penetration test. The second and third exercise can be considered as a reproduction
of exercises reported by other authors [37, 68, 13].
8.3 Implications
Running the practical assignment is challenging. Most of the issues we faced we
discuss in Section 6.4.6 and Section 6.5.6 in Chapter 6.
During the design of the course, we had four major concerns. First, the execu-
tion of the assignment might violate the law. Second, the assignment is executed
in an environment where the outcome cannot be controlled. Thirdly, the assign-
ment teaches students to steal and lie. Finally, the assignment includes deceiving
employees. In the rest of this section we explore the implications.
8.3.1 Legal implications
To ensure that we were operating within the law, before deploying the assignment
we consulted the legal department of the university. Following the advice from
the legal department, we forbade all scenarios that included (1) theft of any object
besides the laptop, (2) searching through the belonging of the employees and (3)
impersonation of officials of the university, police, fire department, etc.
6www.backtrack-linux.org
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8.3.2 Reducing unexpected outcomes
The assignment was executed on the campus of the university. This is a semi-
controlled environment, where we could neither fully control the behavior of the
students nor the behavior of the employees and the security personnel. We applied
the following principles to the design of the exercise:
1. Limit the scope of the activity. The students were not allowed to use in-
timidation, violence nor to put the employees or themselves at risk. They
were also forbidden to cause any physical damage, except for cutting the
Kensington locks. The laptops were clearly marked and the students were
allowed to gain possession only of a specific laptop. All students signed the
rules of engagement before the scouting phase.
2. Control the risk. All attack scenarios were approved in advance by us, and
only minor deviations in the execution were allowed. The web-cameras and
the students recorded with video/audio of all their activities. The recordings
allowed us to see if the employees were treated with respect or were put at
risk. Finally, all students were given a lecture on the ethical aspects of social
engineering and theft.
3. Reduce the impact of the exercise. Just after the execution of the task, the
students reported to us. When the laptops were stolen without knowledge
of the employees, we tried to inform the employees before they found the
laptop gone. The employees were briefed from the beginning not to store
any sensitive, private nor critical information on the laptops, and to use them
only for gaming and surfing. At the end of the assignment, we properly
debriefed all the employees, and provided small gifts for the participation.
4. Introduce escape clauses. The employees and the students participated vol-
untarily in the study. Both groups were aware, and signed an informed
consent stating they can stop with the activity at any time. All students
were given ”get out of jail” cards in case they are caught by the security
guards. The cards contained phone numbers of the security management
and the lecturers. The security management had information about all the
target employees and all the students who participated in the exercise.
8.3.3 Ethical implications for the students
During the design of the first part of the assignment, the physical penetration
tests, we were concerned (1) whether the students would feel comfortable with
the activity and (2) whether we were training a future generation of criminals.
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Benefits Risks
1. Practical overview of all
aspects of security.
1. Reduced comfort level.
2. Awareness of the strengths
and weaknesses of security
mechanisms.
2. Misuse of the knowledge.
Figure 8.3: Risks and benefits from the assignment to the students
8.3.3.1 Comfort level of the students
Before the start of the assignments, all the students were given the opportunity to
perform an experiment of their choice instead of participating in the assignment.
The only limitation was that the experiment should have the same workload as the
assignment. All the students decided to join the assignment.
Survey among the students
To evaluate their level of comfort we devised two questionnaires, one before the
exercise and one after the exercise. We had 31 respondents (94%) for each of
the questionnaires. The students graded on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5
(strongly agree) how much they agree with a statement.
The majority of students felt comfortable during the assignment. The number in-
creased from 65% before the execution of the exercise, to 77% after the exercise.
Most students thought the assignment would be fun, but the percentage dropped
from 71% to 65% after conducting it. At the beginning students felt less comfort-
able because they were not sure what kind of attacks they would perform. After
we approved only the low risk scenarios, the comfort level increased, but the fun
part of the activity decreased. 68% said they would repeat the assignment if they
were again given the chance. The results are summarized in Figure 8.4.
The students filled out another questionnaire after finishing the course, as part
of the standard quantitative evaluation of courses in the university. The results
show the satisfaction of the students increased as well as their attendance in class
compared to the previous year (Figure 8.5). The grade of the course increased
a whole point, from 6.8 in 2008 to 7.8 in 2009, thanks to the enthusiasm of the
students for the practical assignment. The average grade of the rest of the courses
were 7.2, both in 2008 and 2009.
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Question Av. SD
Before the exercise:
The exercise will be fun 4.6 0.7
The exercise is useful 4.1 0.8
I feel fine about the exercise in general 3.8 1.1
I feel fine about the ethical implications of the
exercise
3.5 1.2
After the exercise
The exercise was fun 4.5 0.7
The exercise was useful 4.1 0.9
I feel fine about the exercise in general 4.1 1.0
I feel fine about the ethical implications of the
exercise
3.6 1.2
I would do the exercise again 3.9 1.2
I am now more aware of physical and social se-
curity
3.9 0.9
Figure 8.4: Results from the students before and after the first part of the assign-
ment
Year: 2008 2009
Respondents: 40 (100%) 28 (90%)
1. The course was well organized 7.4 8.6
2. My attendance was above 80% 7.3 8.9
3. I liked the practical assignment 5.6 8.2
4. Overall grade of the course 6.8 7.8
Figure 8.5: Results from the students after passing the course
8.3.3.2 Risks of teaching students to steal
Checking if we are teaching the next generation of criminals is a more subtle issue.
The benefit of educating students in the adversarial aspect of security is widely
discussed and implemented in many security courses. Pashel [76] and Logan and
Clarkson [64] discuss the ethical implications of teaching students to hack and the
possibility of misusing the acquired knowledge. We show that the arguments in
favor of teaching digital penetration testing also hold for the physical domain, by
establishing an analogy between digital and physical penetration testing.
Analogy to teaching digital penetration testing
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Question Average SD
1: Deceiving the subject 3.5 1.2
2.1: Physical damage - Discomfort 2.3 1.1
2.2: Physical damage - Injury 1.3 0.8
2.3: Physical damage - Death 1.0 0.0
3.1: Material damage - Emotional 2.4 1.2
3.2: Material damage - Financial 2.8 1.3
3.3: Material damage - Production loss 2.1 1.4
4.1: Psychological damage - Threats 2.1 1.0
4.2: Psychological damage - Deception 4.2 0.8
5.1: Privacy - Assume identity 4.0 1.0
5.2: Privacy - Access sensitive informa. 3.6 1.3
5.3: Privacy - Destroy information 2.3 1.1
5.4: Privacy - Theft of information 3.2 1.3
Figure 8.6: Ethical acceptability of damage according to students
According to Pashel [76] and Logan and Clarkson [64], teaching hacking to stu-
dents is mostly justified, because to provide the best security defense, a system
administrator must possess the same skills as the attacker. We consider this to be
the Locksmith Argument. For any locksmith to be able to create decent locks they
also need to have the ability to break locks (or at least have extensive knowledge
on the techniques of a lock picker). The same argument can be applied to teach-
ing physical penetration testing. The only way a student is able to secure physical
objects is to have extensive knowledge on how attackers penetrate organizations,
buildings and so forth. Letting them gain experience from an attacker’s point of
view will positively affect this knowledge.
Another argument in favor of teaching students digital penetration testing is that
these skills are useful in discovering weaknesses in the security of a system [64].
The same argument can be applied to physical penetration testing. For example,
an insurance company needs to review the physical security (such as cameras and
security guards) and digital security (the network infrastructure that controls the
cameras, the locks and the alarms) of a museum before determining the insurance
premium.
Survey among the students
In the questionnaires we gave to the students, we also asked for their opinion
on ethical issues. The students were told to assume there were no rules in the
assignment, the only objective was to obtain the laptop.
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Benefits Risks
1. Increased awareness of the employees. 1. Employees are deceived.
2. Checks the security mechanisms in the
university.
2. Employees or their data might be
put at risk.
Figure 8.7: Risks and benefits from the assignment to the employees
We asked what type of damage the students are willing to inflict on the employee
or the surroundings: physical, material, psychological damage and invasion of
privacy. Each type of damage consists of some subtypes that contain examples
of such damage, varying from light to severe (in our perception). In this way, we
could identify the ethical sensitivity of types of damage, in the perception of the
students.
The results from this survey are shown in Figure 8.6. The scale is from 1 (uncom-
fortable / I will never do that) to 5 (comfortable / I have no problem doing that).
The questionere was filled out by 28 students (85%).
Physical damage is a sensitive matter. Even light physical damage or emotional
damage was rated only around 2. The roots for this rating can be found in the
basic ethics of society e.g. ”do not hurt people” and ”respect your fellow hu-
man beings”. The students are less concerned with material damage than physical
damage. Ratings are rather spread with this type of damage: some students do not
care about material damage at all while other students do feel very uncomfortable
causing material damage. It is surprising to see that the students feel uncomfort-
able with causing production loss.
Furthermore, threats and intimidation are again sensitive according to the stu-
dents: The rating averages around 2. Deception however does not seem to be such
a big problem, most students have no difficulty in feeling comfortable with de-
ceiving the employee. It is also surprising to see that privacy issues do not make
the students feel very uncomfortable. Destroying information does rate as very
uncomfortable, but other types of privacy issues tend to rate toward comfortable.
8.3.4 Ethical implications for the employees
We describe the ethical implications of the penetration tests to the employees in
Section 6.6 from Chapter 6. Physical penetration testing using social engineering
can never be completely respectful because it is based on deception. However, the
deception used in the assignment presented in this chapter is justifiable.
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Question Av. SD
1. I found the exercise interesting 4.2 0.8
2. The exercise increased my awareness 3.8 1.2
3. The exercise should be done more often 3.8 0.9
4. During the exercise I found myself stressed 1.9 1.1
5. I find the assignment ethical 3.6 1.0
6. These exercises are harmful 2.1 0.9
7. These exercises will benefit students 3.7 0.8
8. The security awareness of students and em-
ployees can be improved through such exer-
cises?
4.4 1.0
Figure 8.8: The view of the employees
Besides the 11 penetration tests we executed as part of the presented assignment,
we orchestrated additional 18 penetration tests in 2010. After the debriefing, we
asked the employees to fill in a survey. Twenty four employees (83%) from which
the students obtained the laptop filled a questionnaire after the debriefing.
They answered multiple questions, on a scale of 1 (I strongly disagree) to 5 (I
strongly agree) and yes/no questions. The results are summarized in Figure 8.8.
Most of the employees said that the university should continue letting graduate
students perform these assignments (71%) or did not have opinion on the topic
(29%), but none of the employees was for stopping the training. 94% of the
employees, also agreed that these kinds of assignments can improve the security
awareness, both that of the students and of the university employees.
8.4 Using Portunes to produce attack scenarios
In 2010 we ran the practical assignment again with two modification. First, the
students had to steal a laptop twice. Once using attack scenarios generated by
Portunes, and once using attack scenarios generated through brainstorming. Sec-
ond, because of the extra work for the students, we removed the online attacks on
vulnerable servers from the practical assignment.
The goal of these changes was to focus on the suitability of Portunes to generate
attack scenarios for penetration testers and to compare the quantity and quality of
the scenarios produced by Portunes with the attack scenarios the testers can come
up by traditional ways (brainstorming).
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8.4.1 Setup of the practical assignment
In 2010 we had 9 teams of 3 students. The teams first got a target and scouted the
target for one week. Simultaneously they were reading on how to use the Portunes
tool to produce models and generate attack scenarios.
After the scouting phase, the teams met for 3 hours in a lab. Here the teams were
divided in two groups. The first group of 5 teams was supposed to brainstorm
as many attacks as possible for their target, while the second group of 4 teams
was supposed to generate a Portunes model and automatically produce the attack
scenarios.
After the 3 hour lab exercise, the teams had one day to write the results in a
general template so it is impossible to see whether the attack scenarios they are
produced by Portunes or brainstorming. We collected these reports and randomly
distributed them to the teams. Upon receiving a set of attack scenarios, the teams
had to grade them and then execute them.
During the second round of penetration tests, the setup was the same, but the
groups changed their roles. The group that generated the attack scenarios using
Portunes in the first round of penetration tests, generated them through brain-
storming, and vice versa, the group of teams that generated the scenarios through
brainstorming generated them using Portunes.
8.4.2 Unanticipated difficulties
During the execution of the exercise, we faced a few unanticipated difficulties,
which hindered us in drawing conclusions.
First, during the lab work it become apparent that most of the teams did not read
the instructions how to use Portunes. For example, the teams were downloading
the Portunes tool for the first time during the lab work, and did not know the
concepts of Portunes nor how to use the tool to start building a model. Without
this knowledge they could not produce any meaningful result within the allocated
3 hours. Thus 2 of the 4 teams that were supposed to generate attack scenarios
using Portunes were allowed to use brainstorming.
Second, we faced a few bugs in the Portunes GUI. For example, when generating
all the attack scenarios, the model gets modified. There was no button to revert
to the original Portunes model. This forced the teams to save the Portunes model
every time before they generated the attack scenarios. These bugs together with
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the time limitation of 3 hours, limited the size of the model the students could
generate.
Third, during the second round of generating attack scenarios, the teams that gen-
erated scenarios using brainstorming (7 out of the 9 teams), produced models such
that generate the same attack scenarios they produced using the brainstorming. We
did not have a clear policy on this before the start of the assignment. In addition,
the time between handing in the reports and the deadline for starting the execution
of the penetration tests was one day, leaving no time to repeat the lab work. Thus,
we accepted these scenarios as valid.
Finally, we had no clear policy how the quality of an attack scenario should be
graded. The positive or negative outcome of an attack depends from many vari-
ables which are not part of the attack scenario. Thus, we asked for subjective
grading from the students based on the likelihood of the scenarios to be success-
ful. We found this reasonable, because the students were the ones that will even-
tually execute the scenarios. However, each set of attack scenarios contained a
scenario where they mimic an ICT employee. In this scenario they state to the
custodian there is a virus in the laptop and they need to take the laptop for in-
spection. When executing the scenarios, the teams most often ignored the other
produced scenarios and executed the ICT Desk attack scenario (14 out of the 18
tests). Thus it is hard to determine how realistic were the other scenarios produced
both by Portunes and through brainstorming.
With the above mentioned limitations of the assignment, we could distill the fol-
lowing conclusions:
• Portunes can generate realistic, executable scenarios similar to the ones
generated by brainstorming. The students were able to generate the same
scenarios from the brainstorming using Portunes. The average number of
scripts is almost equal (13 for manual against 12 for Portunes). There was a
non-significant difference in the average grading with 1 point (6.5 for man-
ual against 5.5 for Portunes).
• Using Portunes, a penetration tester can generate a set of attack scenarios
within 3 hours. All scenarios the teams generated were within the allocated
slot of 3 hours.
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8.5 Conclusion
To make students aware of physical and social aspects of security, these aspects
need to be included in security courses, both from a theoretical and a practical
point of view. We presented a practical assignment consisting of three steps. First,
the students needed to steal a laptop from an unaware employee, then decrypt a
document from the laptop, and finally use the information from the document to
attack vulnerable servers.
As part of the assignment the students used the Portunes framework to automati-
cally generate physical penetration tests to execute. However due to unanticipated
difficulties in the setup of the experiment, we were not able to draw conclusions
on the usability of Portunes in generating attack scenarios.
The students enjoyed the assignment and their awareness of the physical and so-
cial aspects of security increased. During the course they learned the strengths
and weaknesses of common physical, digital and social mechanisms used to se-
cure sensitive information. Such experience is essential for the future security
architects and chief security officers. Furthermore, the practical assignment in-
creased the overall attendance in the course and improved the course grade.
However, the assignment is challenging to administer and draws ethical and legal
implications. The students might feel uncomfortable to execute the attacks or the
employees might not be treated with respect. The students might also abuse the
new skills in illegal actions.
Surveys among students and employees indicate that the risks can be managed.
Employees who participated in the exercise did not feel stressed nor considered
the exercise harmful. Moreover, the arguments used in favor of digital penetration
testing also apply for physical penetration testing. Therefore, we believe the ben-
efits of the practical assignment outweigh the mentioned risks. This assignment
can be used by other universities in introducing computer security to graduate
students.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions
In the introductory chapter, we introduced the term alignment of orga-
nizational security policies. In the same chapter we introduced three
research questions that would improve the policy alignment and en-
forcement. In this chapter we summarize the contributions of this
thesis, in relation to the research questions and show how our con-
tributions can help solve practical problems in the industry. We also
highlight future research directions both related to the work intro-
duced in this thesis as well as the area of aligning security policies
across the physical, digital and social domain in general.
Historically, policy alignment is either observed from management perspective,
where managers align the security requirements with the business requirements,
or from technical perspective, where security professionals align policies in a spe-
cific software, computer or computer network. Recently, policy alignment is be-
ing seen more as a tool that allows the security professionals to refine security
requirements into technical security specification.
Policy alignment can be horizontal, when policies at the same level of abstraction
are aligned, or vertical, when more abstract policies are refined into low-level
policies on objects and data. During a horizontal alignment, the main goal is to
make the policies jointly exhaustive and mutually consistent, which means that
every behavior is either allowed or forbidden, and there is no behavior that is both
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allowed and forbidden. During a vertical alignment, the main goal is to ensure
that low-level policies are complete with respect to the high-level policies, which
means that every behavior that is allowed by the high-level policies is allowed by
the low-level policies, and that every behavior that is forbidden by the high-level
policies is also forbidden by the low level policies.
The main goal of policy alignment research is to provide enforcement of high-
level policies into security mechanisms, taking into consideration the physical,
digital and social aspects of security. To achieve this goal, this research domain
needs to provide (1) a consistent and exhaustive horizontal alignment of high-
level security policies, (2) complete vertical alignment between high-level and
low-level security policies and (3) complete enforcement of the low-level security
policies into security mechanisms.
The first focus in this thesis is on helping organizations to have complete verti-
cal alignment by providing formal methods for proving completeness of vertical
alignment, and is addressed in Chapter 2, 3, 4 and 5. We show how the results
from the first part of the thesis can be applied in mitigating the insider threat. In-
siders have intimate knowledge of the policies of the organization, and may use
them to their advantage to achieve a malicious goal. As a running example, we
used the road apple attack, where an insider deceives an employee to plug an in-
fected dongle into a server residing in a restricted area, enabling the transfer of
sensitive information to a remote server.
After the policies are horizontally and vertically aligned by the HR and IT and
physical security departments, they are enforced into security mechanisms. Se-
curity mechanisms cannot guarantee 100% enforcement of the policies because
of their nature (locks may break, people may reveal confidential information).
Therefore testing the security mechanisms by taking an adversarial role plays an
important role in assurance that the deployed mechanisms are sufficient and oper-
ational.
The second focus in this thesis is on helping organizations have complete enforce-
ment of the security policies by providing methodologies for testing and improv-
ing the effectiveness of security mechanisms in organizations, and is addressed in
Chapter 6, 7 and 8. We show how the results from the first part of the thesis can be
applied in mitigating the laptop theft threat. Laptops are mobile devices that are
easy to cloak and steal, and may contain whole databases of sensitive information.
A loss of a single laptop can cost an organization loss of productivity, restitution
cost to clients and loss of intellectual property. As a working example, we use
the scenario of stealing a laptop from an employee in a restricted area within the
premises of the organization.
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9.1 Scientific contributions
In the introductory chapter we formulated the following research question:
Main research question: How can we align and enforce security poli-
cies spanning the physical, digital and social domain?
We refined the main research question into three research question that could help
in aligning and enforcing security policies spanning the physical, digital and so-
cial domain. Below we summarize the contributions of this thesis for each of the
research questions from practical and theoretical perspective.
Research question 1: How can we represent the policies from the three domains
in one formal framework?
• We specified the three domains in one formal framework, Portunes. The
framework is able to express: 1) physical properties of elements, 2) mobility
of objects and data, and 3) trust and delegation between people. The frame-
work is also able to represent low-level policies on objects, locations and
data, such as identity, credential and location based access control (Chap-
ter 3).
• We specified high-level policies formally. We defined a modal logic, de-
signed to specify a set of desired and undesired behaviors and states of Por-
tunes models. These behaviors and states are represented as properties of
Portunes models and can also be used to describe adversarial goals (Chap-
ter 5).
Research question 2: How can we efficiently discover all cross-domain threats
caused by policy misalignment?
• We provided a set of algorithms that from a Portunes model generate a be-
havior that is allowed by the low-level policies but forbidden by a high-level
policy (Chapter 4). The algorithms can be used to test the completeness of
the vertical alignment across the physical, digital and social domain.
Research question 3: How can we test and improve the enforcement of the low-
level policies?
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• We developed two methodologies for testing the enforcement of the low-
level policies through physical penetration tests (Chapter 6).
• We analyzed the logs from actual thefts and 32 penetration tests to deter-
mine the effectiveness of most commonly used security mechanisms in pro-
tecting against laptop theft (Chapter 7).
• We designed a practical assignment for graduate students in introducing the
basic concepts in information security using live penetration tests (Chap-
ter 8).
9.2 Practical contributions
Besides the scientific contribution, the results from the research can help address-
ing practical issues in the industry. In the introduction of this thesis we provided a
motivating example where the management faced two issues in their information
security program:
Problem 1: How can the management be sure that the total set of low-level poli-
cies produced by the physical, IT and HR departments matches their high-level
policy?
Problem 2: How can the three departments be sure that the security mechanisms
in place follow the design specifications of the low-level policies?
We approached the first issue using formal methods by providing a formal model
and a logic and were able to define low-level policies, high-level policies and
behaviors in a single formalism. From a practical perspective, we implemented
the algorithms and partially the logic in a single proof of concept tool, which
is freely available. Now the security departments can build a model that will
represent the environment of interest, input the current low-level and high-level
security policies and generate and simulate behaviors that are allowed by the low-
level policies but forbidden by the high-level policies. The tool can be used at
various cycles of development, for example, before system deployment to analyze
what-if scenarios and after high-level policy modification, to check whether the
low-level policies are still complete with respect to the high-level policies. These
contributions can help the management to obtain formal assurance that the low-
level policies defined by the physical, IT and HR departments are properly refined
from the high-level policies and are complete with respect to them.
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We addressed the second issue from the motivating example by providing an ex-
tensive overview of methods used to protect assets in an organization from theft,
and testing methodologies to assure the security departments that the low-level
policies are properly implemented. The security departments can now run physi-
cal penetration tests using social engineering with methodologies that have been
scrutinized by the scientific research community and take into consideration the
ethical implications of the tests. The results we obtained from orchestration 32
penetration tests provide valuable first hand information on the advantages and
limitations of the proposed methodologies, as well as empirical information on
the effectiveness of the most commonly used security mechanisms in open orga-
nizations.
9.3 Future work
The results in this thesis open several possible research directions.
• The constructs used to describe the three security domains in Portunes are
carefully chosen with respect to their expressiveness and the complexity
they add in the automatic generation of the behaviors. One can envision
extending the Portunes framework with constructs such as negotiation be-
tween people, behavior templates (sequence of action templates that rep-
resent a generic behavior) or logging mechanisms, to increase the level of
detail at which behaviors can be presented.
• In this thesis we presented only one analysis of Portunes models: automatic
generation of behaviors. With small modifications, the Portunes framework
is suitable for other types of analysis:
Quantitative analysis. Using Portunes we can get a number of scenarios
that lead to the violation of a high-level policy. The number of scenarios can
be related to how well this policy is refined. For example, there is difference
whether 1000 behaviors violate the policy rather than only 2. However,
not all behaviors are equally likely. With addition of probabilities to the
model, by giving to each action the likelihood of occurrence, we can provide
quantitative analysis of Portunes models. Thus, the chance that someone
forgets to lock a door or would be susceptible to social engineering can be
encoded within the model and used for ranking the produced behaviors.
Logging. Portunes can describe only preventive security mechanisms,
such as firewalls, encryption, passwords and physical locks. By adding log-
ging constructs on the policies, the Portunes framework can be extended
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with detective security mechanisms, such as cameras, intrusion detection
sensors, guards, infrared sensors etc. The analysis can then be extended
to search for behaviors that are not detectable with the current positioning
of the detective security mechanisms, but still violate the high-level pol-
icy. Another usage of logging can be to provide a minimal set of low-level
policies that log the actions the guard, so no malicious behavior can occur
undetected.
• The penetration testing methodologies proposed in this thesis were used to
orchestrate 32 penetration tests. Throughout the execution of the tests we
identified two issues that we consider to require further research.
Perceived importance of the asset. During the penetration tests we no-
ticed that some of the employees might have guarded the provided laptops
much less than the laptops they work on. In other cases, the situation was
reversed. Because the employees were entrusted with a new laptop, they
seemed to guard these laptops much more than their own. It would be inter-
esting to see how the perceived importance of the asset affects the behavior
of the custodians. In an experiment, the custodians can be separated in two
groups. One of the groups can be informed that the laptop contains infor-
mation critical for the organization. Through another round of penetration
tests we could see the difference of behavior between the groups.
Safety as a requirement. The penetration tests are usually performed in
office buildings. However, when they need to be performed in potentially
hazardous environments, such as chemical, biological or nuclear laborato-
ries safety becomes an important requirement for the methodology. It is
interesting to investigate the aspect of safety of both the employees and the
testers and include it into the penetration testing methodologies.
• During the analysis of the effectiveness of security mechanisms we used the
logs from thefts from two universities and the results from the penetration
tests. A more general picture would be obtained if we complement these
results with logs from thefts from other institutions, as well as results of
penetration tests performed at different premises.
9.4 Application of the results to other research areas
The results of this thesis can assist in multiple areas of information security:
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Penetration testing. Until recently, the focus of penetration tests was finding vul-
nerabilities in computer networks. With the realization that the employees are the
weakest link in security, the number of penetration tests increases where social
engineering is used as a tool. The thesis provides a methodology the penetration
testers can use to execute penetration tests. The Portunes tool can assist in the
penetration test by providing the testers an automatically generated attack scenar-
ios.
Risk assessment. Risk assessment usually takes as input attack scenarios where
an asset or process is interrupted, stolen or exposed, and calculates the probability
of these scenarios happening and the impact on the organization if such scenario
occurs. The quality of the risk assessment depends directly on the quality and
quantity of the attack scenarios used in the analysis. The Portunes tool can help
presenting and generating these scenarios.
Security awareness training. Educating the future security professionals and the
employees is becoming a standardized process in universities and organizations.
The assignment provided in the thesis allows students to learn first-handedly the
weaknesses of the most commonly used security mechanisms. The Portunes tool
also provides step by step simulation of attack scenarios. These scenarios can be
used as part of educating employees during security awareness trainings.
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Appendix A
Comparison of related models
In this appendix we analyze in greater detail the Ambient Calculus, the model
of Scott and the model of Dragovic. We analyze the models using the device
tampering, coldboot attack and the road apple attack, which were presented in
the case study in Chapter 2. Using the attacks from the case study, we point and
discuss the shortcoming of the presented models.
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Ambient calculus 
 
For the semantics of the ambient calculus refer to the original paper [23]. The 
results below have been validated on the Basic Ambient Factory tool. Here we 
show why the ambient calculus can not present tampering with a device, and an 
approach to model the coldboot attack and the road apple attack.  
 
Tampering:  
 
1. Without any information about the tamper resistance of the device, we can 
present the data leaving the device as. 
 
device[data[out device]] 
 
2. We can present the increased tamper resistance by using N layers of nested 
ambients. 
 
device[pLayer1…[pLayerN[data[out pLayerN… out pLayer1.out device]]]…] 
 
The capability of the data leaving the device resides with the data, not with the 
device. Through this presentation, for every change on the stack of layers, the 
capability of the data needs to be changed dynamically. 
 
A simple example is:  
 
device[pLayer1[pLayer2 [data[out pLayer2.out pLayer1.out device]]]] 
 
If pLayer1 is removed from the device (the adversary circumvents one layer of 
defense or reduces the strength of the resistance of the device), the data ambient 
will never be able to get out of the device because out pLayer1 capability will never 
be executed. 
(NO) 
 
Coldboot attack: 
 
To present the attack, we model 2 laptops, the data of interest, the RAM which is 
being moved, and the destination hard drive. In steps (1) and (2), the ram moves 
from laptop1 to laptop2. In steps (3) and (4) the data moves from the ram to the 
hdd of laptop2. Every current action is presented in bold font. 
 
laptop1[ram[out laptop1. in laptop2. data[out ram.in hdd]]] | laptop2[hdd[]] 
ĺlaptop1[] | laptop2[hdd[]] | ram[in laptop2. data[out ram.in hdd]] 
ĺlaptop1[] | laptop2[ram[data[out ram.in hdd]] | hdd[]] 
ĺlaptop1[] | laptop2[ram[hdd[] | data[in hdd]]] 
ĺlaptop1[] | laptop2[ram[hdd[data[]]]] 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
 
(YES) 
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Road apple 1: 
 
adversary[in cafeteria.usb[out adversary. in employee. in laptop. rootkit[]] | out cafeteria] | 
employee[in cafeteria | laptop[open usb] | out cafeteria] | cafeteria[] 
 
Trace when the adversary succeeds in the attack: 
 
adversary[in cafeteria.usb[out adversary. in employee. in laptop. rootkit[]] | out cafeteria]  
| employee[in cafeteria | laptop[open usb] | out cafeteria] |cafeteria[] 
ĺ  employee[in cafeteria | laptop[open usb] | out cafeteria]  
      | cafeteria[adversary[usb[out adversary. in employee. in laptop. rootkit[]] | out cafeteria]] 
ĺ  employee[in cafeteria | laptop[open usb] | out cafeteria]    
      | cafeteria[adversary[out cafeteria] | usb[in employee. in laptop. rootkit[]]] 
ĺ  employee[in cafeteria | laptop[open usb] | out cafeteria]  
      | cafeteria[usb[in employee. in laptop. rootkit[]]] | adversary[] 
ĺ  cafeteria[employee[laptop[open usb] | out cafeteria] | usb[in employee. in laptop. rootkit[]]] | adversary[] 
ĺ  cafeteria[employee[usb[in laptop. rootkit[]] | laptop[open usb] | out cafeteria] ] | adversary[] 
ĺ  cafeteria[employee[ laptop[open usb | usb[rootkit[]]] | out cafeteria] ] | adversary[] 
ĺ  cafeteria[employee[ laptop[rootkit[]] | out cafeteria] ] | adversary[] 
ĺ  cafeteria[] | employee[ laptop[rootkit[]]] |adversary[] 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
 
Besides being able to present the coldboot attack, the calculus is able to present 
concurrent actions. In this scenario, there are two other trance which we just 
mention. The first branch generating new trace can occur in (2), where the 
adversary enters the cafeteria but does not leave the dongle (out cafeteria capability 
in adversary executes before out adversary in usb). The second branching can occur in 
(5), where the employee enters the cafeteria but does not pick up the dongle (out 
cafeteria capability in employee executes before in employee in usb).  
(YES) 
 
Road apple 2: 
 
In this scenario, the adversary sends a message to the employee to plug in the 
dongle. After approval, the dongle goes from the adversary to the laptop of the 
user and infects the laptop. 
 
One trace is: 
 (YES) 
 
 
 
adversary[m1[out adversary.in employee] |open m2.usb[out adversary. in employee.in laptop.rootkit[]]]  
|  employee[open m1.m2[out employee.in adversary] | laptop[open usb]] 
ĺ adversary[open m2.usb[out adversary. in employee.in laptop.rootkit[]]]  
     |  employee[open m1.m2[out employee.in adversary]| laptop[open usb]] | m1[in employee] 
ĺ adversary[open m2.usb[out adversary. in employee.in laptop.rootkit[]]]  
     | employee[m1[] | open m1.m2[out employee.in adversary] | laptop[open usb]] 
ĺ adversary[open m2.usb[out adversary. in employee.in laptop.rootkit[]]]  
     | employee[m2[out employee.in adversary] | laptop[open usb]] 
ĺ adversary[open m2.usb[out adversary. in employee.in laptop.rootkit[]]]  
     | employee[laptop[open usb]] | m2[in adversary] 
ĺ adversary[m2[] | open m2.usb[out adversary. in employee.in laptop.rootkit[]]]  
     | employee[laptop[open usb]] 
ĺ adversary[usb[out adversary. in employee.in laptop.rootkit[]]] 
     | employee[laptop[open usb]] 
ĺ adversary[] | employee[laptop[open usb]] | usb[in employee.in laptop.rootkit[]] 
ĺ adversary[] | employee[usb[in laptop.rootkit[]] | laptop[open usb]] 
ĺ adversary[] | employee[ laptop[open usb | usb[rootkit[]]]] 
ĺ adversary[] | employee[ laptop[rootkit[]]] 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
(6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
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Model of Scott 
 
The model of Scott is capable of presenting the coldboot attack and the road apple 
attack with indirect interaction between the adversary and the employee, but can 
not present device tampering and the road apple attack with direct interaction 
between the adversary and the employee. 
 
Tampering:  
 
Similarly to the ambient calculus, we can assume multiple layers of protection 
over the data. But, the defined command over data (emit/receive) uses 
“teleporting” approach and ignores the layers between the source path and 
destination path. Because of the teleporting, any obstacles placed between the data 
and the adversary can be ignored, and thus, no tamper resistance of a device can 
be presented. 
(NO) 
 
Coldboot attack: 
 
Initial: 
room[laptop1[RAM[key[0]]] | laptop2[0]] 
 
Transformations: 
]2[]1[
21
2;1
laptoplaptop
laptoplaptop
laptoproomroomlaptop
RAM
RAM
RAMRAM
KK  o
 o
 o o  
Result: 
room[laptop1[0] | laptop2[RAM[key[0]]]] 
 
The transformation above shows the RAM leaving laptop1 and going to laptop2, 
through the room entity.  
 
2;1 laptoproomroomlaptop RAMRAM oo  
 
This derivation can be read as: the RAM moves from the position of laptop1 to the 
position of laptop2. Here we point out the teleportation effect, where all entities in 
between which might restrict the movement (in this case room) are ignored in the 
formula.  
]2[]1[ laptoplaptop RAM KK o  
(YES) 
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Road apple 1: 
                                  
 
 
Initial: 
 
building[room1[adversary[dongle[donglecontext[rootkit[0]]]]] | cafeteria[0] | 
room2[employee[laptop[laptopcontext[appcontext[0]]]]]] 
 
Transformations: 
              
][][
;
][][
;
][]2[
2
;2
]1[][
1
1;
][][
][]1[
1
;1
)()(
appcontextextdonglecont
appcontextextdonglecont
appcontextextlaptopcontextlaptopcontextdonglecont
laptopcafeteria
laptopcafeteria
laptopbuildingbuildingcafeteria
cafeteriaroom
cafeteriaroom
cafeteriabuildingbuildingroom
roomcafeteria
roomcafeteria
roombuildingbuildingcafeteria
cafeteriaadversary
cafeteriaadversary
cafeteriaroom
cafeteriaroom
cafeteriabuildingbuildingroom
rootkit
rootkit
rootkitrecieverootkitemit
dongle
dongle
dongledongle
employee
employee
employeeemployee
adversary
adversary
adversaryadversary
adversary
dongle
adversary
adversary
adversaryadversary
KK
KK
KK
KK
KK
KK
 o
 o
 o o
 o
 o
 o o
 o
 o
 o o
 o
 o
 o o
 o
 o
 o
 o
 o o
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Result: 
 
building[room1[adversary[0]] | cafeteria[0] | 
room2[employee[laptop[dongle[donglecontext[0]] | 
laptopcontext[appcontext[rootkit[0]]]]]]] 
 
 (YES) 
 
Road apple 2: 
  
Although the model can present the physical/digital transitions, the model can not 
present the interaction employee-adversary. A similar approach as presented in the 
ambient calculus example will require generating new rules besides pick up/leave 
down. We show an approach that might be used to present the attack to a greater 
extent. First, we add context to people. Second, we use special agents which will 
present messages and reside in the context in people. The world for the road apple 
attack with direct interaction between the employee and the adversary would be: 
 
 
room[adversary[usb[usbcontext[rootkit[0]]] |humancontext1[message1agent[0]] | 
employee[laptop[laptopcontext[0]] | humancontext2[message2agent[0]]] 
 
Next, we need to add rules for exchanging messages between people, such as: 
 
]2[]1[
21
2;1
1
1
)1()1(
xthumancontecontexthuman
xthumancontexthumanconte
xthumanconteemployeeemployeexthumanconte
agentmessage
agentmessage
agentmessagerecieveagentmessageemit
KK  o
 o
 o o  
(NO) 
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Model of Dragovic 
 
Tampering: 
    leave(Data)       
 
The model of Dragovic, besides providing attributes that define the tamper 
resistance of a device, provides information for the sensitivity of the data inside 
the device, the level of exposure of this data, as well as additive protection of 
multiple types of containers. The additional information is not provided because it 
is out of the scope of the paper. For further information refer to [35,36]. 
(YES) 
 
Coldboot attack: 
 
Initial: 
tr = tamper resistance 
room:tr=0;[laptop1:tr=0.2;[RAM:tr=0.5;[key:tr=0[0]]] | laptop2:tr=0.2;[0]] 
 
Transformations: 
leave(Room/Laptop1/RAM) 
update(RAM, tamper resistance = 0.8) 
enter(RAM, Room/Laptop2) 
update(RAM, tamper resistance = 0.2) 
Result: 
room:tr=0;[laptop1:tr=0.2; | laptop2:tr=0.2;[RAM:tr=0.5;[key:tr=0;[0]]]] 
 
Besides providing information about the movement of the RAM with the data, the 
model provides information for the degradation of the data inside the RAM when 
the RAM is removed from the laptop. 
(YES) 
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Road apple 1: 
 
Initial: 
For brevity, we assume the containers to have no attributes. 
building [room1[adversary[dongle [rootkit[0]]]] | cafeteria[0] | 
room2[employee[laptop[0]]]] 
 
Transformations: 
migrate (building/room1/adversary, building/cafeteria) 
migrate (building/cafeteria/adversary/dongle, building/cafeteria) 
migrate (building/cafeteria/adversary, building/room1) 
migrate (building/room2/employee, building/cafeteria) 
migrate (building/cafeteria/dongle, building/cafeteria/employee/laptop) 
migrate (building/cafeteria/employee/laptop/dongle/rootkit, 
building/cafeteria/employee/laptop) 
 
Result: 
building[room1[adversary[0]] | cafeteria[0] | room2[employee[laptop[dongle 
[rootkit[0]]]]] 
(YES) 
 
Road apple 2: 
 
Initial: 
room[adversary[dongle[rootkit[0]]] | employee[laptop[0]]] 
 
Transformations: 
migrate (Room/Adversary/Dongle, Room/Employee/Laptop) 
migrate (Room/Employee/Laptop/Dongle/Rootkit, Room/Employee/Laptop) 
 
Result: 
room[adversary[0] | employee[laptop[dongle[0] |rootkit[0]]]] 
 
This model also does not present interaction between people. A workaround will 
be similar as in modeling the road apple example with Scott’s model.  
(NO) 
Appendix B
Rules of engagement
Rules of engagement
I, (name of student) agree to perform penetration tests for
(name of researcher)
I understand that the participation of is completely voluntary. At any time, I can
stop my participation.
I fully oblige to the following rules of engagement:
1. I will only execute attacks that are pre-approved by the researcher and only
to an assigned target.
2. I am not allowed to cause any physical damage to university property, except
for Kensington locks.
3. I am not allowed to physically harm any person as part of the test.
4. I will video or audio record all my activities while interacting with people
during the penetration test as a proof that no excessive stress or panic is
caused to anyone.
5. If I am caught by a guard of a police officer, I will not show any physical
resistance.
Signature of researcher: Date:
Signature of student: Date:
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Appendix C
Informed consent
Informed consent
I, (name of employee) agree to participate in the study performed
by (name of the research group).
I understand that the participation of the study is completely voluntary. At any
time, I can stop my participation and obtain the data gathered from the study, have
it removed from the database or have it destroyed.
The following points have been explained to me:
1. The goal of this study is to gather information of laptop usage. Participation
in this study will yield more information concerning the habits people have
in using mobile devices.
2. I shall be asked to work for 5 min every day on a laptop for one month.
The laptop can be monitored and/or recorded using a keylogger and a web-
camera. At the end of the study, the researcher will explain the purpose of
the study.
3. No stress or discomfort should result from participation in this study.
4. The data obtains from this study will be processed anonymously and can
therefore not be made public in an individually identifiable manner.
5. The researcher will answer all further questions on this study, now or during
the cause of the study.
Signature of researcher: Date:
Signature of employee: Date:
187
Appendix D
Sample report of a laptop theft
Report 2009/0670, 6-07-2009, 1/1
Date of the incident: Wednesday, 01 July 2009
Time of the incident: 14:00h
Place: 4th floor, main building
Person reporting: Alice
Description:
On the above date, Mr.”Bob” came to the security post and informed
me that his laptop and the laptop of his colleague were stolen from room
Yellow. Mr.”Bob” informed me that at 13:45 they both left the room Yellow
without anyone inside. After returning to the room at 14:00, both laptops
were gone. Both laptops were locked to a table with a Kensington lock.
The locks were cut. RoomYellow is accessible only by using an access pass.
Actions taken:
I called to the Facility management and asked if someone used an
access pass to enter the room Yellow between 13:45 and 14:00. I was
informed that only the pass of Mr.”Dave” was used. However, the pass of
Mr.”Dave” was not used for entering or leaving the building, and we cannot
reach him. We searched the camera images from this period, but we could
not find any useful information.
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Appendix E
Get out of jail card
Get out of jail card
The student is performing a penetration test in the period between
xxth and xxth of September. The test is approved by xxxxxxx (researcher name)
and the security management of xxxxxxx. In case of being caught while executing
the penetration test, please contact xxxxxxx (researcher) tel: xxxxxxx or xxxxxxx
(security manager) tel: xxxxxxx at any time of the day.
Signature of researcher:
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Appendix F
Note left from the testers
Dear Sir/Madam
Your laptop is taken by a team of physical penetration testers. The laptop is not
stolen nor damaged in any way.
These penetration tests are a joint effort between the security management of Uni-
versity of Twente and the Distributed and Embedded Security Group (DIES). The
goal of the tests is to examine the effectiveness of the physical security in the cam-
pus of the University. The tests will help us reduce the number of the increasing
thefts of laptops, computer equipment and lab equipment in the campus.
All the data stored in the laptop will be treated as confidential and will be avail-
able to you upon request. After the all tests are finished, we will invite you for a
debriefing session where we will describe you the methodology we used and the
results we obtained. The same results (anonymized) will be used as case studies in
the training of the security personnel in the University. If you have any questions,
please contact us by mail or by phone at any time.
DIES Group:
Dimkov Trajce Wolter Pieters Pieter Hartel
t.dimkov@utwente.nl w.pieters@utwente.nl p.hartel@utwente.nl
Zilverling 3006 Zilverling 3023 Zilverling 3001
Tel: xxxxxxxxxxx Tel: xxxxxxxxxxx Tel: xxxxxxxxxxx
Security management:
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
xxxx@fb.utwente.nl
Tel: xxxxxxxxxx
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Appendix G
Successful and unsuccessful
attempts during the penetration
tests
In this appendix we present a summary of all penetration tests performed by the
students, both the successful and unsuccessful.
Table G.1 shows the actions that contributed to the successful penetration tests,
ordered according to the frequency they were used in the successful attempts. For
example, there were 27 successful attempts, where the testers entered the building
during working hours, when the outside doors are open to the public. Thus, from
the frequency of the actions, the easiest way for the tester to obtain the laptop is
to go into the building during working hours, while the custodian is in his office,
and provide a reason why she needs to unlock the laptop and give it to the tester.
Similarly, in Table G.2 we summarize the mechanisms that contributed to the
failed attempts. For example, because of the presence of the employees, the testers
were 7 times not able to enter the office, while they were not able to steal the laptop
3 times because of the Kensington lock. Some of the reasons why the attempts
Enter building Enter office Unlock laptop Leave
working hours (27) someone inside (20) custodian unlocks (19) working hours (26)
obtained a card (2) key from employee (5) bolt cutter (5) using access card (3)
asked an employee (1) room was unlocked (4) laptop was unlocked (3) emergency door (1)
during social event (1) cleaning lady (1) detach from desk (2) during social event (1)
secretary opens (1) found key in office (1)
took the desk with the
laptop (1)
Table G.1: Actions used in successful attempts
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Enter building Enter office Unlock laptop Leave
locked door (1) employee (7) custodian (6)
custodian (2) Kensington lock (2)
secretary (2) employee (3)
door lock (2) lab officer (2)
guards (1) laptop not found (3)
Table G.2: Reasons why attempts failed
failed were purely coincidental and if repeated could have most likely succeeded.
For example, on few occasions, the custodians despite the rules took the laptop
home. Thus when the testers approached them, although they were willing to hand
over the laptop, they did not have it in the office. Similarly, on some occasions
the mere presence of employees in the office was sufficient to abort the attack,
because it was not matching the scenario the testers were allowed to execute.
There were 31 successful and 31 unsuccessful attempts in total. We distinguished
six elements from each attempt: (1) how the testers entered the building, (2) how
did the testers entered the office where the laptop resides, (3) how the testers cir-
cumvented the Kensington lock, (4) the role the testers took as a disguise and (5) a
qualitative analysis on how high the security awareness of the affected employees
was.
During some attempts, the testers had to circumvent the CCTV surveillance or
record the attempt. In those attempts, we also include this information. During the
unsuccessful attempts, we include the successful actions until the attempt failed,
and the reason why the attempt failed (in bold font).
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
TEAM IRA Cornelissen Donker
Enterbuilding workinghours workinghours workinghours
Enteroffice custodianinside custodianinside custodianinside
Unlocklaptop custodianunlocks custodianunlocks custodianunlocks
Leave workinghours workinghours workinghours
Recording hiddencamera
Roleofpentester coordinatorassistant gameplayers/students ICTDesk
CCTV scoutingandhiding hoods scoutingandhiding
Resistance MEDIUM.Thecustodiantried
tocallthecoordinatorbut
failed.
HIGH.Testersfakedanemail
grantingthempermissionon
thelaptop.Thetesters
promisedtoreturnthe
laptopinafewhours.
HIGH:Thecustodianaskedto
talktothecoordinatorfor
permission.Aftertalkingtoa
fakecoordinatorthrougha
testerphone,thecustodian
acceptedtogivethelaptop.
TEAM BytePhilosophy Laverman Veen
Enterbuilding workinghours workinghours workinghours
Enteroffice secretary custodianinside custodianinside
Unlocklaptop custodianunlocks custodianunlocks custodianunlocks
Leave workinghours workinghours workinghours
Recording  camera
Roleofpentester coordinatorassistants coordinatorassistants ICTDesk
CCTV scoutingandhiding scoutingandhiding Hoods
Resistance LOW.Atestersentafake
email.Thecustodianpacks
thelaptopandleavesitinthe
office.Thesecretary
unlockedthedoor,andgave
thelaptoptothetester.
LOW.Thecustodiandidnot
getsuspiciousandhandedin
thelaptop.
LOW:Thecustodiangavethe
laptopeasilyafterbeingtold
bythetestershewillgetthe
laptopbackinafewhours.
TEAM Nicked X Damhuis
Enterbuilding workinghours socialengineeredacard waitsafterworkinghours
Enteroffice custodianinside cleaning lady keyfromjanitor
Unlocklaptop custodianunlocks boltcutter boltcutter
Leave workinghours usingthesamecard throughemergencydoor
Recording opencamera webͲcamera
Roleofpentester coordinatorassistant PhDresearcher students
CCTV usednewspapers scoutingandhiding scoutandhide
Resistance LOW.Thecustodianbelieved
inthefakeemailandhanded
inthelaptop.
LOW:Theemployeeeasily
gavethenightcardtothe
tester.Thecleaninglady
easilybelievedthetesterisa
PhDresearcherandlethim
insidetheoffice.
LOW:Thejanitorgavethe
testersakeyfromtheroom
afterworkinghours.


  

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
TEAM Clerro Flickr Team8
Enterbuilding workinghours workinghours workinghours
Enteroffice employeedidnotlock custodianinside custodianinside
Unlocklaptop boltcutter custodianunlocks custodianunlocks
Leave workinghours workinghours workinghours
Recording camera camera camera
Roleofpentester ICTDesk ICTDesk ICTDesk
Resistance






MEDIUM:Theemployeewas
convincedtoturninthe
laptop,butcouldnotfindthe
keyfromtheKensington
lock.Whilehelefttheroom
tosearchforthekeywith
oneofthetesters,twoother
testersenteredtheroomand
cuttheKensingtonlock.
LOW:Thesecretary
introducedthetestertothe
custodian,thusthecustodian
didnotdoubtanything.
Secretarydidnotaskforany
identification,norchecked
thefakephonenumberand
email.
HIGH:Theemployee
contactedthehelpdesk.
Althoughtheyinformedhim
theyarenotawareofvirus
spread,thecustodianstill
gavethelaptoptothe
testers.Thecustodian
requireddocumentsignedby
thetestersthattheytakethe
laptop.


TEAM He Hafidz TeamX A
Enterbuilding duringsocialevent
whendoorsareopen
workinghours workinghours workinghours
Enteroffice custodianinside custodianinside roomwasunlocked keyfromjanitor
Unlocklaptop custodianunlocks custodianunlocks laptopwasunlocked laptopnotlocked
Leave samedoor workinghours workinghours workinghours
Recording   camera webcamera
Roleofpentester students coordinator
assistants
deliveryman student
CCTV didnothide scoutandhide scoutandhide
Resistance VERYHIGH:The
custodiangota(fake)
identification,but
askedthemtosigna
documenttheywill
returnthelaptop.
LOW:Aftergetting
thefakeemail,the
custodianhandedin
thelaptop.
LOW:Thetesters
phonedtheonly
presentemployeein
theoffice,stating
thatthereisa
packageforhim.The
employeeleftthe
roomunlocked.The
laptopwasalso
unlocked.
MEDIUM:Thejanitor
openedthedoorfor
thetestersafter
beingshownafake
mail.However,he
escortedthemduring
thetheft.
TEAM Awesome 093 Pasta
Enterbuilding workinghours workinghours nightpassfromemployee
Enteroffice keyfromjanitor keyfromjanitor usemasterkey
Unlocklaptop laptopnotlocked foundkeyinthedesk notlockedproperly
Leave workinghours workinghours nightpassfromemployee
Recording webcamera webcamera camera
Roleofpentester student student studentspreparingaparty
CCTV scoutandhide scoutandhide
Resistance MEDIUM:Thejanitoropened
thedoorforthestudents
afterbeingshownafake
mail.However,heescorted
themduringthetheft.
MEDIUM:Thejanitoropened
thedoorforthestudents
afterbeingshownafake
mail.Hedidnotescortthem
totheroom.
LOW:Thesecurity
officer/janitorgavethe
studentsthemasterkeyof
thebuilding.


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
TEAM MCNTeam Outcasts Clerro
Enterbuilding workinghours workinghours workinghours
Enteroffice employeeinside custodianinside custodianleftunlocked
Unlocklaptop detachfromdesk custodianunlocks boltcutter
Leave workinghours workinghours workinghours
Recording camera camera Camera
Roleofpentester ICTDesk ICTDesk /
Resistance LOW:Anemployeegavethe
laptopwithoutcheckingthe
identityofthetesters.
LOW:Thecustodiangavethe
laptopwithoutanyrequest
foridentification.
N/A:Therewasnosocial
engineeringusedinthis
scenario.
TEAM Team8 TeamX BigBrothers
Enterbuilding workinghours workinghours workinghours
Enteroffice custodianinside custodianinside custodianinside
Unlocklaptop custodianunlocks custodianunlocks custodianunlocks
Leave workinghours workinghours workinghours
Recording audio audio camera
Roleofpentester ICTDesk ICTDesk ICTDesk
Resistance MEDIUM:thecustodian
askedforcredentials,but
wasnotinsisting.
LOW:thecustodiandidnot
challengetheemployees.
Theypresentedhimonly
withareportstatingthereis
avirusinthelaptop.
LOW:Theteamsentanemail
claimingthelaptophasa
virus.Thecustodiangavethe
laptopwithoutaskingany
question.
TEAM Pasta Flickr TheInsiders
Enterbuilding nightpassfromemployee workinghours workinghours
Enteroffice roomwasunlocked custodianinside custodianinside
Unlocklaptop takethedeskwiththelaptop custodianunlocks custodianunlocks
Leave useanightpass workinghours workinghours
Recording camera camera camera
Roleofpentester Student ICTDesk ICTDesk
Resistance N/A:Therewassocial
engineeringusedonlytoget
thenightpass.Thetesters
usedthenightpasstogetto
thelaboratory.Theytookthe
wholedesk,andbroughtit
with5otherstudentsin
Zilverling.Theyhadalso
accesstothisbuilding.
LOW:Thesecretary
introducedthetestertothe
custodian,thusthecustodian
didnotdoubtanything.
Secretarydidnotaskforany
identification,norchecked
thefakephonenumberand
email.
HIGH:Thecustodianwanted
areceipt.Thelaptopwas
keptinalockedclosed,
lockedwithaKensington
lock.Thus,shewastheonly
personintheofficethat
couldaccessit.
TEAM MCNTeam BigBrothers TheInsiders
Enterbuilding workinghours workinghours workinghours
Enteroffice custodianinside custodianinside custodianinside
Unlocklaptop custodianunlocks custodianunlocks boltcutter
Leave workinghours workinghours workinghours
Recording camera Camera camera
Roleofpentester ICTDesk ICTDesk ICTDesk
Resistance LOW:Thecustodiandidnot
askanyquestions.
LOW:Theteamsentanemail
claimingthegraphicchipset
isfaulty.Theycame20min
latertopickupthelaptop.
Thecustodiandidnotask
anyquestions.
LOW:Thetestermanagedto
cuttheKensingtonlockwhile
therewasanotherpersonin
theoffice.Thetesterwasnot
challengedonwhatheis
doing.

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TEAM Cornelissenfailed Xfailed Xfailed
Enterbuilding workinghours workinghours workinghours
Enteroffice custodianinside custodianinside spottedguardsandaborted
Unlocklaptop custodianforgetskey custodiandeclines 
Leave workinghours workinghours
Recording 
Roleofpentester gameplayers ICTDesk 
Resistance LOW.However,sentemailto
coordinatoraskingaboutthe
game.Coordinatorsayshe
hasneverheardofit
MEDIUM:thecustodianasks
foranemailtoconfirmthat
thelaptopneedstobe
replaced.
TEAM Xfailed Veenfailed Veenfailed
Enterbuilding workinghours workinghours workinghours
Enteroffice employeeinside employeeinside custodianinside
Unlocklaptop employeedeclines employeeagrees,butno
laptop
custodiandidnothavethe
laptop
Leave 
Recording  camera camera
Roleofpentester masterstudent ICTDesk ICTDesk
Resistance MEDIUM:theemployee
opensthedoorforthe
tester,butisreluctantto
searchforkeyforthe
Kensingtonlock,andinstead
asksthetestertotalktothe
custodian
LOW:theemployeeiswilling
togivethelaptopofthe
custodian.Thecustodian
breakstheagreement,and
takesthelaptopwithhim
whenheleavestheoffice.
LOW:thecustodianiswilling
togivethelaptop,butleaves
ittohisgirlfriendinBelgium.
TEAM Damhuisfailed Damhuisfailed Damhuisfailed
Enterbuilding workinghours workinghours workinghours
Enteroffice keyfromjanitor secretaryrejected employeeinside
Unlocklaptop employeeenterswhile
stealingthelaptop
Leave 
Roleofpentester students students PhDresearcher
Resistance LOW:thejanitorhandedin
thekeywithoutproblem.
Whentheemployeeenters
theofficeandspotsthe
tester,itdidnotchallenge
him.
HIGH:insteadofgivingthe
key,thesecretaryaskedthe
custodiantocometowork
andtalktothestudents
TEAM Afailed Afailed 093failed
Enterbuilding workinghours workinghours workinghours
Enteroffice locked custodianinside secretary
Unlocklaptop 
Leave 
Roleofpentester student student student
Resistance LOW:Anemployeegotakey
fromthesecretarytohelp
thetester,butforsome
reasonthekeydidnotwork.
HIGH:Thecustodiangot
suspiciousanddidnotallow
anytheftinhispresence.
HIGH:Thesecretaryasked
themtotalktosecurityfor
gettingthekey.

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TEAM Clerrofailed Flickrfailed TheInsidersfailed
Enterbuilding workinghours workinghours workinghours
Enteroffice custodianinside toomanyemployeesinside
theroom
custodianinside
Unlocklaptop  custodianrejects
Leave 
Roleofpentester deliveryperson ICTDesk
Resistance N/A:Thetesterscalledthe
custodiantryingtotellher
thatthereisadelivery
waitingdownstairs.The
custodiandidnotpickupthe
phone.
N/A:Afterseeingthatthere
aremanypeopleinthe
office,thetestersleftthe
area.
HIGH:thecustodianrejected
tounlockthelaptoporgiveit
tothetester.Thecustodian
insistedthelaptopshouldbe
fixedonthespot.
TEAM MCNTeamfailed MCNTeamfailed Outcastsfailed
Enterbuilding workinghours cannotenterthebuilding workinghours
Enteroffice leftroomunlocked employeeinside
Unlocklaptop tooshorttimetocutthe
lock
laptopnotpresent
Leave 
Roleofpentester  ICTDesk
Resistance N/A:Theroomwasleft
emptyonlyforashorttime.
Thetestersdidnothave
enoughtimetocutthe
Kensingtonlock.
N/A:Thetesterstriedto
enterthebuildingafter
workinghoursandsocial
engineerthecleaninglady.
Thecleaningladiesare
presentonlyinthemorning.
LOW:Theemployeewas
willingtogivethelaptopof
thecustodian,buttheycould
notfindit.
TEAM Outcastsfailed Pastafailed Pastafailed
Enterbuilding workinghours workinghours workinghours
Enteroffice custodianinsider custodianinside toomanypeopleinside
Unlocklaptop laptopnotpresent stoppedbylabofficer 
Leave   
Roleofpentester ICTDesk Students students
Resistance LOW:Thecustodianwas
willingtogivethelaptop,but
shetookithomeandthe
laptopwasnotatwork.
HIGH:Theemployeesinthe
labweresuspiciousonthe
testers.Themanresponsible
forthesecurityinthelab
stoppedthetestersand
askedthemtoleavethelab.
N/A:Theroomwasoccupied
withmanypeople,makingit
impossibleforthetestersto
stealthelaptop.
TEAM Pastafailed Pastafailed Pastafailed
Enterbuilding workinghours withapass workinghours
Enteroffice toomanypeopleinside unlockedoffice couldnotseelaptopfrom
window
Unlocklaptop  couldnotfindlaptop 
Leave 
Roleofpentester students Students students
Resistance N/A:Theroomwasoccupied
withmanypeople,makingit
impossibleforthetestersto
stealthelaptop.
N/A:Theroomwasempty,
butthetesterscouldnot
locatethelaptop.
N/A:Thetesterscouldnot
locatethelaptop.

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

TEAM Pastafailed Pastafailed Pastafailed
Enterbuilding workinghours workinghours workinghours
Enteroffice unlockedoffice toomanypeople custodianinside
Unlocklaptop couldnotfindlaptop stoppedbylabofficer
Leave   
Roleofpentester students Students students
Resistance N/A:Thetesterscouldnot
locatethelaptop.
N/A:Theroomwasoccupied
withmanypeople,makingit
impossibleforthetestersto
stealthelaptop.
HIGH:Theemployeesinthe
labweresuspicions.The
personresponsibleforthe
securityinthelabstopped
thetestersandaskedthem
toleavethelab.Thistimehe
askedthemtospeakwiththe
custodian.
TEAM Outcastsfailed TeamX failed MCNTeamfailed
Enterbuilding workinghours workinghours workinghours
Enteroffice employeeletsthemin employeelocksdoorbehind toomanyemployeesinside
theroom
Unlocklaptop cannotfindthekey 
Leave 
Roleofpentester ICTDesk deliveryperson

Resistance HIGH:Afterthefailed
attempt,thecustodian
contactedthecoordinator.
Thetestersdidnottryany
otherattempt.
HIGH:Thetesterscalledthe
employeeandtoldhimthere
isapackageforhiminthe
reception.Whenthe
employeeleft,helockedthe
doorbehind.
N/A:Afterseeingthatthere
aremanypeopleinthe
office,thetestersleftthe
area.
TEAM Flickrfailed 
Enterbuilding workinghours
Enteroffice secretarylethimin
Unlocklaptop laptopwasunlockedbutno
positiveID
Leave 
Roleofpentester ICTDesk
Resistance MEDIUM:Thesecretarylet
thetestersintheofficeand
letthemrunsoftwarefroma
USBdrive.Shealsoleftthem
forafewminutes.However,
thetestercouldnotgeta
positiveidentification
whetherthelaptopisthe
targetanddidnotstealthe
laptop.

Appendix H
Variables used in the quantitative
analysis
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Chapter H. Variables used in the quantitative analysis
N Variable Description Encoding
Yes No
1 SocialEng An individual was social engineered 1 0
2 PhysicalTheft A physical theft took place 1 0
3 WorkingHours The students entered the building during working hours 1 0
4 SocialEngCard The students entered the building using an access card 1 0
5 AskEmployee The students entered the building by asking an employee 1 0
6 DuringSocialEvent The students entered the building during a social event 1 0
7 SomeoneInside The students entered the office while someone was inside 1 0
8 KeyFromEmployee The students entered the office with a key from an em-
ployee
1 0
9 UnlockedRoom The students entered an unlocked office 1 0
10 CleaningLady The students entered the office with help of a cleaning
lady
1 0
11 Secretary The students entered the office with the help of a secretary 1 0
12 CustodianUnlocks The custodian unlocks the Kensington lock 1 0
13 BoltCutter The students circumvent the lock using a bolt cutter 1 0
14 NotLockedKL The laptop was not locked with a Kensington lock 1 0
15 DetachFromDesk The Kensington lock was detached from the desk 1 0
16 FindKeyInDesk The students found the key from the Kensington lock 1 0
17 TakeDesk The students circumvented the Kensington lock by taking
the desk where the laptops is lock
1 0
18 WorkingHoursL The students left the building during working hours 1 0
19 UsingAccessCardL The students left the building using an access card 1 0
20 DuringSocialEventL The students left the building during a social event 1 0
21 EmergencyDoor The students left the building through the emergency exit 1 0
22 ICTEmployee The students took the role of an ICT employee 1 0
23 Student The students took the role as students 1 0
24 CoordinatorAss The students took the role as coordinator assistants 1 0
25 PhDStudent The students took the role as PhD Students 1 0
26 DeliveryPerson The students took the role as delivery person 1 0
27 Custodian The students approached the custodian 1 0
28 Employee The students approached an employee 1 0
29 Janitor The students approached the janitor 1 0
30 CleaningLadyApp The students approached the cleaning lady 1 0
Figure H.1: Independent variables
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